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This dissertation looks at nineteenth-century British writers who developed 
aesthetic strategies for making use of the patterns of addiction. A number of other studies 
on addiction in the nineteenth century have detailed how the medicalization of addiction 
emerged through efforts at social control; this study, meanwhile, looks at the literary 
discoveries made by writers who considered that medical problem. Specifically, this 
dissertation considers how writers built texts around addicted characters whose condition 
drives them always to search for something more even while they live repetitiously, 
resulting in addiction-like narratives, or repetitive texts of endless pursuit. Such literary, 
aesthetic strategies of addiction, this dissertation argues, emphasize narratives structured 
around affectively charged, exploratory repetition. 
My first chapter is an introduction of the overall argument. The second chapter 
deals with Percy Shelley’s poetics of world-shaping habit, which he derived as a 
corrective response to the frightening power he saw in intemperance, and which he 
described as a healthier version of intemperance. Chapter three concerns itself with 
Thomas De Quincey’s aesthetic of exploratory repetitions, as evoked by the narrative of 
his own drug use. The fourth chapter closely reads Christina Rossetti’s and Alfred 
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Tennyson’s conflicted, “double” poems about addicts who see strangeness in their 
material surroundings. The fifth chapter examines George Eliot’s and Charles Dickens’s 
serial novels about addicted or addict-like investigators, and the final chapter argues that 
optative movement among indolent yet scientifically curious habitual drinkers shapes 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Each chapter after the introduction 
concentrates on particular formal innovations, or innovative uses of a pre-existing form, 
that operate as part of a text’s generally addiction-like strategy for outlining possibility 
through repetitive familiarity. 
The theoretical framework for this project draws from a tradition of criticism that 
focuses on literary orientation toward possibility and possible worlds. Possible-worlds 
theorists and critics have described how specific attitudes toward possibility shape texts; 
addiction, I argue, intensifies a sense of unattained possibility that must be endlessly 
sought, and so addiction-like narratives consequently involve narrative worlds of 
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INTRODUCTION: ADDICTIVE POSSIBILITIES 
 
This is the story behind the good sort of addiction. That “good sort” is not, I must 
be clear, the medical condition of substance dependence, which is disastrously harmful 
and potentially life-threatening. Instead, by “good sort of addiction,” I refer to the sense 
of addiction we find throughout pop-culture criticism. We see it in descriptions of 
videogames, in articles on music, and in television reviews like Kirsten Acuna’s piece on 
Breaking Bad, where she uses the language of drug use to celebrate a television show 
(which is, in this case, a show about a methamphetamine-dealer named Walt). “If you’re 
binge-watching,” Acuna writes, “‘Breaking Bad’ becomes as addictive as the blue meth 
Walt’s buyers can’t go without.”  
Acuna is quite specific about the nature of Breaking Bad’s good sort of 
addictiveness. She argues that the show’s habit-forming property comes from its strategy 
to promise new information in each chapter: “The final 12–15 minutes of nearly every 
episode,” she writes, “usually has a huge plot turn.” For Acuna, addiction doesn’t mean 
only a life-destroying habit. The word has a positive sense, too, denoting a sober desire 
for encounters with more and more and more, an exploratory consideration of something 
new and different, an orientation toward constantly promised narrative possibility. Such 
an addiction—not substance dependence itself, once again, but rather an aesthetic 
experience like that dependence due to similarly pursued repetitions—combines the 
propulsion of desire with learning. This is what I will call the aesthetic of addiction, a 
category of aesthetic experience in which compelling possibility is suggested most 
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intensely and repetitively. “Intense, repetitive pursuit of the possible,” granted, is a phrase 
that covers far more than addiction, but I will discuss this aesthetic experience in relation 
to addiction because 1) “addiction” remains a popular term for this phenomenon and 2) 
aesthetic orientation toward intensely, repetitively sensed possibility emerged quite 
emphatically, I will show, in literature that dealt with substance dependence. 
There are, too, a number of parallels between actual substance dependence and 
the aesthetic category I term “addictive” or “addiction-like.” As described by the fourth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Medical Disorders, the physiological 
condition of substance dependence compels ongoing pursuit of more and more through “a 
pattern of repeated self-administration” (176). In other words, both the aesthetic category 
of addiction and literal addiction involve repetitive pursuit of that which can never be 
satisfyingly, ultimately attained—a pursuit of that which always remains elusive and 
suggestive of further possibility. Yet there remain obvious differences between the two 
senses of addiction, between the health problem and the aesthetic category, and before 
going further I want to clarify those differences. Medically understood addiction, or 
substance dependence, often torments those who suffer from it, overrides their will, and 
drives them to consume a substance “despite knowledge of having a persistent or 
recurrent physical or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or 
exacerbated by the substance” (DSM-IV 181). Meanwhile, the aesthetic version of 
addiction that Acuna and countless others describe (the sort of addiction with which my 
study chiefly deals) requires no substance-consumption while it encourages exploratory 
and conscious attention to difference, strangeness, and novelty. The addictive allure of 
Breaking Bad, in Acuna’s view, depends on curiosity about “huge plot turns,” on an 
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investigatory attitude toward always-developing and always-promised changes. Rather 
than serving as a mindless compulsion toward sameness, routine merges with its opposite 
for the figuratively addicted audience’s contemplation. Breaking Bad’s merely addiction-
like form—its episodically plot-driven tantalization—establishes the rhythms of that 
routine engagement with the non-routine, structuring the aesthetic experience by which 
an audience enjoys exploration of strangeness through habit.1  
 In what follows, I examine how patterns of the perilous condition of addiction 
informed this exploratory aesthetic. I specifically look at Britain in the nineteenth century, 
when addiction became an established medical condition that, from its inception, bore the 
weight of an array of meanings beyond simply those of a health hazard. Addiction in 
Britain only became widely medically recognized once intensely potent habits had 
become central for so many different aspects, bad and good, of British life. Heightened 
consumerism and a corresponding rise in global commerce during the nineteenth century, 
for instance, were increasingly dependent upon addictive substances such as rum, tobacco, 
and opium.2 Enlightenment thinkers including Hume, Burke, and others had also in the 
eighteenth century advocated custom and habit as the mechanisms for society’s stability 
at a time when social habits frequently occurred in coffee-houses and taverns. And as the 
nineteenth century progressed, the scientific method, by which habitually repetitive 
experiment drives ceaselessly toward some experiential knowledge yet to be had, gained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I do not, either, want to rule out the possibility that some forms of media and narrative deemed addictive 
may be experienced through compulsions fed by the same brain-chemistry as actual drug addiction. But my 
focus is on the aesthetic category and strategies of addiction rather than on defining the entire range of 
affective responses to addiction-like narratives, responses that are highly variable from person to person 
and in most if not all cases demonstrably not the same as the experience of morphine addiction, for instance.	  
2 Mark Kishlansky in A Monarchy Transformed: Britain 1603–1714 notes that in the seventeenth century, 
Britain was already met with “an amazing assortment of new products, such as tobacco, sugar, rum, gin, 
port, champagne, peppermint and Cheddar cheese. Tea, coffee and chocolate produced a revolution not 
only in habits of consumption but also in diet” (2). Most of those items are either literally, chemically 
addictive or colloquially described as such.  
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increased cultural significance as the figure of the professional scientist was born. Key 
figures in the age’s science, moreover, self-experimented with drugs and eventually 
developed addictions themselves, making their intensely repetitive investigation of 
worldly possibility seem all the more evidently addiction-like. Writers covered by the 
present study thus had an expanse of meaning to draw from when they represented 
addiction, and that sheer sense of variety accompanied their dramatizations of addictive 
consumption. In short, the writers in the following chapters typically saw literal addiction 
as a true hazard, but they also evoked a corresponding, addiction-like, repetitive pursuit 
that intimated great variety and possibility. 
There were a number of good reasons for nineteenth-century writers to pattern 
texts after addictive pursuit of possibility. As a sales strategy, peddling addiction-like 
enjoyment is demonstrably savvy, and repetitively consumed serial fictions were 
certainly designed and produced to meet regular consumer desires.3 But this study’s point 
is not simply that addiction-like literary techniques were devised to hold an audience’s 
interest, maintain consumerist desire, or control those consumerist cravings. Those uses 
of addiction-like techniques have been effectively illuminated by others (especially Susan 
Zieger and Clifford Siskin in their work on addiction discourse’s role as a mechanism for 
social control). Again, this study will instead concern how reliance on addiction-like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Generally, too, the same forces scholars have cited as responsible for the English novel’s form (and its 
success with readers) can all be found within addiction discourse; those forces include response to a rise in 
individualist consumerism, engagement with individual desires through prevalent ideologies of control, and 
acceptance of medical science that sought to express and categorize existence in authoritatively diagnostic 
language. Colin Campbell locates consumerism at the heart of Romanticism in The Romantic Ethic and the 
Spirit of Modern Consumerism; Ian Watt has noted that same consumerist, bourgeois ethic at the core of 
the English novel as it developed through Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding in The Rise of the Novel: Studies 
in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding; in Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel, 
Nancy Armstrong finds in domestic novels the rise of a disciplined sense of individual selfhood, 
particularly in terms of gender roles; Lawrence Rothfield in Vital Signs: Medical Realism in Nineteenth-
Century Fiction relates the rise of realist novels that critique social ills to the contemporaneous rise of 
medical science and medical approaches to social problems. 
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aesthetic strategies intensified literary orientation toward possibility by sustaining 
narratives of emphatically reiterative exploration. Those strategies were many, but at the 
early period of the aesthetic tradition on which I focus, they tended to involve 
representation of addicted or addict-like characters inclined to hunger intensely and 
repetitively after mystery.  
As mentioned, historically specific attitudes toward habitual behavior made 
different metaphorical senses of substance dependence all the more available to 
nineteenth-century writers. As science was professionalizing, it turned more regimented 
and habitual in the nineteenth century—the very word “scientist” was developed in the 
1830s, and later representative Victorian scientists such as Thomas Huxley reckoned with 
a sense of scientific practice “as a useful profession” (White 31).4 Yet nineteenth-century 
science proved also exploratory and imaginative as hypothesis-driven, inductive work 
gained prominence. Jonathan Smith has described how nineteenth-century science came 
to describe facts as necessarily grasped through theory (22). That emphasis on 
imaginative hypothesis was shared by Romantic-era scientists as well as Victorians—
including William Whewell, who devised the word “scientist” in a discussion with 
Coleridge (see Snyder 368), and John Stuart Mill, who “was opposed to Whewell’s 
idealism” but who nevertheless had written on the necessity of hypotheses (J. Smith 31).5  
Mill’s outline of the scientific method in his System of Logic places hypothesis at 
the core of scientific work; he writes there that often “what is an hypothesis at the 
beginning of the inquiry becomes a proved law of nature before its close” (292). And this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For more on the rise of the Victorian scientific professional, see Jack Meadows’s The Victorian Scientist: 
The Growth of a Profession. 
5 Richard Yeo’s Defining Science provides a useful overview of William Whewell’s role in the invention of 
the professional scientist. 
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hypothesis, a useful device for arriving at proved natural law, has “no other limits” 
beyond “those of the human imagination” (System of Logic 290). To derive natural law 
from whatever the scientist imagines, however, would require repetitive experiment; Mill 
writes of a need to “assure ourselves, by a repetition of the observation or the experiment” 
(System of Logic 252). Imagination and speculation thus joined with nineteenth-century 
science’s repetitive experimentation for the establishment of natural laws. Developed in 
part via the work of Romantic scientists (among them Whewell, Humphry Davy, and 
other close associates of Samuel Taylor Coleridge), this speculative scientific study 
entailed a general, repetitive questing for more: more experience, more understanding, 
more knowledge, always suggested by an imaginative scientific mind.6  
That repetitively experimental quest could become figured as addiction-like once 
addiction was a known condition, and in the nineteenth century, the rise of professional 
medicine and medical journals supported an increasingly medicalized discussion of drug 
habituation. “Habitual use, what we would now call addiction, caused less concern,” 
notes Virginia Berridge, than other risks of drug use in the nineteenth century (Demons 
26), but the problems of habitual use were at least registered. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, contradicting a tradition that had viewed tendencies toward intoxication as 
primarily moral flaws and following the eighteenth-century work of Benjamin Rush and 
Thomas Trotter, habitual intoxication became increasingly described as a disease, in a 
variety of medical publications (for one overview of this development, see Harry G. 
Levine, “The Discovery of Addiction”). Words like “alcoholic” and “addict,” now our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 David Hume linked understanding of actuality with our ability to think of it in terms of possibility. Hume 
writes, “Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation,” 
noting that conceiving of splitting things apart allows for recognition of those essential, actual things that 
cannot be further divided (Treatise of Human Nature 8). 
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standard terms for describing substance-dependence, emerged in the nineteenth century, 
even if terms like “intemperance” or “inebriate” remained most commonly used to denote 
the same phenomenon.7 Temperance movements, too, became potent cultural and 
political forces in the nineteenth century, signaling a broader public concern with habitual 
inebriation. Addiction may not have been the preferred term, and clearly fears about 
opium habituation were not strong enough to regulate the substance in any real way prior 
to the 1868 Pharmacy Act, but what we now call addiction was recognized as early as the 
eighteenth century, and increasingly described by writers such as Coleridge, De Quincey, 
and later authors who would cite them. 
The prominence of nineteenth-century scientists’ drug use lent a peculiar 
framework for thinking about this newly observed and increasingly troubling medical 
problem. And scientific, habitual drug use directly impacted nineteenth-century writers: 
consider opium-dependent Samuel Taylor Coleridge and cocaine-addicted Sigmund 
Freud.8 Both habitually took intoxicants as part of chemical or medical studies they found 
aesthetically pleasing, after which they developed addictions, and both wrote texts widely 
thought to be influenced by their habitual intoxication. But theirs were just cases in which 
desirous, repetitive experiment could seem most obviously related to addiction. In 
general, professional science was known to require intensely repetitive and yet personally 
imaginative drives to confront something new in the material world, via a method thus 
framed as especially addiction-like. Those such as Freud would only make the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Oxford English Dictionary’s earliest noted use of “alcoholism” is from 1848; and though “addiction” 
had been used to mean habitual compulsion to intoxication well before the mid-nineteenth century, the 
OED’s first noted use of “addict” as a noun is from 1899. 
8 Coleridge had begun some of his (not addictive) drug use as scientific experiment at the Pneumatic 
Institute that included Thomas Beddoes and Tom Wedgwood, among whom he had experimented with 
nitrous oxide; with Wedgwood, particularly, he sought out cannabis. Molly Lefebure writes, “The 
suggestion, sometimes made, that these two invalids were proposing to embark upon an intensive medical 
cure together can only be dismissed as impossibly naive” (63). 
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association between scientific and addictive pursuits more obvious as the century 
progressed.9  
The following question might arise at this point: why should literary texts 
reflecting the patterns of intensely repetitive possibility-pursuit (even when centered 
around addicted characters) not be considered science-like, rather than addiction-like? 
Either term might be appropriate enough, were it not for the fact that the term “addiction-
like” covers more essential details of the sort of narratives under discussion. These details 
include: characters driven by desire and affective impulses in a manner evocative of 
addiction; the fact that such texts arose during the emergence of addiction discourse in 
particular and more frequently involved clearly addicted characters than they involved 
scientists; and the way such texts’ repetitive possibility-pursuits do not quite have 
science’s grave responsibility to actuality. This justification for my distinction between 
“addiction-like” and “science-like,” however, is not meant to suggest a pure separation 
between the two. Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy, describes the Dionysian aesthetic 
experience associated with intoxication as a way to access the previously unintelligible, 
and so art, for Nietzsche, suggests “a necessary correlative of and supplement to science” 
(80). The addiction-like is, similarly, always in part the science-like, even if the 
addiction-like pertains to a stronger element of emotional craving than we might 
normally find in scientific work. (In case further terminology questions remain, I include 
a brief list of key terms and my own definitions at the end of this chapter.)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Readers of Freud and Coleridge will be familiar with that intertwinement between repetitive, personal 
pleasure and repetitive experiment, an intertwinement that their addictions reflected. “The most striking 
feature of Über Coca,” writes Howard Markel about Freud’s celebratory study of cocaine’s medicinal value, 
“is how Sigmund incorporates his own feelings, sensations, and experiences into his scientific observations” 
(82). 
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Yet even if we accept that addiction-like methods allow for greater imaginative 
exploration than the science-like, we might still face objections about the viability of 
addictive aesthetic strategies for creative exploration. Shouldn’t an addiction-like strategy 
produce stagnating forms, or dull repetitions—shouldn’t addiction, a frightening medical 
problem, smother possibility even in the aesthetic strategies it inspires? What matters 
here is the difference between addiction as substance dependence and the other, 
figurative sense of the word “addiction,” which I call the addiction-like. The addiction-
like, once recognized and approached deliberately, holds creative promise that extends 
beyond addictive and scientific reiterations: that which is like an overwhelming desire 
can have overwhelming desire’s tendency to compel one intensely toward otherness, 
without desire’s tendency to limit conceivability around an obsessively desired object. 
The philosopher and theorist of possibility Gregory Currie puts it simply: “there is such a 
thing as imagining that is desire-like” (204). This, he writes, “helps explain the affective 
consequences of imagination” (211). He notes that “the effect of shifting” from desire to 
“desire-like imaginings is to free the subject from external constraint” (214). We can 
affectively and successfully access the possible, Currie argues, not exactly through desire, 
which can overrun and constrain thought, but through something “desire-like,” wherein a 
more conscious impulse brings us toward thoughtful consideration of the always-yet-to-
be-grasped (the possible).10 And because substance dependence, according to the DSM-IV, 
revolves around “craving,” or “a strong subjective drive to use the substance” (176), 
something that is like substance dependence can present a similarly strong degree of 
creative potential, becoming a powerful tool for opening up cognition of possibility. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The question of the distinction between “fictional” and “possible” has opened a great deal of debate. 
Overview of this problem can be found in Ruth Ronen’s Possible Worlds in Literary Theory. My own 
study approaches the fictional as an exaggerated form of the possible—not as an entirely different species. 
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the nineteenth century, the use of addiction-like properties for the creation of habitually 
consumable literature meant precisely this; addiction-like literature (literature patterned 
after addictive habits) would intensify creative explorations of the possible, as is most 
abundantly evident in stories about addicted investigators and addicted pursuers.11  
 Among the works built around addicted investigators were some of the most 
influential popular entertainments, from Dickens’s novels to the Sherlock Holmes stories. 
While addiction-like techniques bolstered narrative emphasis on investigating possibility, 
then, they also accompanied an expansion in the domain of literary invention.12 This 
should not be surprising. As far back as Aristotle, philosophers and critics have been 
reminding their audience that fiction itself results from an engagement with possibility.13 
Lubomír Doležel writes that fictionality works as a particular approach to the possibility 
making up a “universe of discourse” that is “not restricted to the actual world but spreads 
over uncountable possible, nonactualized worlds” (13).14 It is no wonder, then, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Peter Brooks describes a fundamental relationship between desire and the forging of interconnected 
worlds of a novelistic narrative; he writes, “Desire necessarily becomes textual by way of a specifically 
narrative impulse, since desire is metonymy, a forward drive in a signifying chain” (105). When desire can 
be traced to something external to the desirer—a matter of addiction to something consumed, not an 
internal, inherent drive—it becomes even more expansively metonymic, more connected to related things, 
to a world in process. Myriad, attendant novelistic realms can thus follow, as they did follow from 
nineteenth-century addiction discourse. 
12 While examining that intensified, literary orientation toward possibility, I am influenced by the work of 
possible-worlds theorists who recount how literature in general results from attention to possibility (Doležel, 
Pavel) and from those who consider ways in which the actual must be known as it relates to the possible 
(Kripke, D. Lewis). These theorists and philosophers, whether intentionally or not, investigate problems 
related to the concerns of both writers and scientists of the nineteenth-century, to whom possible worlds 
were of real interest (William Whewell himself wrote a monograph titled On the Plurality of Worlds). 
13 Aristotle in the Poetics notes three kinds of mimetic poetry, two of which clearly imitate possibilities 
rather than certain actuality: “the kind of thing that is said or thought to be the case” and “the kind of thing 
that ought to be the case” (42). Modal logicians have broadened this, focusing on how language in general 
engages in the possible. See, for instance, Naming and Necessity, where Saul Kripke describes how 
language functions meaningfully with regard to possible worlds. 
14 Thomas Pavel discusses the possibility emerging even in reference that has the dullest consensus behind 
it: “referential behavior,” he notes, “includes a creative, risk-taking aspect, as well as a tendency to settle 
down into conventional patterns” (27). The patterns of linguistic reference are loaded with possible 
meanings, in other words, from the start, even as their patterns provide reliability and comfort, and fictional 
texts exploit that function of language. 
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addiction-like techniques have structured a profusion of fictional worlds, given the need 
to found such worlds upon a sense of the nonactualized, the unattained. Addiction 
heightens the sense of unattained possibility, and the endlessly investigative, addiction-
like approach to literary form allows writers and readers access to innumerable worlds of 
possibility without the oppression of the physical condition itself. 
I use the term “world” here to describe the narrative realm writers create with 
each work, and I do so with regard to the sense of “world” used by possible-worlds 
theorists such as Pavel and Doležel. “Fictional world” in this sense means a set of 
possible relations within conditions and boundaries set by a text, and fiction’s possible 
worlds do not need to be possible now, in the present tense and in our given present 
conditions. In the case of futuristic science fiction or convincing realist fiction set in the 
present moment, a narrative will surely seem more possible to the contemporary reader 
than historical fiction in which Napoleon never set foot in France, but that historical 
fiction still explores a possible world, though it is one based on different temporal 
conditions. This is why I find it useful to consider all fictional worlds as possible worlds. 
Let me give an example of a fictional world formed by a very specific orientation 
toward possibility: the children’s book If You Give a Mouse a Cookie. The story distills 
the most basic, requisite element of fiction-making—the exploration of “what if”—and it 
emphasizes the appetitive nature of that exploration. The book is patterned after its titular 
mouse’s hunger for more and more and more; the story directs itself intensely toward 
possibility from its title on, beginning with that conditional “if.” If you give a mouse a 
cookie, the mouse is bound to start demanding milk, which creates a new condition to 
consider, and if you give the mouse milk, there will come a demand for a straw, and so 
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on. Maybe you will never actually give the mouse a cookie, and maybe you would never 
actually follow that gift with milk, but this does not matter: the story is off and running 
(in, again, a manner reflective of the mouse’s cravings). Conditions have been established, 
and possibilities within those conditions are then explored in a desire-like (or hunger-like, 
or thirst-like) way. It follows that addiction’s intensified, hungrier orientation toward 
possibilities would suggest an intensified profusion of addiction-like, narrative realms of 
more exaggerated possibility. After the nineteenth century’s association of addiction with 
scientific study, moreover, one could still more readily think of the addiction-like as 
exploratory pursuit, and Victorian fiction that was structured around wandering, 
adventuring, explicitly addicted characters—characters like Dr. Jekyll or Sherlock 
Holmes—portrayed realms of intensified possibility often accessed through investigative 
studies of a mystery or otherness.15  
To be sure, before addiction was a widely recognized medical problem, there was 
still awareness of affectively charged repetitions that lead toward new experience and 
understanding of possibility—Humphry Davy was pursuing such personally enthralled 
science all on his own before anyone thought his friend Coleridge was an addict. And had 
addiction not become medicalized, perhaps, there would still have been some manner of 
serial literature, of which we have more than enough examples whose plots are not 
centrally based around addiction. Furthermore, nobody needs to know about addiction to 
conceive of possibility. But nineteenth-century addiction-like literary strategies, drawing 
from the scientific-affective associations with the then-newly established medical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Novelistic thinking did not just reflect a developing sense of the body’s role in a wider web of 
commercial interconnection and narrative possibility. Novels at times influenced the trade in addictive 
substances: opium-trading vessels were named after novels such as James Fenimore Cooper’s Red Rover or 
Sir Walter Scott’s Rob Roy (Fay 60). 
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category, can be shown to have attended an emphasis on investigation in various kinds of 
fiction and to have structured enormously popular stories of repetitive exploration. This is 
the central argument of the present study: addiction-like literary devices brought 
repetitive investigation into popular aesthetic experience, supporting especially a sense of 
the literary as habitual exploration—as an ongoing, intense engagement with the 
unknown by way of the familiar. 
 I want to summarize, now, the basic components of this argument, both to clarify 
what I have covered and to prepare the reader for the rest of this project: 
1) Desire-like engines for moving toward the possible without wholly 
succumbing to the limits of actual desire, as Currie suggests, make 
aesthetic, literary experience of possibility accessible. 
2) Addiction intensifies desire, and therefore addiction-like strategies 
support intensified literary engagement with possible worlds. 
3) Much of what we know about addiction was established by scientific 
self-experimenters such as Coleridge and Freud, who exemplified 
connections between addictive pursuit of possibility and repetitive, 
experimental investigation that always drives toward possible 
understanding.  
As addiction was revealed in all its terrible might, then, and as the addiction-like 
suggested tools for literary creation, many nineteenth-century writers also maintained a 
scientific element of reiterated, desirous experiment in their narratives of addiction, 
thereby concocting addiction-like narrative forms for episodic or recurring exploration of 
mystery. These writers did so through various literary strategies influenced by addiction 
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discourse, strategies for eliciting an addiction-like aesthetic response that one might also 
refer to as “the healthier addiction” or “the good sort of addiction.” 16 
My argument will unfold gradually, each chapter examining a different literary 
strategy refined according to the aesthetic category of addiction. Because addiction-like 
strategies continually manifest themselves in new forms for ongoing possibility-pursuit, 
this study will be constituted in large part by close reading of some of those innovations. 
The formal innovations I analyze include the world-shaping poetic reiterations described 
by Percy Shelley that bridge sameness and imaginative difference, the sprawlingly 
digressive but repetitive essays of De Quincey, the investigatory serial fiction of Dickens 
and Eliot, the double-poems of Christina Rossetti and Tennyson in which subjective and 
external realities merge through hungry exploration, and the mystery fiction of Stevenson 
in which habitual investigation occurs indolently, vicariously. An astonishing profusion 
of invention came from creative strategies responding to the problem of addiction. Still, 
the above three points can serve as touchstones for every chapter, each of which builds 
from my central contentions. 
Our story begins here with Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who wrote at an early stage 
of addiction discourse but who represented to later writers (Thomas De Quincey most 
influentially), the literary possibilities that might be abstracted from addiction. So much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Orrin Wang describes a Romantic sobriety that anticipates the sort of “healthier addiction” that this study 
finds throughout nineteenth-century literature. Regarding Wordsworth’s poetic work and development, 
Wang notes that “a new cultural self-knowledge is won at the expense of a former . . . self marked by error 
and delusion” (19–20), a path through intoxication toward sobriety that Wang sees in “Tintern Abbey” 
specifically and elsewhere in Romantic thought. Thus sobriety for the Romantics, as Wang puts it, was 
enriched by something dizzying, by something risky, by intoxicating experience. Wang’s sense of 
Romantic sobriety is a cool, reflective intoxication, which he describes as a condition of both sensory 
connection and mental detachment, as steady historical situation and phantasmatic, tropological flux. “This 
historical problem of sobriety as the problem of the metaphor for the stability of metaphor, of the steady 
relation between figure and content, is what the circuit of ideology and figure in Romantic sobriety most 
forcefully and unevenly marks” (31). Wang’s study traces the literary results of this tension in Romantic 
sobriety, especially in terms of how history and metaphor intersect dramatically.  
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of Coleridge’s life was ruined by substance dependence, yet his writing suggested 
potential to be mined from the forms and the patterns of repetitive desire. The main 
chapters continue after this introduction to discuss later writers who ambitiously 
developed new forms around narratives of addictive investigation and repetitive desire, 
often with reference to Coleridge or De Quincey.  
Coleridge represents the foundation for my study’s entire argument. The poet saw 
science and art linked as possibility-driven enterprises; he experimented with intoxicants; 
he defined the imagination as a matter of creative repetition; he was thought to attribute 
some of his own poetry to the drug to which he was addicted; he defined for future 
writers a sense of the creative mind that produces works of genius according to addiction-
like thinking. Before moving on to discuss the bigger implications of this project and the 
course of ensuing chapters, then, I would like to consider Coleridge’s contributions to the 
aesthetic of addiction.  
 
Coleridge and the Addiction-Like Imagination 
Throughout his life, Samuel Taylor Coleridge enthusiastically cultivated different 
habits. He spent much of his early acquaintanceship with William Wordsworth, for 
example, habitually wandering in Somerset’s Quantock Hills, venturing into the 
woodlands around the village of Nether Stowey. This was in the 1790s, at the start of the 
intellectual partnership that would lead to their collaboration on the Lyrical Ballads.17 
Wordsworth went on to idealize that productive time in The Prelude as a “summer, under 
whose indulgent skies, / Upon smooth Quantock’s airy ridge we roved / Unchecked, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Adam Sissman’s The Friendship for a recent overview of this time, to which Sissman also relates the 
Prelude quote I mention (186). 
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loitered mid her sylvan coombs” (XIV.397–399).18 The two of them found insight in 
regular loitering, in a routine lack of routine. 
These loiterers were, whether they had planned to or not, participating in a 
tradition of Enlightenment thinkers who sought knowledge and its pleasures through 
repetitive digressive experience. Often such digression had occurred with even less 
vigorous activity than the Romantics’ wandering, and Coleridge enjoyed those more 
indolent habits. The talkative poet excelled conversationally, for instance, at the 
institution emblematizing the eighteenth-century ideal of habitual, sociable pursuit of 
knowledge: the coffee-house.19 The coffee-house presented a suitable locale for the 
routine exchange of estimable ideas and diverting gossip—a favorite channel for regular 
encounters with the non-routine, for fervent intellectual discourse. Joseph Addison wrote 
in his own outlet for eighteenth-century public intellectualism, The Spectator (No. 10), “I 
shall be ambitious to have it said of me, that I have brought philosophy out of closets and 
libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-tables and in 
coffee-houses” (I. 311). The Spectator was itself written in Lloyd’s coffee-house (Russell 
and Tuite 6). 
Coleridge, in other words, would have found habits for pleasure and learning both 
in the coffee-house and out in the hills, through rambling conversation or actual 
ambulatory rambling with a good friend. In the work of epoch-defining eighteenth-
century writers whom Coleridge had read closely, too, habit arises again and again as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I quote here from the 1850 edition of The Prelude. 
19 Coleridge had at a very young age already dazzled the coffee-house world; he had gone with his uncle 
John Bowdon “on his frequent escapes to the taverns, and had his first unforgettable taste of the great 
talking-shop of London, the Johnsonian world of clubs and coffee-houses, with its last echoes of the 
elegant, rakish Augustan society of Steele and Addison” (Holmes, Coleridge: Early Visions, 1772–1804 
24). Habermas sees such coffee-house scenes as the center of the eighteenth-century’s public sphere, noting 
the vigorous sharing of ideas that occurred there (32–33).  
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guiding principle for the acquisition of pleasure and knowledge. Edmund Burke, referring 
to the enjoyment of tobacco in his study of the sublime, notes that “habit alone has 
reconciled [the smoker’s] palate to these alien pleasures” (14). David Hume, meanwhile, 
argues for the epistemological validity of a habitual scientific method in his Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding. There, Hume contends that existence is given 
meaningful form and made comprehensible by repetitive confirmation, through reiterated 
experience from which the mind can derive reasonable, reinforced connections of cause 
and effect; he writes that experience grants us knowledge of that which is regularly, 
“constantly” linked (19).20 Habitual experience, the argument goes, makes possible the 
repetitive perception needed to understand how different things conjoin and relate 
reliably. Without habit, without constancy, Hume implies, the world would seem a 
bewildering array of novelty. He elsewhere (like Burke) argued that habit supported the 
socially stabilizing, moral experience of sentiment.21  
There was a problem with that Enlightenment philosophy of habit for Coleridge, 
however, no matter how much pleasure he took from his routines, no matter how many 
discoveries he made in his habitual rambles with Wordsworth or in the coffee-house. 
Coleridge, we now know, eventually developed a life-threatening habit, one that worked 
less predictably than those that Enlightenment thinkers would have liked, and this habit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The early English pneumatic researcher Robert Boyle is also credited as “a founder of the experimental 
world in which scientists now live and operate” (Shapin and Schaffer 5), and that world’s experimental 
method worked through regular, habitual, routine social interaction with peer researchers. Boyle’s scientific 
method, argue Shapin and Schaffer, worked as a way to “[crystallize] forms of social organization and as a 
means of regulating social interaction within the scientific community” (14). For Boyle the public scientist 
and experimenter in a lab, Shapin and Schaffer write, “Matters of fact were to be produced in a public 
space: a particular physical space in which experiments were collectively performed and directly witnessed 
and an abstract space constituted through virtual witnessing” (69).  
21 Hume developed a related social sense of habit that could manage the chaos implicit in the non-habitual, 
the moral confusion of a universe without guarantees, of a realm that is always a matter of waiting and 
seeing. “The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty,” Hume writes in his Enquiry Concerning 
the Principles of Morals, and “beget correspondent habits [my italics]” (14).  
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was observed to alter the experience of even his habitual wandering with Wordsworth. As 
he walked with his friend through Somersetshire, Coleridge periodically suffered from 
unbearable pain; the trouble was his regular consumption of opium, which led to anguish 
in between his doses, afflicting him with the torments of withdrawal. Wordsworth 
observed that “sometimes,” Coleridge would “throw himself down and writhe like a 
worm upon the ground” (Moorman I. 354–355; qtd Sissman 183).   
And so, while some habits—wandering, conversation—helped Coleridge explore 
his world successfully and sociably, others on occasion reduced him to a disastrous, 
pitiful state. Erstwhile friend Thomas De Quincey eventually identified drug use at the 
core of what made Coleridge much of who he was—Coleridge’s “sufferings,” he wrote, 
“came from opium” (Recollections 97–98). Coleridge himself described opium as a “free-
agency-annihilating Poison” (Coleridge Letters III. 490) and the drug habit as “a Slavery 
more dreadful than any man who has not felt its iron fetters eating into his very soul, can 
possibly imagine” (Coleridge Letters III.495). To Coleridge’s friend and physician James 
Gillman, too, the poet was physiologically addicted, though the word “addicted” was 
rarely applied to drug use at the time. “Neither morally nor physically was he understood,” 
Gillman wrote, explaining that Coleridge’s opiate troubles were not due to immorality. 
“He did all that in his state duty could exact” (Gillman I.173).22 Quite clearly, Romantics 
could and did think of habit-forming drug use much as we now think of it. Coleridge’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This would oppose the view of others at the time, however; Coleridge was writing while the condition 
was still under construction, while routine drug use was often still seen as a vice, a bad habit. For instance, 
friends of Coleridge, such as Robert Southey, believed Coleridge’s drug use “constituted a gross self-
indulgence which might have been abandoned, categorically, by a simple, if powerful, effort of will” 
(Lefebure 34). 
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case shows us that what we call addiction was bedeviling people before the rise of 
temperance movements and Victorian medicalization of drug use.23  
De Quincey, however, also went so far as to relate Coleridge’s opium use to his 
poetic creation—in, for instance, the case of Coleridge’s “Dejection: An Ode” (Burwick 
43). Coleridge himself had promoted that sense of his poetry’s foundation in opium, 
describing how Kubla Khan resulted from “an anodyne” which, as Lefebure notes, means 
that it was “universally accepted as opium-inspired” (27). De Quincey accordingly 
regarded Coleridge’s habitual opium use as central to the poet’s thinking. His essay on 
Coleridge and opium established a literary reputation that has lasted to this day; 
Coleridge became seen as one of the first iconically addicted artists. His habits of 
indolence, his poetic, philosophical, and scientific musings, would all be subsequently 
read in light of addiction.24   
Coleridge deserves some credit for manufacturing this reputation, and not just 
through his attribution of “Kubla Khan” to an anodyne. After the 1798 and 1800 
publication of the Lyrical Ballads, as his addiction worsened, Coleridge went on to 
produce writing especially devoted to the imagination’s habitual pursuits. He saw intense 
possibility-pursuit in science as well as in literature, too. Because science related to “the 
passion of Hope,” he wrote in a letter to Humphry Davy, it shared attributes of poetry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 My awareness of these telling passages from Coleridge’s letters and from Gillman’s work is due to Molly 
Lefebure’s Samuel Taylor Coleridge: A Bondage of Opium. As for the growing sense of addiction as a 
public and medical—not strictly moral—problem that developed in the nineteenth century, see histories of 
the development of temperance movements like Brian Harrison’s Drink and the Victorians. Harrison notes, 
“Not until the 1860s and 1870s did American experiments convince Englishmen that habitual drunkards 
required voluntary or compulsory asylum treatment” (21–22). The medical sense of addiction was in 
process before then, however, as habitual drug use became widespread enough to motivate professional 
attention. And as the quotes from Coleridge’s circle show, there were obviously those who thought of a 
drug habit as a medical problem far earlier than 1860. 
24 Molly Lefebure’s Samuel Taylor Coleridge: A Bondage of Opium is devoted to Coleridge’s addiction 
and defines him in terms of the condition. 
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(Coleridge Letters I.557),25 and Coleridge clarified his preferred hopeful pursuits as 
habits—generally, he aimed for “the inculcation of the habit of seeking and finding 
relations in mind and nature” (Levere 28).26 During and after the years of his opium 
addiction, in short, Coleridge was committed to writing about the power of repetitive 
possibility-pursuit.27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 During his involvement with the Pneumatic Institute in Bristol in the 1790s, Coleridge’s interest in the 
possibilities suggested by self-experimentation took on a greater importance. There, along with Humphry 
Davy and Thomas Beddoes, Coleridge experimented with nitrous oxide and became involved in a circle of 
scientists with lofty, artistic aims (Davy himself was a poet). Much of the thought and interests of the 
Pneumatic Institute had been established earlier by Joseph Priestley, the materialist Dissenter. Priestley’s 
work on Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air opens with succinct statements on the 
mysterious, alluring possibilities of scientific research. “The greater is the circle of light,” he writes, “the 
greater is the boundary of the darkness” (I.xix). Coleridge wrote a poem on Priestley in 1794, one of his 
“Sonnets on Eminent Characters,” praising that adventure into the unknown; science, Coleridge writes, 
would be Priestley’s saving grace, as “Meek Nature slowly lifts her matron veil / To smile with fondness on 
her gazing son” (13-14). The poem describes serenity despite anticipation, or happiness found in the great 
possibility that becomes knowable, if never fully actual, as the veil of nature is only slowly in the process 
of being lifted. 
26 Coleridge also highly esteemed empirical scientists such as Bacon and Boyle, placing Boyle alongside 
Shakespeare and Milton in his pantheon of great minds in English history (Coleridge’s Notebooks 98). 
27 Richard Holmes has found in Coleridge’s discussion of “loss and failure” during his time of addiction 
and illness “not restriction, but release; not depression, but delight” (Coleridge: Early Visions, 1772–1804 
302). Coleridge in the following letter uses the patterns of illness to articulate an imaginative sense that 
pushes beyond disease and toward knowledge. Confined physical experiences and associations lead him 
not to stagnant fancies, but to expansive considerations: 
In my long Illness I had compelled into hours of Delight many a sleepless,  
painful hour of Darkness by chasing down metaphysical Game — and since  
then I have continued the Hunt, till I found myself unaware at the Root of  
Pure Mathematics — and up that tall smooth Tree, whose few poor branches  
are all at it’s [sic] very summit, am I climbing by pure adhesive strength of  
arms and thighs — still slipping down, still renewing my ascent. — You  
would not know me —! all sounds of similitude keep at such a distance from  
each other in my mind, that I have forgotten how to make a rhyme (Coleridge  
Letters II.389–390; qtd Holmes, Coleridge: Early Visions, 1772–1804 301).  
The addict’s illness, Holmes notes, “is consistently contradicted by the excitement and spontaneity of the 
leaping rhythms and metaphors” (302). Coleridge finds a compensatory, imaginative power within his 
condition’s physical routines. He then states a basic inclination to “hunt,” to want and pursue; he finds a 
thirst for imaginative possibility among “sounds of similitude” echoing across distances within his yearning 
mind. The similitudes Coleridge observes are not proximal or well matched enough to suffocate that poetic 
mind. These similitudes are now so distant from one another—as the gaps between iterations in the 
desirous mind are so great—that Coleridge might explore enormous imaginative potential among those 
gaps, losing track even of rhyme. In the passage above, similitude’s association mixes with discontinuity, 
discontinuity that Coleridge can struggle with to make newly imagined associations. Moving from 
mathematics to the branches of a tree to the loftiest (possibly hallucinatory) stage of intellectual ambition, 
the poet has found in his indolent condition the grounds for dreaming and wanting, for considering 
potential while so little is actually happening. 
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Whether with regard to science or poetry, he had a clear theoretical interest in 
reiterative experience that supported ongoing awareness of possibility, and he eagerly 
expounded upon the associative patterns that habitual experience established. He named 
his son, Hartley Coleridge, after David Hartley, the philosopher who had described 
associative, habitually established relationships between mind and world. The fifth 
chapter of Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria is “On the law of association—Its history 
traced from Aristotle to Hartley,” and credits Hartley as the Newton of the mind 
(comparing “the law of association” to gravity) (89; 92). Coleridge, however, argues that 
Hartley’s association (by which mind and world neatly harmonize through chains of 
repeatedly confirmed, linked relationship) does not go far enough in examining the all-
powerful role of the desirous individual (Biographia Literaria [hereafter BL] 106–117). 
Coleridge describes instead an imaginative individual as a creature of active repetitions: 
“The primary IMAGINATION,” Coleridge writes, “I hold to be the living Power and 
prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM” (BL 304). Repetitions, Coleridge held, linked the 
mind with infinity, continually making possible the conscious perception and creative 
articulation of something more. 
This Coleridgean imagination differs from the consciousness understood by 
Hartley’s followers, who would have “consciousness considered as a result, as a tune, the 
common product of the breeze and the harp” (BL 117). To Coleridge, the Hartleyan 
method did have the benefit of harmony; it explained at least some formal link between 
mind and world—that of vibrations, from stimulus to memory to thought. But Coleridge 
held that the mind also creates forms out of its portion of infinity, out of the otherness 
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from which and to which its ongoing repetitions spring. This creative force is, as 
Coleridge describes it, a literary capability supported by repetitive movement toward 
more and more; by repeating out into infinity, Coleridge’s imagination forges links 
between familiarity and the infinite. The poet’s situation as a known addict would make it 
possible for De Quincey and others after to regard such ideas about strong, habitual 
repetitions of possibility-pursuit as addiction-like.  
Coleridge never claimed that his theories about imagination were theories of an 
addict-like imagination, and he did not have access to the widely accepted medical sense 
of addiction that later nineteenth-century writers would have. Though he stated that he 
was enslaved by opium—though he plainly saw himself to be what we would describe as 
addicted—at the time his habit worsened (between 1801 and 1806) opiate habituation 
among many was still “not regarded as dangerous . . . indeed habituation was widely 
thought to make opium safer” (Vickers 92–93). Coleridge thought, rather, in ways that 
were during his lifetime just starting to be considered in terms similar to terms of 
addiction. With Thomas Trotter’s dissertation on inebriety, from 1788, British medical 
science was beginning to cite habitual intoxication as a serious problem worthy of 
sustained attention.28 It would take some time for that serious consideration to become 
institutionally accepted, to become widely understood as medical truth and to aid 
influential temperance movements.29 Still, Coleridge makes an important introductory 
figure in this study because in the eyes of his emulator De Quincey, he was a poetic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 “Hinc in scriptis de re medica ebrietatem inter causas morborum brevissime memoratam invenimus, dum 
modus agendi penitus notitam effugit,” notes Trotter, before continuing with his dissertation that corrected 
that oversight. [Translation: “So in medical writing, we find drunkenness too briefly mentioned among the 
causes of morbidity, while its actions escape notice.”] The Latin is from Trotter’s Dissertatio Medica 
Inauguralis, Quaedam De Ebrietate, eiusque Efectibus in Corpus Humanum Complectens.  
29 Temperance movements “distinct from previous” (mostly religious) “attacks on drunkenness” emerged in 
Britain in the 1820s, though these typically remained at least partly religious (Harrison 90–91). 
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genius shaped by his habit-forming drug use. The forms and the patterns of addiction (not 
exclusively addiction itself) were thereafter used by De Quincey and others as tools for 
exploring a related, Coleridgean interconnection between sameness and otherness.30 
There is abundant evidence for this sense of addiction-like, Coleridgean aesthetic 
experience in De Quincey’s work. De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium-Eater 
contains, for instance, a passage on endlessly replicating staircases that draws from both 
Coleridge’s influence and the addictive patterns associated with the poet. The staircases 
in question are the famous, endlessly replicating ones portrayed by the artist Giovanni 
Piranesi, and De Quincey describes them in similarly repetitive terms to illustrate the 
opium eater’s mindset.31 Yet De Quincey had not actually seen the image himself. He 
used Coleridge’s description of the Piranesi image, a description that Coleridge claimed 
had related to his own sick “visions.” Thus, while De Quincey used an aesthetic strategy 
of addiction-like, digressive repetition to structure his prose, he consciously did so by 
copying Coleridgean repetitive experience (the poet’s visions of Piranesi’s endless 
staircase) in order to portray repetitiously encountered possibility. 
Certainly addiction hindered those who suffered from it. The opium habit sent 
Coleridge, for example, into long periods of anguish. But many of those who reflected on 
addiction’s patterns also found an approach for creating intensely repetitive literary 
exploration. Still, literary scholars in recent decades have examined how the emergence 
of addiction discourse in the nineteenth century policed desires;32 Clifford Siskin, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Alethea Hayter in Opium and the Romantic Imagination gives an overview of the relationship between 
intoxication and the age’s poetry, as does M.H. Abrams in The Milk of Paradise: The Effect of Opium 
Visions on the Work of De Quincey, Crabbe, Francis Thompson, and Coleridge.  
31 Specifically, De Quincey uses repetitive imperative verbs: “follow the stairs. . . you perceive it . . . you 
suppose . . . raise your eyes, and behold . . . elevate your eye” (78). 
32 Important studies on the social discipline accompanying the rise of addiction discourse in the nineteenth 
century include Susan Zieger’s Inventing the Addict: Drugs, Race, and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century 
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instance, writes that “discourse of addiction . . . inscribed upon the culture an inherently 
disciplinary model” (190). In this study, I seek to account for the literary invention 
manifestly achieved by writers using the patterns of addiction. Those patterns, once put 
into writing, whether deployed in serial narratives of addicts or periodical essays about 
them, I term “addiction-like,” in order to distinguish them from actual addictions that 
limit will. From Thomas De Quincey to Christina Rossetti to Robert Louis Stevenson, the 
writers covered in the following pages all saw imaginative possibility flourish amid the 
constraints of repetitive existence, and they subsequently fashioned texts that repetitively 
charted newly imagined worlds of intense possibility.33 
  
Theoretical Background and Implications:  
New Formalism, Speculative Materialism, and Affective Cognition 
With this study, I hope to suggest pathways toward better understanding of a 
major aesthetic category, that category’s history, and the manner of concocting related 
aesthetic strategies with regard to sensed possibilities. But my emphasis on aesthetic form 
as both historical artifact and structure for lived experience means that the following 
pages also participate in a scholarly discussion about formalism: specifically, in the 
discussion on form’s provenance and functions. As mentioned, the following chapters 
describe aesthetic forms emerging from specific historical and material contexts of 
addiction discourse, and I also examine how such forms generate particular effects (the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
British and American Literature; Lawrence Driscoll’s Reconsidering Drugs: Mapping Victorian and 
Modern Drug Discourses; and Clifford Siskin’s Historicity of Romantic Discourse. One foundational text 
for this sense of disciplinarian medical authority is Michel Foucault’s Madness and Civilization: A History 
of Insanity in the Age of Reason. 
33 Other, twentieth-century senses of possibility discovered in constraints have reflected the addiction 
aesthetic’s discoveries; examples of this can be found in the work of the Oulipo, the literary society 
dedicated to creative potential that comes from adhering to structural limits. See Daniel Levin Becker’s 
Many Subtle Channels: In Praise of Potential Literature. 
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effects of addiction-like reading). A connection between those two aspects of literary 
form—the historical contexts of form and the work done by form—would suggest a 
connection between materiality, history, and imaginative experience, and such a 
connection seems consistently revealed by addiction literature. 
Two ways that scholars have tended to think of literary form—as a reflection of 
its historical context or as a tool for creation of particular experiences—have often 
existed separately. Marjorie Levinson has summarized these two separated positions of 
contemporary formalist critics as “activist” criticism (which examines how literary forms 
derive from historical context) and “normative” criticism (which describes particular 
“cognitive and affective” norms in the aesthetic) (559). My study, meanwhile, bridges the 
gap between activist and normative formalism, examining formal invention in light of 
material, historical contexts (the rise of addiction discourse) while also taking into 
account the cognitive and affective effects of those forms (the suggestions of addiction-
like experience of repetitive possibility-pursuit found in major addiction texts). The 
formal developments in the following chapters, I will show, all reflected historically 
specific and medically specific senses of actuality and its potential, but the result was 
often inventive exploration of possibility.  
Attention to possibility and modality, specifically, helps elucidate this link 
between form’s background and form’s effects. The case of addiction literature shows 
how forms develop in terms of historically (and medically) delimited possibilities. And as 
historical context and medical context alike produced different modalities—different 
orientations to possibility—writers, I argue, found resources to produce different formal 
inventions. Those formal inventions, as inventions (that is, as things that did not exist 
	   	   	   	   	  
	   26	  
before writers produced them), themselves generated and represented new experiences of 
possibility, with attendant new ways of thinking and feeling about possibility. Addiction, 
by intensifying a sense of possibility and by being itself so formally repetitive, has 
continued to inform a kind of literary experience in which historically and medically 
specific orientation to possibility sustains new artistic forms, forms that themselves 
sustain addiction-like experience of intense pursuit of possibility.  
In addition to possible-worlds theory’s attention to modality, two additional 
theoretical positions have aided my study of how possibility is accessed from material 
actuality for the creation of literary realms that provide ongoing experiences of 
possibilities. The first is the ecocritical, materialist, or speculative-realist argument that 
possibilities registered for narrative-making inhere in material experience (this 
corresponds, roughly, with the “activist” formalism characterizing my study). The second 
theoretical view relevant to my project is that of affect theorists, who describe desirous, 
embodied emotional senses that shape thought about the world’s possibilities (this 
corresponds, roughly, with the “normative” formalism characterizing my study). Studies 
of affect remind us that senses of the world are so often approached through feeling with 
some bodily, material ramification. Similarly, the addiction texts covered here give us 
possible worlds of intensely pursued mystery and correspondingly intensified, affective 
compulsions toward possibility in their represented worlds. Both theoretical 
frameworks—that of materialism and affect theory—concern narratable possibility 
humans locate in physical actuality. Both help us understand how aesthetic forms engage 
a sense of possibilities in phenomena. 
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Materialist scholars have examined, for example, the commercial variety of 
material possibility that nineteenth-century writers exploited.34 Elaine Freedgood has 
described how “the literal material qualities of things,” frequently commodified, are put 
to use in Victorian novels with regard to their politically loaded “large, historically 
enriched figural possibilities” (28). Ecocritics have pointed out how commercial 
consumption in general demonstrated to Romantics an expanse of possibilities that we 
might pursue in the material world: Timothy Morton describes ways in which widespread 
consumerism in the context of a global empire, for instance, contributed to Romantic 
literary attitudes toward a new global space;35 Lawrence Buell, in The Future of 
Environmental Criticism, has drawn from Thoreau especially while outlining 
environmental criticism’s role in addressing developments in global versus regional 
spatial coordinates in a world of global commerce.36 For both Buell and Morton, writers 
in the Romantic or Transcendentalist tradition appear especially aware of perplexing new 
spaces and places developed through the processes of commerce and consumption, and 
Freedgood argues that Victorian texts were inflected by the forces of material 
consumption that shape a social order.37 Each of these critics observes that nineteenth-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Work by scholars of Victorian material culture has further clarified how writers addressed consumption 
loaded with social meaning. I am referring to studies such as The Empire Inside: Indian Commodities in 
Victorian Domestic Novels by Suzanne Daly and Novel Craft: Victorian Domestic Handicraft and 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction by Talia Schaffer. 
35 “Environmental Romanticism argues that globalization has undermined any coherent sense of place” 
(Morton, Ecology without Nature 84). 
36 “Thoreau’s masterpiece was a local book addressed in the first instance to a regional readership . . . that 
spends much more time analogizing between its place and other landscapes and cultures around the world” 
(Buell, Future of Environmental Criticism 83). 
37 The literary tradition I discuss spans the divide between Romanticism and Victorianism because 
addiction discourse developed throughout the nineteenth century. Studies of the relationship between the 
two eras often view Victorianism as something separate, as a reaction to Romanticism’s excessive 
desires—examples of such arguments can be found in Joel Faflak and Julia Wright’s edited collection, 
Nervous Reactions: Victorian Recollections of Romanticism. While such a reaction no doubt existed (see 
any number of Victorian novels in which unruly individuals become chastened), Victorian literary 
production also intensified the Romantic sense of potent, desirous habits. When reading with attention to 
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century writers accessed some manner of worldly possibility sensed and exploited in 
materiality and in turn engaged greater conversations about the state of their world. 
In writer after writer examined in this study, I have found a related fascination 
with the production of realms through intensified consumerist tendencies registered in 
terms of addiction discourse.38 The writers who patterned their texts after addiction 
forged literature that shared addictive consumption’s world-shaping orientation to 
possibility, without addictive consumption’s chemical, immediate risks.39 Writers of 
nineteenth-century addiction texts could thus deal with historically specific material 
circumstances while producing imaginative, speculative realms. Speculative realists have 
their own explanation for such simultaneously imaginative and material existences, an 
explanation that resonates with my argument about producers of addiction-like 
literature;40 Ian Bogost has argued that “[it] is ultimately impossible for one thing to 
understand the experience of another, but we can speculate about the withdrawn, inner 
experience of things based on a combination of evidence—the exhaust they leave 
behind—and poetics—the speculative work we do to characterize that experience.” In the 
eyes of such a speculative realist, we spend our material lives with regard to possible 
worlds, always thinking about an unattainable something when we consider materiality. 
A condition like addiction (again: not literal addiction) that inclines us further toward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
addiction tropes, then, similarities often seem greater than the differences between Victorian and Romantic 
literature; in both De Quincey’s and Robert Louis Stevenson’s writings on intoxicating habits we find a 
similar orientation toward exploration via repetitive consumption.  
38 For an extended analysis of the capitalist production of space, see Henri Lefebvre’s study of the subject.  
39 Thus, while I draw evidence from historical accounts that consider Romantic literature and its derivatives’ 
use of addiction tropes for ideologically interested definitions of individual desires (and consequently for 
forcefully warping the actual, social world), I mainly consider moments when such addiction tropes were 
used consciously to produce imagined narrative worlds. I am, still, indebted to Clifford Siskin for his 
overview of the rise of addiction discourse during the Romantic era, and Jerome McGann’s study of The 
Romantic Ideology has also been helpful in its exploration of how an ideology of individual growth came to 
define the age’s literature, emphasizing the necessary link between Romantic imagination and historical 
context. 
40 See especially Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. 
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material possibility, then, offers strategies for recognizing more profoundly that same 
speculative existence.  
One additional implication of this project’s central argument—the argument that 
nineteenth-century writers forged literary worlds of intensified possibility using patterns 
similar to those found in material addiction—is precisely this entanglement of affective, 
aesthetic experience with investigatory quest into the unknown. The possible worlds of 
addiction-like literature are worlds for affectively vivid exploration (see the thrilling, 
tormenting labyrinths and mazes in De Quincey’s work). That entanglement of feeling 
and learning through repetitive experience is nothing new. Something emotionally 
compels the steady procession that Thomas Kuhn observes running through scientific 
paradigms, for instance, and desirous feeling seems suggested by much scientific 
experimentation that moves endlessly toward falsifiability (as Karl Popper describes it). 
The paradigms Kuhn tells of in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions survive according 
to a repetitive and wishful movement toward the possible: “The success of a paradigm,” 
writes Kuhn, “is at the start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and still 
incomplete examples” (23–24). Scientists receive a promise—let us say, for instance, of 
teleportation or intergalactic travel—and then pursue that promise of success hopefully. 
That Kuhnian advancement of science would typically rely on some degree of feeling, 
some speculative, hopeful (optative) mood.  
Addicted and addict-like scientists in the nineteenth-century underscored that 
relationship between science and feeling. In the later half of the century, as I have 
mentioned, Freud demonstrated confusion between his own enjoyed, addictive pursuits 
and scientific experiment while defending his advocacy of cocaine as a treatment for 
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morphine addiction in an essay on “Craving for and Fear of Cocaine.”41 His habitual use 
of cocaine blurred the difference between physician, scientist, and patient; the medical 
application of a drug and the scientific observation of repeatable phenomena were in 
Freud’s case also the sickness of addiction. Even when Freud would deny the extent of 
cocaine’s addictive properties, he discussed his own experimental “regular use” of the 
drug “over long periods”—a use he enjoyed quite enthusiastically, thereby fusing 
scientific method and aesthetic pleasure (Cocaine Papers 173). 
Theresa Brennan describes affect in particular as always a self-interested way of 
investigating the world; she writes that it “carries a message of self-interest along with 
the attention it rides on” (41). Addiction, a matter of both repetitive experiment and affect 
regulation, clarifies (because it intensifies) the affectively compelling element of studious 
attention to the still-to-be-encountered.42 All this might start to resemble the death drive 
as described in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where Freud outlines the compulsion to 
repeat that moves us, feelingly, toward something always beyond repetition. Yet when 
reviewing the addiction-like techniques in Victorian writing, we see more than just paths 
to mental blankness; we see a formal, repetitive union between science and the arts, 
between experiment and aesthetics, and between cognition and feeling. Ruth Leys has 
criticized the relatively recent turn to affect in the humanities as a turn away from 
attention toward cognition, signification, and the ideologies that work through those 
means (437). A more nuanced take, she argues, relies upon “thick descriptions of life 
experiences of the kind that are familiar to anthropologists and novelists” (471). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 In the Cocaine Papers, Freud writes, “I have had broad experience with the regular use of cocaine over 
long periods of time by persons who were not morphine addicts, and have taken the drug myself for some 
months” (173). 
42 See, for one of many studies on addiction and affect regulation, Timothy Carmody’s “Affect Regulation, 
Tobacco Addiction, and Smoking Cessation.” 
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addiction-like strategies of nineteenth-century writers, I argue, provided just that, 
weaving together affective desire with knowledge-acquisition. Such strategies show 
material existence, speculation, and feeling joining in the experience of intensified 
possibility.  
The addiction aesthetic’s adventurous union of feeling and thinking can help 
explain why calling something like Breaking Bad “addictive” does not disparage it. 
Instead, we can regard so-called addictive forms such as streaming TV and videogames 
just as nineteenth-century readers thought of serial novels: as repetitive experiences that 
sustain an ongoing sense of possibility, continually taking the audience toward 
strangeness and new understanding in realms of intense mystery. When encountering 
those literary worlds, so modally oriented toward possibility, strangeness, or otherness in 
repetitive language, we stand to learn a great deal from close attention to the formal 
devices and stylistic patterns by which their modal orientations are expressed. Frederic 
Bogel argues for similar formal attention that specifically produces “apprehension of 
otherness” in texts (15), and some manner of otherness—the speculative, the unattained, 
the always merely wanted, the possible—is precisely what addiction literature directs 
itself toward most intensely.  
 
Project Overview 
In my next chapter, I consider The Cenci, Percy Shelley’s Gothic tragedy, in light 
of Shelley’s early essays on diet, in which he registered concern with the world-changing 
potency of alcohol habits. The characters in Shelley’s play are terrorized by the brutal 
Count Cenci, whose predation is often preceded by and articulated with regard to his 
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drinking. Shelley himself was committed to abstention from alcohol, and in his writings 
on vegetarianism he was clear about the dangers he saw in habitual alcohol use: he 
argued that tyranny and violence stemmed directly from habits of excess and alcohol 
consumption, and he was an early proponent of temperance in light of developing 
medical understandings of alcohol habit. Yet in his later essays, Shelley also describes 
poetic achievement and understanding in terms very much like those he used to describe 
alcohol habit—in terms of habits that alter the shape of the world. Habitual intoxication, 
then, was an aesthetic and ethical problem that Shelley needed to address, and he did so 
in both his essays and The Cenci. Beatrice, Count Cenci’s daughter who brings the Count 
to justice, speaks of a better set of patterns, sympathetic patterns that build knowledge of 
others and that can create a better world than the addict’s. This, I argue, foreshadows the 
patterns used by writers following the Romantics—those literary patterns that support 
reflective thought about difference rather than, in the manner of literal drug addiction, 
deathly, mindless pursuit. Shelley, I contend, arrived at a belief in the possible-world-
creating and world-enhancing power of such salutary habits after first contemplating the 
brutal world-making power of addictive habits. In the poetic repetitions of The Cenci’s 
dialogue, Shelley evokes both kinds of habits and shows how their different patterns 
structure differently shaped and known worlds: an enclosed realm in Count Cenci’s case 
and an expansive and imaginatively liberating one in Beatrice’s, which models the 
efficaciousness of the merely addiction-like for future construction of possible worlds 
and for consideration of broader variety. 
Thomas De Quincey, in his Confessions of an English Opium-Eater, recounts a 
harmful substance habit as well, but he also connects the condition more directly to his 
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personal aesthetic achievements. The relationship between actual addiction and 
addiction-like literary strategies thus becomes even closer; De Quincey more firmly 
established a basis for addiction-like literature of ongoing consideration of possibility 
built around stories of actual addiction. In chapter three, I examine how De Quincey in 
his Confessions emphasizes investigative and aesthetic properties of addiction and then 
exhibits the creative potential of such compulsive, investigative aesthetic pursuit. In the 
Confessions, De Quincey describes his younger self’s addicted behavior and employs 
addiction’s patterns to shape and evoke imagined worlds—such as the Piranesi labyrinth 
he describes, a place for expansive wandering and repetitive grasping for more (if any 
writer in this study comes close to erasing distinctions between addiction and the 
addiction-like, even if momentarily, it is De Quincey). This chapter thus concerns the 
literary realms of intense possibility patterned after De Quincey’s drug habit. Here, I 
consider how drug habits were approached as a danger, much as Shelley took alcohol use 
to be, but as a danger with at least some formal properties to be extracted and repurposed 
for literary benefit.  
Poets of the Victorian era further developed an aesthetic experience of vexed 
interrelationship between self and other through the conflicted “double poem” (as Isobel 
Armstrong has described it). Chapter four deals with two representative poets of this 
contradiction-conveying form: Alfred Tennyson and Christina Rossetti. Both wrote 
poetry constituted of patterns that we might normally associate with ordered thinking—
such as the scientific patterns of Tennyson’s work or the religious patterns of Rossetti’s. 
Both, however, also located creative, productive potential in ongoing patterns that always 
drive toward more, and both figured patterned pursuits as addiction-like. Tennyon’s and 
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Rossetti’s poems, I argue, present unhealthy thinking that still proves aesthetically and 
intellectually productive. In Tennyson’s case, I will consider this addiction-like poetry as 
it appears especially in “The Lotos-Eaters,” and in Rossetti’s, I examine the exploratory 
but troublingly toxic habits in her “Goblin Market.” 
Chapter five begins a consideration of the Victorian novel and the central role 
addicts play as knowers and participants in the plots of two major texts: Charles 
Dickens’s Bleak House and George Eliot’s Middlemarch. Both novels involve at least 
one plot-compelling opium-user—Bleak House’s Nemo (in a story populated by other 
habitual consumers of intoxicants) and Middlemarch’s recovered opium-experimenter, 
Will Ladislaw. Both novels have passages in which addiction and addiction-like thinking 
structure a search for knowledge mixed with aesthetic enjoyment. In either case, that 
pursuit replicates the patterns of addiction in the novel itself, shaping an episodically 
articulated novelistic world of labyrinthine places there to be pondered endlessly. It was 
in the same mid-Victorian period that Charles Darwin undertook his own studies of 
habit’s role in a fluidly evolving kind of ecological habitation (studies that would have 
particular relevance for Eliot), and the epigraph to Darwin’s On the Origin of Species 
itself compares scientific searching to habitual intoxication.43 In Eliot’s novel especially, 
I argue, a related Darwinian experience and understanding is achieved by the sober addict, 
the recovered Will Ladislaw. 
Chapter six considers one further formal discovery made with regard to addiction, 
one additional literary payoff of an intense reliance on optative language of addictively 
constant wishing. The literary payoff: plots of indolent, vicarious pursuit strongly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Quoting Francis Bacon’s Advancement of Learning, Darwin’s epigraph reads: “let no man out of a weak 
conceit of sobriety . . . think or maintain, that a man can search too far or be too well studied in the book of 
God’s word, or in the book of God’s works” (Origins 89). 
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suggestive of cinema. Drug habits in the nineteenth century were frequently understood 
to relate to indolence, yet a drug habit also meant that one would have a constant wish to 
pursue a specific, desired drug, as well. A narrative of vicarious movement—a story 
carried out optatively—could thus reflect narrative reliance on addiction. The sixth 
chapter centers on Robert Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, 
which tells of characters who investigate lazily while habitually drinking wine or 
experimenting with a drink compared to alcohol; they are constantly wandering 
sluggishly, often exploring through mediation, whether in the case of Jekyll adventuring 
about through the avatar of Hyde or the lawyer Utterson’s tendency to investigate by way 
of letters and gossip. Both bibulous characters, Jekyll and Utterson, pursue from a 
distance, optatively and vicariously. Stevenson describes this vicarious movement in 
cinematic terms, suggesting the future of repetitively consumed aesthetic experience. 
These chapters by no means cover the whole history of the addiction aesthetic. 
There are major nineteenth-century addiction-like writings that do not have chapters 
devoted to them, such as Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories and Edgar Allan 
Poe’s entire body of work. Both of those, however, can be understood through the central 
terms of my study. The association of pleasurable investigation with addiction in terms of 
episodic experience is perhaps most enduringly expressed in Conan Doyle’s stories about 
his great detective; in The Sign of Four, Holmes himself relates his drug habits to 
investigation, both of which give him “mental exaltation” (124). His investigations, 
accordingly, take on a repetitive episodic form much like his drug use. Still earlier than 
Conan Doyle, Edgar Allan Poe created his own thrilling fictions around seekers with a 
proclivity for addictive consumption, such as the narrator of “The Purloined Letter,” 
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whose inquisitive contemplation begins the story along with the enjoyment of “a 
meerschaum” (208). Poe and Conan Doyle both had major characters drawn to opium, 
and both had read much De Quincey. They thrived within the tradition discussed in the 
following pages. Yet I mention them only in passing, first because an adequate study of 
Poe’s intricate use of addiction-like strategies would necessitate at least a whole book, 
and second because Conan Doyle’s use of addiction-like, episodic form for narratives of 
investigation intensifies formal strategies already covered in my chapters on earlier 
writers such as Stevenson and Dickens. In my effort to avoid redundancy, I have included 
Sherlock Holmes as a reference point without giving him his own chapter. More work on 
the role of addiction in the writings of Poe and Conan Doyle surely must be done, but 
they remain beyond the scope of the present project to identify and examine the literary 
origins and functions of the aesthetic of addiction.  
 
Distinction between Literal Addiction and the Aesthetic of Addiction 
A series of warnings, clarifications, and distinctions seems necessary, especially 
when writing about ideas drawn from a condition that destroys lives. First—I repeat for 
emphasis—the medical problem of addiction is not the hero of this study. Quite the 
opposite. The writers whose work I examine all saw addiction as a central problem of 
their age, and they responded to its threat through literature that drew from addiction’s 
great power and patterns but could not succumb to its physiological will-control. Among 
other things, such an approach is in keeping with the enduring strategy of replacing one 
addiction with another set of compelling patterns—nicotine gum for tobacco, AA mantras 
and ritual meetings for alcohol, methadone for heroin. I am not, however, presenting the 
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authors here—except for Percy Shelley—as temperance writers, and I generally seek to 
avoid making too many claims about their intentions, which were varied and inconsistent. 
What remains consistent among the writers in this study is simply their engagement with 
addiction for aesthetic strategies related to ongoing pursuit of possibility. 
Today, works that suit the aesthetic of addiction do not need to deal with 
addiction as a subject matter. But among the precursors to such contemporary serial 
amusements we find a preponderance of addicted characters and narratives of addictive 
pursuit of knowledge. The iconic, original, most widely read mystery stories—indeed, 
some of the most widely read, thought-to-be-addictive fictions of the Victorian era—were 
structured around addicted investigators.44 The aesthetic of addiction we now live with 
thus developed through texts that actually narrated substance dependence in stories of 
repetitive possibility-pursuit.  
But just as not every addictive story deals with substance dependence, not every 
story about addiction applies so intensely aesthetic strategies of addiction as I have 
defined them, which require attention to the addiction-like processes of investigation 
through reiterated experiment. Thomas Hardy’s Mayor of Casterbridge and Anne 
Brontë’s Tenant of Wildfell Hall, for example, both have narratives structured around 
addicted central characters, but in both cases the patterns stemming from addiction do not 
work so strongly as repetitions in pursuit of understanding—the addict’s repetitions in 
these two books are life-destroying, and few addiction-like habits of investigation arise to 
overcome literal addiction in either text. Still, temperance novels and works such as 
Brontë’s and Hardy’s contributed to the development of the aesthetic of addiction first by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 To take one of many examples: Henry Mansel in The Quarterly Review bemoaned the addictive, 
“ravenous appetite” (502) fed by sensation fiction, of which Dickens was, Mansel thought, a particularly 
effective producer. 
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demonstrating the plot-causing capability of addictive desire and second by 
demonstrating the dangers of actual addiction, dangers that other writers opposed or 
subordinated to the more creative powers of the addiction-like.  
In the world outside this dissertation, that addiction-like strategy is so commonly 
used, the word “addictive” deployed in such a cliché manner, that I would blame no 
reader who finds my own discussion of the word irritating.45 But I do not mean to extend 
the cliché’s dominion, nor do I aim to diagnose fictional characters. I seek only to 
understand how the popular—perhaps clichéd—aesthetic of addiction works, what it 
offers us, and how it derived from the actual, literal experience of substance dependence. 
To do so, I will occasionally refer to the medical sense of addiction as substance 
dependence, which is what I mean by “literal addiction” (I do not describe habits of 
gambling, sex, junk food, or exercise as literal addictions, whether or not they might be—
nor do I claim that the aesthetic of addiction is a literal, physiological dependence; by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 We continue to live with our own versions of an aesthetic of addiction, with our own forms for sustaining 
aesthetic habits. Novels, films, television shows, and videogames have persisted in dealing with addicted 
characters engaged in episodic plots about the incessant hunt for possibility. David Foster Wallace’s 
Infinite Jest, an epic novel about drug addiction in a speculative reality, places addiction at the center of a 
culture haunted by the need for entertainment that never satisfies completely, unless it kills or otherwise 
incapacitates its victims [Wallace, incidentally, wrote his undergraduate thesis at Amherst College on 
modal logic, and that thesis is now published as Fate, Time, and Language: An Essay on Free Will (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010)]. More addiction-narrative examples are probably unnecessary for 
the reader conversant in twentieth-century popular culture; again and again, artists have turned to the topic 
of addiction when exploring the issue of wanting and thinking in ways that cannot ever be satisfied. The 
different levels of mediation that feed this hunger in Infinite Jest—videogames, televideo avatars, film 
cartridges, drugs themselves—are familiar parts of the general postmodern problem of repetitive 
signification without a grounded center. Infinite Jest presents the healing capacities of cliché, of Alcoholics 
Anonymous with its mantras and patterns (Wallace’s novel also explicitly promotes Alcoholics 
Anonymous in the fine print by the copyright information), as corrective forces opposed to the limiting 
self-focus of real addiction. This sort of repetitive, addiction-like experience is held to bear more salutary 
potential than the aesthetic categories noted by Sianne Ngai in Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, 
Interesting. For Ngai, the zany, the cute, and the interesting represent experience of “hypercommodified, 
information-saturated, performance-driven conditions of late capitalism” (1). The addiction-like as I am 
defining it, however, offers sober exploration of possibility through reiterations—it offers ways out of the 
patterns Ngai notes in the other categories, and it does so by providing patterns that broaden thought about 
possibility. 
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“literal addiction” I stick to the terms of medical discourse over the past two centuries 
that has most commonly explained addiction as a dependence on substances such as 
alcohol, nicotine, opium, and caffeine). I make no strong differentiation between different 
kinds of substance dependence, however; addiction based on substance dependence is, 
regardless of substance, a matter of regulated affect toward a desired substance, and that 
affect regulation remains similar (though with obvious and varying degrees of intensity) 
whether the drug is opium, alcohol, or nicotine. The drugs have different effects, and the 
intensity of addictions varies by substance, but the basic mechanism of addiction persists. 
My examples of addictive substances in this study thus will range from tobacco to 
alcohol to opium, all habit-forming substances that lead to affect regulation, and in the 
nineteenth century, as I will show, the addictive effects of that range of substances were 
already thought to be strongly related. To this day, in fact, dependence on different 
substances is understood as basically the same condition: “The symptoms of Dependence,” 
notes the DSM-IV, “are similar across the various categories of substances” (176). And 
that dependence, whatever the substance, has set the patterns for aesthetic strategies of 
addiction that originated when writers first built texts around habitual consumption of a 
variety of drugs. 
De Quincey saw substance dependence set those patterns quite clearly in his own 
case and in Coleridge’s, and writers after De Quincey would continue to use such 
addiction-like strategies to create their own texts of repetitive investigations. Of the 
writers who did so, once more, almost all represented actual substance dependence as a 
great peril while posing the addiction-like as a relatively beneficial experience (producing 
exploratory awareness). And so, while actual addiction has represented much of what 
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remains harmful in modern approaches to otherness—such as mindless consumerism’s 
unhealthy appetites—addiction-like work, such as Coleridge’s writing in De Quincey’s 
view, came to offer benefits like awareness of difference tied to sameness, a sense of 
ceaseless exploration and intellectual curiosity linked to personal sensations and feelings, 
and creative engagement with the strangeness persisting in habitual life. This was a new 
kind of aesthetic experience, departing from the more simply organized aesthetics of the 
sublime and the beautiful.46 Addiction-like experiences are rather like that which an 
especially insightful addict described as “uncanny,” bridging the familiar with the 
unfamiliar, and they can be found in great abundance today in a variety of forms and 
media. 
 No matter the medium, however, addiction-like experience as I have defined it 
remains the same: it intensifies a union between affect and speculation while representing 
a link between the repetitively quotidian and speculative possibility. This is an aesthetic 
experience that offers us insight into how we imagine, think, and create by sensing in 
material circumstances an ever-present suggestion of something else.  
 
Terms and Definitions 
 
The addiction aesthetic (also referred to herein as the addiction-like): This is the chief 
subject of my study, and I explore this aesthetic particularly as it developed through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Prior to addiction’s establishment (as a medical problem and as an aesthetic), eighteenth-century 
aesthetic categories of the beautiful, the sublime, and the picturesque had made distinctions between vast 
sublimity and picturesque smallness (for an overview, see Walter John Hipple Jr.’s The Beautiful, the 
Sublime, and the Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory). But, I argue, De Quincey’s 
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater and other addiction texts would demonstrate how something as 
small and mundane as consumption patterns might prompt imaginative digressions of the grandest scale.  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   41	  
literature. The addiction aesthetic is one in which we repeatedly and intensely consider 
the possible, often through art or narrative, without becoming physiologically dependent 
or focused on a single substance. This intensely repetitive movement toward something 
novel thus lacks the gravest risks of literal addiction and contains real potential for 
invention. In the nineteenth century, such addiction-like experience was often articulated 
with regard to other known, intensely repetitive movements toward novelty, such as 
scientific experiment and investigation, and narratives of addiction often treated addicts 
or the addict-like as investigators who lived and thought extremely repetitively. 
Developments within this aesthetic category include, most famously, serial mystery 
fiction. 
 
Substance dependence (also known as literal addiction): This denotes physical 
dependency on a substance, which involves never-satisfied, ongoing pursuit of that 
substance. That pursuit keeps the addict in a condition of constantly wanting and 
intensely considering possibility (however limited the focus of that consideration might 
be). 
 
Possible world: a set of linked possibilities, often conceived of as one explores our actual 
world. Fiction works as one such possible world, forged by desire-like creativity, and its 
fictionality can be intensified through the sense of possibility attained by addiction-like 
strategies.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SHELLEY, ALCOHOL, AND THE “WORLD WE MAKE”: PLACE-MAKING 
HABITS IN THE CENCI 
 
Beginning in 1818, Percy Shelley’s travels through Italy brought him again and 
again to the story of Beatrice Cenci, the sixteenth-century Italian aristocrat who was 
executed for killing her abusive father. In Livorno, Shelley read an account of Beatrice; 
in Rome, he saw the supposed portrait of her that had been attributed to Guido Reni; later, 
he strolled through “the grim buildings of the Palazzo Cenci down by the Tiber Island, 
with its iron-fenced windows and its small dim courtyard” (Holmes 513). Repeated 
encounters with Beatrice’s story—through text, painting, and architecture—had patterned 
Shelley’s Italy, and in his tragedy The Cenci, Shelley would likewise show habit’s 
patterns shaping the places experienced by his characters. 
This chapter argues, first, that engagement with early nineteenth-century 
discourse on intemperate habits had prepared Shelley to reflect on how habit’s patterns 
shape the world we experience, and, second, that The Cenci displays Shelley’s view of 
aesthetic patterns as a world-shaping force that shares habit’s potency. After composing 
The Cenci, Shelley explicitly defined habit as poetic in his Defence of Poetry, where he 
writes that habits—behavioral recurrences—and poetry—artful linguistic recurrence—are 
synonymous (513).47 Both habit and poetry, as Shelley describes them, provide 
reiterations by which we give formal shape to our world. He had earlier described that 
function of dietary habit in “A Vindication of Natural Diet,” where he contends that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 References to essays and poetry by Shelley are, unless otherwise noted, from Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 
ed. Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). 
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habitual alcohol use creates oppressive places (82);48 he suggests thoughtful poetry’s 
patterns as a corrective response to those problems of material excess in the Defence of 
Poetry (531). Poetry, for Shelley in the Defence, serves as a tool by which a writer 
“creates anew the universe after it has been annihilated in our minds by the recurrence of 
impressions blunted by reiteration” (533); this occurs through poetry’s own patterns or 
“recurrence” that tend to “produce in the mind an habit of order and harmony” (534). In 
The Cenci, Shelley similarly poses Beatrice’s thoughtfully poetic patterns, through which 
she speaks of a harmoniously ordered world, against the annihilating and imprisoning 
reiterations of a habitual predator and sickly, intemperate consumer, her father.  
The argument that Beatrice effectively, radically opposes Count Cenci departs 
from a tradition of criticism that holds, as Jerrold Hogle has argued, that Beatrice’s 
retributive violence tragically reflects Count Cenci’s violence. While Beatrice is indeed 
heroic in her stance against her tormenter, Hogle notes, “she is also ‘tragic’ in showing 
how much the logic she assaults has become so thoroughly her own” (693). Undeniably, 
Beatrice has been trapped in the world ruled by her father, imprisoned in his violent 
scheme, and her own rebellion does participate in that world’s brutality: she directs her 
father’s slaying by intimidating her henchmen (IV.iii.22–36). She is a tragic heroine, 
flawed and troubled, and it is precisely that miserable, tragic element that Shelley sought 
to impart: “Revenge, retaliation, atonement, are pernicious mistakes,” he writes in The 
Cenci’s preface. “If Beatrice had thought in this manner she would have been wiser and 
better; but she would never have been a tragic character” (142). While her conflict with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Here Shelley describes how alcohol consumption debases populations, and he specifically uses the 
example of Paris under Robespierre. From The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, vol. 1, ed. E.B. 
Murray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 77–91). 
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her father proves disastrous, then, Beatrice is also intended to evoke tragedy’s emotional 
response of pity in her audience, because the destruction of her very being is so 
distressing. This brings us, however, to one reason why Beatrice cannot be said to share 
entirely the logic of Count Cenci: while the Count gives himself over to intemperate 
habits and tyrannical violence, Beatrice consciously calls for a repetitive sympathetic 
response, “constant” love, while speaking forth patterns that would shape a more caring 
world (V.iv.146–149). She asks for others to experience sympathy, pity, and love when 
thinking of her story: in effect, then, she authors her own tragedy, and she calls for the 
opposite of the patterned, toxic behavior represented by the tyrant. 
Reading The Cenci with attention to its different kinds of constancy and habit 
does more than reveal the stark differences between its two main characters. We can also 
see how Shelley’s characterization of Count Cenci in terms of toxic habits—anticipating 
addiction discourse of the later nineteenth century—dramatizes a kind of villainy Shelley 
had pondered in earlier work on consumption and clarifies the radically creative 
departure from damaging material habits that Shelley would call for elsewhere. In “A 
Vindication of Natural Diet,” Shelley had argued that Parisians had submitted to 
Robespierre’s brutality under the influence of their own intoxicating drinks (82). 
Shelley’s Cenci—an avowed sadist who at “sight of agony” feels a “sense of joy” and 
“no remorse” (I.i.82-84)—proves likewise to produce an especially destructive worldly 
scheme when influenced by intemperate habits. Those sickly material habits, I will show, 
extend Cenci’s evil into repetitively patterned, worldly form while Beatrice, heroically 
resistant, speaks forth different patterns of sympathy through which she calls for a better 
future.  
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These two characters, articulating different kinds of recurrences, evoke differently 
patterned areas—an actual dungeon in Count Cenci’s case and an imagined, expansive 
realm in Beatrice’s. Two senses of place are at issue in The Cenci, then: one is a socially 
ordered physical realm that the tyrannical Cenci devises, and the other is the largely 
imagined one that his daughter Beatrice speaks into being so that it may someday become 
actual. Cenci, first, delights in ruining lives and creating entrapping circumstances for his 
victims as a matter of routine, of habit, and in the most physiological terms; he says that 
he “rarely” kills a victim in order to maintain a suffering body as “a strong prison” 
(I.i.114–115). While this horrible scheme constructed by Cenci’s routines has been 
examined by scholars, however, more remains to be said about the universal place 
Beatrice describes. Beatrice, too, speaks both repetitively and about habits, and she also 
speaks into existence her own sense of place, but it is a place wholly different from her 
father’s, an imagined place for sympathy and pity that Beatrice’s audience has inhabited 
over the course of centuries. She calls for “constant” love (V.iv.146) and imagines a 
broader realm where sympathetic connections span all differences: “I am as universal as 
the light,” she ultimately says, “Free as the earth-surrounding air; as firm / As the world’s 
centre” (IV.iv.48–50). She establishes this new sense of place in language of constancy 
and recurrence, and therefore she deploys some of the formal logic of her father’s place-
making, but Beatrice thinks more expansively, idealistically, and without concern for 
personal appetite. Hers is merely addiction-like thinking. The patterns she speaks can 
shape possible worlds with all the potency of more perilous, material patterns, but she is 
not limited to the narrow focus of substance dependence. The Cenci thus displays, with 
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its Shelleyan sense of reiteration that shapes the world, idealist possibility emerging 
within a materialist context.49 
 
Terminology 
Some of this chapter’s key terms, because they are so closely interrelated, can 
here benefit from clarification: 
 “Addiction” and “alcoholism” are terms Shelley and his contemporaries would 
not have used to describe habitual alcohol use, so here I will frequently use terms like 
“intemperance,” widely employed in Shelley’s era. Our contemporary sense of addiction, 
however, closely relates to Shelley’s understanding of intemperance, excess, and alcohol 
use.50 Shelley, as I discuss below, had studied and quoted work on alcohol habits that 
overrun will, work that would prove foundational for medical senses of addictive habit. 
By “habit,” I refer to any behavioral recurrence, willed or unwilled, especially those that 
became viewed as pattern-making by Shelley. “Pattern” I use to refer to the forms 
generated by recurrences—poetic and behavioral recurrences alike. 
 
Places Patterned by Habit and Poetry 
The medical discourse that informed Shelley’s ideas on both habit and world-
shaping reiteration had come to his attention early. In his 1813 “Vindication of Natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Angela Leighton addresses the coexistence of Shelley’s empirical, materialist thinking with his 
comparatively abstract and idealist sense of sublimity in Shelley and the Sublime: An Interpretation of the 
Major Poems. Shelley, she writes, “moves progressively from reliance on empirical arguments, which 
support his radicalism and atheism, to an interest in the sublime,” but Leighton adds that “the two 
perspectives remain in conflict throughout his life” (vii). 
50	  The years preceding Shelley’s writing on diet and perilous habits saw a number of texts that influenced 
addiction discourse. See, for instance, George Young’s Treatise on Opium or Erasmus Darwin’s Zoonomia, 
which discusses both the power of habit over the body in general (I.35) and the dangers specifically of 
excessive use of “spirituous liquor” (see I.234).	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Diet,” Shelley quotes Thomas Trotter, a late eighteenth-century pioneering scholar on 
alcohol abuse (87). Trotter describes habitual inebriation as illness rather than solely a 
moral failing—he writes that drunkenness is “a disease of the mind” (174). Shelley would 
adopt that sense of customary inebriation as a condition that alters the mind for the worse, 
though he would expand upon Trotter’s discussion to portray how those altered minds 
shape society. He wrote The Cenci in 1819, six years after his “Vindication of Natural 
Diet,” and he wrote the Defence of Poetry in 1821, and while his ideas changed over the 
course of that time, his views on habit’s potency remain remarkably consistent in these 
three works. In the “Vindication of Natural Diet,” for instance, Shelley observes the 
formidable power of sustained alcohol use, describing how thousands have become 
“domestic tyrants” and “murderers” due to liquor (82). He contends that such habitual 
consumption, moreover, alters a place: 
Who will assert, that had the populace of Paris drank at the pure source of 
the Seine, and satisfied their hunger at the ever-furnished table of vegetable 
nature, that they would have lent their brutal suffrage to the proscription-
list of Robespierre? (82) 
Paris became a torturous place, in Shelley’s view, in part because of regular alcohol 
consumption and predatory diet. This brutal place is the reversal of the harmonious, more 
expansive realm of the imagination that salutary poetic recurrence, according to Shelley’s 
Defence of Poetry, can structure.51 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 In the Defence of Poetry, too, Shelley routinely uses language of grand scales and wide scope as opposed 
to specific, reduced, localized senses of place to convey the realm of the poetic imagination. Poetry 
“enlarges the mind itself,” he writes, and “enlarges the circumference of the imagination”; poetry at its best 
offers a “widest dominion” (517). 
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In Shelley’s 1819 tragedy, Count Cenci makes his family’s dwelling-places into 
confining places of torture and terror based on his own habits of predation and 
consumption, which include a strong attachment to wine. He celebrates, for example, one 
of the many catastrophes to befall his family (the deaths of his sons) with “bright wine 
whose purple splendor leaps / And bubbles gaily in this golden bowl / Under the lamp 
light, as my spirits do” (I.iii.77–80). Cenci’s menacing internal “spirits” and wine are 
alike here, and it is suggested elsewhere that he combines drinking and patriarchal 
abuse—Orsino, hearing from Beatrice of her father’s “dark spirit” (I.ii.61), suggests it 
could be attributed to “a free life as to wine” (I.ii.76), and Cenci himself counts alcohol 
consumption among his regular habits.52 When speaking of a possible attempt on his life 
and considering likely scenarios, Cenci asks if someone is to “Put poison in my evening 
drink? / Or smother me when overcome by wine?” (II.i.142–143). References to his 
alcoholic drinking typically occur with regard to violence, cruelty, death—results that 
Shelley’s writings on dietary habit would have predicted—and in general, toxic habits 
oppress Cenci’s victims. 
Shelley’s solution for such ills, both in his essay on vegetarianism and in his 
Defence of Poetry, was simply to apply repetitions more thoughtfully, more healthily, 
more ethically. He called for recurrences supported by sympathy; in the Defence, he 
claims that poetry especially can promote better habits by regularly activating sympathy 
in its audience, who might then forge a place or a social world founded upon regular 
admiration for others. He uses the example of Greece, of “Homer and his contemporaries,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Shelley, incidentally, was not alone in recognizing that relationship between patriarchy and toxic habit; 
the male who seeks knowledge and power was one of the more common figures of nineteenth-century 
literature’s engagement with opium. See particularly Barry Milligan’s brief discussion of Middlemarch’s 
addict and doctor in Pleasures and Pains: Opium and the Orient in Nineteenth-Century British Culture (10). 
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arguing that “the sentiments of the auditors must have been refined and enlarged by a 
sympathy with such great and lovely impersonations, until from admiring they imitated, 
and from imitation they identified themselves with the objects of their admiration” (516). 
The admirable attributes of Greece, Shelley asserts, were developed through consistent, 
behavioral replication of poetic patterns. Similarly, Beatrice speaks of creating 
sympathetic habits through poetic patterns in order to forge a superior place, accessible to 
a broader, more thoughtful audience than Count Cenci’s realm. To use Beatrice’s words: 
theirs is a struggle over the sort of “world we make, / The oppressor and the oppressed” 
(V.iii.74–75).  
Despite the importance of unhealthy habit for Shelley’s tragedy as well as for his 
writings on diet, little has been written about drug use of any kind in his work (though a 
recent essay by Katherine Singer does much to change this).53 Yet as Anya Taylor has 
noted, “Shelley, abstemious in drink, may have had a greater interest in Dionysianism 
than has been previously suspected” (131). Such an interest seems clear in Shelley’s 
writings on healthy consumption habits (particularly vegetarianism) and also holds 
relevance for his later work on salutary poetic habits. When Shelley argues in the 
Defence of Poetry that poetry could provide a cure for material excess, for instance, he 
describes idealist creativity as a response to materialist concerns about toxic habit. Poetry, 
he claims there, “is never more to be desired than at periods when, from an excess of the 
selfish and calculating principle, the accumulation of the materials of external life exceed 
the quantity of the power of assimilating them to the internal laws of human nature” 
(531). Selfish material excess harms humanity, but mind-expanding poetry offers escape 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 For a summary of Shelley’s personal encounters with laudanum, see Singer’s “Stoned Shelley: 
Revolutionary Tactics and Women Under the Influence.” 
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from this peril. In both “A Vindication of Natural Diet” and The Cenci, too, we see 
alcohol habit abetting the institution of dangerous locales, and in both texts Shelley 
opposes such habits to sympathetic patterns.54  
Shelley had, again, witnessed the beneficially world-shaping effects of 
sympathetic habits in his journey through Italy, moved by iteration after iteration of 
Beatrice’s story. In the preface to The Cenci, he writes that he observed a simultaneously 
“national and universal interest” in Beatrice’s story (141), a joining of region-
characterizing narrative and relevance to a wider realm of ideal justice, because hers was 
“a tragedy” with a long-lasting “capacity of awakening and sustaining the sympathy of 
men” (142). Accordingly, then, Shelley’s tragedy portrays Beatrice’s imaginative shaping 
of a vaster, universal scheme from her Italian locale, speaking of a greater domain 
enriched with sympathetic reiteration, while her father merely shapes a prison-world 
through his brutal habits.  
The Defence of Poetry proclaims most lucidly Shelley’s belief that poetry and 
habits could do related, place-making work. As mentioned, Shelley there argues that the 
two are synonymous: “religious and civil habits of action,” he writes, “are all the 
instruments and materials of poetry; they may be called poetry by that figure of speech 
which considers the effect as a synonime of the cause” (513).  Evidently, Shelley found 
that habit and poetry both provide tools for humans to structure their social world, 
whether these are habits of alcohol use that can form tyrannical and criminal places such 
as Paris under Robespierre (“Vindication” 82) or the poetically initiated behaviors of 
Homer’s audience that formed Greece (Defence of Poetry 516). These patterns and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Shelley is insistent about sympathy’s role in the reception of this drama; he writes in the Preface, “The 
highest moral purpose aimed at in the highest species of the drama, is the teaching the human heart, 
through its sympathies and antipathies, the knowledge of itself” (142). 
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recurrences did more than shape social places, too—they shaped Shelleyan experience of 
the world by creating the formal continuity by which the world might be understood. In 
his “Essay on the Literature, the Arts, and the Manners of the Athenians,” Shelley 
describes how repeated resemblance configures our experienced reality. He notes that the 
mind “moulds and completes the shapes in clouds, or in the fire, into the resemblances of 
whatever form, animal, building, &c., happens to be present to it” (17). Through that 
recurrence or resemblance, the mind imaginatively “completes” the world by forging and 
applying formal connections, much as (according to Shelley in his essays on diet) habit’s 
recurrence moulds the social world into reinforced form.  
One great danger for the world we make, then, would be forms of recurrence that 
deny sympathetic awareness—selfish habits, oppressive habits, poisonous habits. 
According to those who think in light of addiction discourse (which early nineteenth-
century discussions of intemperance were urging along), alcohol does not merely 
intoxicate.55 It can alter one’s habitual, mental being and consequently the societies made 
of such beings. Shelley had asserted this early, thereby anticipating later fears, voiced by 
temperance societies, that habitual alcohol use would cause societal as well as personal 
harm.56  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 While the Victorian era is more typically associated with the pathologization and medicalization of 
addiction, by Shelley’s time Thomas Trotter and others had already, in clear terms, described habitual 
alcohol use as a disease. See Trotter’s Essay, Medical, Philosophical, and Chemical, on Drunkenness, 174. 
There were other influential voices on intemperance at the time, as well. The American Benjamin Rush’s 
writings on excessive use of tobacco, tea, and alcohol became influential in Britain near the turn of the 
nineteenth century, through, for example, the adoption of his ideas by the influential Dr. John Lettsom 
(Brian Harrison 92). See also Benjamin Rush, The Drunkard’s Emblem; or, An Inquiry into the Effects of 
Ardent Spirits upon the Human Body and Mind. With an Account of the Means of Preventing, and of the 
Remedies for Curing Them.	  
56See Brian Harrison, Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England 1815–1872 for a 
history of those temperance movements. Peter Bailey in Leisure and Class in Victorian England: Rational 
Recreation and the Contest for Control, 1830–1885 describes how those Victorian temperance movements 
sought a similar end—to produce aesthetic enjoyment that might prove habitual, but less toxic than 
intemperance, “providing an alternative world of recreation” (59). 
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The Risks of Habitual Consumption 
 By the time Shelley travelled to Rome, he had read a great deal of literature on the 
benefits of good habits. He had studied David Hume, who writes, “The end of all moral 
speculations is to teach us our duty; and . . . beget correspondent habits [my italics]” 
(Enquiry 14). He had read Edmund Burke, who observes in Reflections on the Revolution 
in France that “the course of succession is the healthy habit of the British constitution” 
(109). Sympathetic habits, in particular, were understood by Enlightenment writers to 
create social stability. By such thinking, the most broadly just social harmony would 
result from customary respect for individual concerns that mirror one another. To 
establish Hume’s version of moral good, for instance, sympathy needed to become 
routine; in his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes that “we have no such extensive 
concern for society but from sympathy” (579), and, again, he asserted that the 
maintenance of that moral concern for others required inculcation of particular habits.57 
Shelley adopted a related view of sympathy’s interrelationship with good habit, a 
view evident in his contention that admirable Greek habits both sustained and resulted 
from sympathy initiated by Homeric poetry’s patterns. Yet Shelley also saw a particular 
force at work in the habitual emotions that might secure sympathy. In “On Love,” he 
writes, “We are born into the world and there is something within us which from the 
instant that we live and move thirsts after its likeness” (504). Such a repetitious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Scholars have noted how sympathy discourse maintained an intense individualism along with an intense 
commitment to others; Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature, Adela Pinch in Strange Fits of Passion writes, 
“contends that feelings are transsubjective entities that pass between persons; that our feelings are always 
really someone else’s” (19). This was a complex dynamic. In The Surprising Effects of Sympathy: 
Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau, and Mary Shelley, David Marshall reflects on Adam Smith’s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, writing about “sympathy as an epistemological and aesthetic problem” (5). 
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compulsion is a lifelong, ingrained habit, “from the instant that we live,” and it almost 
seems a natural fit for the Enlightenment scheme. As a constant “thirst” after likeness, 
however, Shelley’s internal drive leads somewhere desirously, rather than simply 
reiterating what once was. That constant thirst suggests formally patterned, habitual 
advances toward something more, something different, something elusive. In Shelley’s 
work the resulting patterns can prove either liberating or dangerous, depending on the 
pattern-maker’s attitudes toward difference and toward others. Count Cenci, for instance, 
expresses desirous thirsts repeatedly, but his are explicitly selfish thirsts for poisonous 
experiences, and they thus create frightening patterns. He “must” drink, he claims 
(I.iii.170), to aid his villainy.  
Shelley had, prior to writing “On Love,” long been concerned with the broad 
threat posed by dangerous thirsts or consumption habits as well as the salutary 
possibilities of other kinds of recurrence. In Shelley and the Revolution in Taste, Timothy 
Morton describes this especially Shelleyan idea, writing about “how individual acts of 
consumption are always caught up in something larger” (3). Richard Holmes observes 
that in the pamphlet “On the Vegetable System of Diet,” “Shelley seemed to be content to 
argue that political injustice and oppression was the consequence of indigestion” (220). 
Shelley’s interest in good diet that might eliminate injustice and widespread crime 
accompanies, in that early work, its reverse: a fear of the bad consumption habits that 
support oppressive brutality. Shelley opens “A Vindication of Natural Diet” along those 
lines: “I hold that the depravity of the physical and moral nature of man originated in his 
unnatural habits of life” (77). 
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What are these bad, unnatural habits that deprave human nature, those sickening 
practices opposed to moral habits? They are, in Shelley’s vegetarian essays, intoxicating 
and predatory habits, which must be extirpated through the practice of healthier behaviors, 
more ethically pursued thirsts. In that same essay on natural diet (where he promotes 
vegetarianism and the drinking of pure water), Shelley compares the consumption of 
animals’ flesh to an alcohol habit, citing Trotter (87). Such habit causes systemic 
problems intimately linked to the rest of humanity: 
How can we take the benefits, and reject the evils of the system, which is 
now interwoven with all the fibres of our being?—I believe that 
abstinence from animal food and spirituous liquors, would in a great 
measure capacitate us for the solution of this important question. (79) 
This connection between systemic, evil behaviors and routine alcohol consumption had 
been made elsewhere by members of Shelley’s circle. Sharon Ruston, writing of 
Shelley’s association with the surgeons John Abernethy and William Lawrence, 
compares Shelley’s views on diet to those of another radical vegetarian and student of 
Lawrence’s, Thomas Forster, who wrote an early text on alcohol abuse. Ruston notes that 
“their mutual interests in the early 1810s are highly suggestive of a shared intellectual 
circle” (118). Thomas Forster’s treatise, Physiological Reflections on the Destructive 
Operation of Spiritous and Fermented Liquors on the Animal System, relates alcohol 
abuse to bad habits in general, stating that “among the ‘evil habits’ that presently ‘act to 
our detriment’ are ‘sedentary occupations and slothful habits of life, confinement in the 
impure air of cities, irregularities of diet, peculiarities of atmosphere, and the reciprocal 
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influence of the mind and body on each other’” (qtd. Ruston 120).58 Forster came to 
know Shelley as a similarly committed believer in the dangers of certain consumption 
routines,59 and the two shared a sense of alcohol abuse’s position among habits that 
produce “confinement” in a horrible place. 
In general, Shelley was troubled by this potential unhealthiness and social 
destructiveness of habit even as he understood its aesthetic and ethical benefits (the way 
it could reinforce and establish regular, sympathetic bonds among people thirsting for 
likeness). In “On Life,” he writes: 
Let us recollect our sensations as children . . . We less habitually 
distinguished all that we saw and felt from ourselves . . . As men grow up, 
this power commonly decays, and they become mechanical and habitual 
agents. Their feelings and their reasonings are the combined result of a 
multitude of entangled thoughts, of a series of what are called impressions, 
blunted by reiteration. (507–508)  
Habit, though it may bind people and give form to sympathetic bonds, though it may 
regulate the ethical consumption of a vegetarian diet and lead to sustained tranquility, can 
also blunt feeling, sap vitality, and weaken the capacity for human connection. It can, in 
its unhealthier varieties, lose its resemblance to stable, Enlightenment habit; it can come 
to resemble the repetition-compulsion of the death drive observed by Freud in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle—through which the drive to repeat is ultimately a drive to achieve a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The science of the age bolstered such a sense of a convergence between physiology and psychology. 
Alan Richardson in The Neural Sublime describes several correspondences between Romantic idealism’s 
aesthetics and the age’s science, including “a materialist or ‘corporealist’ approach to mind” (11). 
59	  Forster is recorded describing an acquaintanceship with Shelley as well as the poet’s vegetarian views; 
see William E. A. Axon, “Dr. Thomas Forster and Shelley,” Notes and Queries s7–VI: 140 (September 1, 
1888): 161–162.	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   56	  
state beyond life (43-46)—suggesting also the addict’s self-destruction. This holds grave 
implications for Shelley’s idea of poetic patterns, which, again, for him could be 
synonymous with habits. World-shaping recurrence could be vital, imaginative, and life-
sustaining or it could be deadly. As William Keach writes in Shelley’s Style, “Shelley’s 
attitude toward language is deeply divided” between the idea of language as “entirely a 
product of mind” and an awareness that it “inevitably tends to harden into a system in 
which verbal signs limit thought to a sphere of established, habitual, ‘dead’ relations” (2).  
The filicidal, alcoholic Count Cenci quite literally produces that sphere of dead 
relations. He is the habitual, thirsty consumer gone disastrously wrong—predatory and 
destructive, voicing a violent kind of poetry in his monologues. In all his cruelty and 
psychopathic hatefulness, he is the opposite of Shelley’s ideal poet or person of ethical 
consumption habits. As Stuart Curran puts it, “Cenci embodies the disease of the 
Romantic spirit more literally than Dr. Johnson could have intended when he defined it as 
‘that hunger of imagination which preys incessantly upon life’” (75). In what follows, I 
consider how in The Cenci, Shelley characterizes that hungering disease as a bad habit 
that imprisons by shaping Cenci’s social world. In the same play, however, Shelley 
dramatizes a potential cure: the sympathetic patterns inspired by Beatrice. 
 
Count Cenci’s Gothic Realm 
The Paris of Robespierre became what it did in part because of dietary habit—
particularly because of alcoholic habits, according to the younger Shelley. In The Cenci, 
such habits also contribute to a terrifying place, now through a perversion of world-
shaping poetry (whose patterns, as we see in Cenci’s language, are dictated by his 
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consumption habits, which for him are often related to wine). Again, Shelley was 
discovering that habit itself is poetic (“religious and civil habits of action, are all the 
instruments and materials of poetry”) (Defence of Poetry 513), and in Cenci’s case, habit 
and poetry become synonymous most oppressively, turning his domestic place into a 
prison for his family.  
Cenci applies poetic language characterized by bodily reiteration to communicate 
and continue his destructive physical habits, which then imprison those he wishes to harm. 
He announces near the play’s start:  
I rarely kill the body which preserves,   
Like a strong prison, the soul within my power,  
Wherein I feed it with the breath of fear  
For hourly pain. (I.i.114–117)  
Corporeal recurrence, “hourly” recurrence of bodily suffering, produces anguish that 
structures the imprisonment of Cenci’s typical, usual victims (he “rarely” kills). Suffering 
body and suffering mind join metonymically here in “the breath of fear,” and Cenci’s 
tendencies make possible the imprisoning recurrence of that union. This is how his logic 
of toxic habits extends to the “prisons” he constructs: he speaks and commands according 
to habits that bodily contain and entrap. He orders and uses his domain for the sake of 
that habitual entrapment, taking his family, for instance, to “the Castle of Petrella” 
because it is “safely walled, and moated round about,” and it has “dungeons underground” 
as well as “thick towers” (II.i.168–170). Cenci rules over an enclosed realm in order to 
pursue routine predation. It was the Gothically oppressive architecture of that realm, 
moreover, that had seized Shelley’s attention; he notes in The Cenci’s preface that the 
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Cenci Palace, “dark and lofty” with “gloomy subterranean chambers, struck me 
particularly” (145). 
 Contemporary readers are increasingly taking note of a fundamental connection 
between the Gothic and addiction. A recent issue of Gothic Studies focuses explicitly on 
this. There Thomas H. Schmid notes the spatial dimensions of Gothic addiction, writing: 
“Isolated physical settings — prisons, dungeons, monastic cloisters, remote castles, secret 
laboratories — have of course played a frequent role in creating the ‘atmosphere’ of 
numerous Gothic novels . . . But spatial/geographical isolation can also signal varieties of 
psychological and social alienation within Gothic texts,” an isolation that, using Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein as an example, Schmid describes in terms of addiction (19). The 
construction of Gothic worlds, Schmid suggests, reflects characteristics of addiction. 
The habits through which Shelley’s Cenci makes his Gothic palace torturous 
frequently pertain to alcohol, too. Cenci exhibits this connection in language of 
compulsion and recurrence, suggesting the age’s evolving discourse on intemperance and 
anticipating Victorian thinking about alcohol compulsion. Having reflected on the deaths 
of his sons and planning further assault on his family, he addresses his drink with an 
incantatory command—and he in turn feels commanded: 
Be thou the resolution of quick youth 
Within my veins, and manhood’s purpose stern, 
And age’s firm, cold, subtle villainy; 
As if thou wert indeed my children’s blood 
Which I did thirst to drink! The charm works well; 
It must be done; it shall be done, I swear! (I.iii.173–178) 
	   	   	   	   	  
	   59	  
The drink supports his evil—the “charm works well” by affecting Cenci physiologically, 
in his veins—and Cenci is driven here through thirsty thoughts of extremely limited 
physical recurrence. Consumed wine metonymically links to Cenci’s blood (“within” his 
“veins”), which is itself genetically linked to his sons’ blood that he wishes to drink; wine 
that courses into the blood thus suggests to Cenci desired drinking of related blood. 
Intensely repetitive language of compulsion follows this consumption: “It must be done; 
it shall be done,” he says, accepting the charge of “the charm” and speaking of ensuing 
catastrophe.  
Cenci’s habitual drinking of wine sustains other villainous poetic patterns, in short. 
I have already partly quoted the passage in which, exulting over word that his sons have 
died, he cries: 
Oh, thou bright wine whose purple splendor leaps  
And bubbles gaily in this golden bowl 
Under the lamp light, as my spirits do, 
To hear the death of my accursed sons! (I.iii.77–80) 
Spirit and wine correlate here, finding harmonious recurrence through one another, and it 
is a habit-forming recurrence. Later, planning his assault on his daughter, Cenci makes 
the following demand: “Fill up this goblet with Greek wine. I said / I would not drink this 
evening; but I must” (I.iii.169–170). He must drink, he claims, even if he had not 
originally wished to do so. His is no typical alcoholic thirst—it is sadistically charged and 
monstrous—but his predation thrives through wine and matches Shelley’s earlier 
understanding of criminals’ toxic habits. His sadistic drives are given oppressively 
repetitive form by a habit that, if not explicitly termed addictive in the play, does 
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anticipate addiction’s compulsions that would be described medically as the nineteenth 
century progressed. Cenci’s predatory consumption habits create a world that entraps in a 
manner suggestive of addiction. We see him uttering into being a kind of imprisonment 
for his terrorized daughter, keeping her in “chains” (IV.i.7–8), and to complete that 
imprisonment, he seeks to establish a life-destroying diet for her: “let her food be / Poison, 
until she be encrusted round / With leprous stains!” (IV.i.128–130). He describes feeding 
his victim poison continually as a method for imprisoning through toxic consumption 
habits. 
Elsewhere, when the guests at the first act’s banquet—having heard Cenci 
celebrate the deaths of his sons—express empathy toward the victims, Cenci passes the 
wine and tells them, “Enjoy yourselves” (I.iii.96). He then articulates a place of tyranny 
structured by consumption that corresponds to his crimes, by the drinking of wine that he 
wishes to represent his son’s blood. Here, he addresses that wine: 
Could I believe thou wert their mingled blood, 
Then would I taste thee like a sacrament, 
And pledge with thee the mighty Devil in Hell, 
Who, if a father’s curses, as men say, 
Climb with swift wings after their children’s souls, 
And drag them from the very throne of Heaven, 
Now triumphs in my triumph!—But thou art 
Superfluous; I have drunken deep of joy  
And I will taste no other wine to-night. 
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Here, Andrea! Bear the bowl around. (I.iii.81–90)60 
Cenci judges the wine to be made superfluous by the already intoxicating thought of his 
son’s blood, and so he orders that the wine be shared. Again he expresses his villainy 
through the terms of alcohol consumption, encouraging its circulating repetition. And 
verbal repetition in the above passage—triumphing in triumph—builds to the word 
“superfluous,” emphasized so suddenly at the beginning of its line and followed by a 
doubly emphatic caesura. No rising and falling determines this speech. Instead, steady 
amassing contributes to excess, leading Cenci to pass the wine around to his guests. The 
bad habit poetically sets the scene. 
Cenci himself recognizes such piling, and even makes mere piling his goal, as he 
explains to his wife, Lucretia: 
When all is done, out in the wide Campagna, 
I will pile up my silver and my gold; 
My costly robes, paintings and tapestries; 
My parchments and all records of my wealth . . . (IV.i.55–58) 
His narrative comprises gain at the expense of the rest of the world; his poetic speech 
comprises a stack of empty repetitions, triumphs after disgusting triumphs, robes on 
paintings on tapestries, to no end other than the creation of a place sick with excess (a 
pile of gold and silver and parchments on a malarial swamp).61 Poetry and bad habit 
combine nightmarishly here, forging Cenci’s idea of a preferred locale. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 There is here a clear perversion of the Catholic ritual of communion. See, for more on this, Mary Finn, 
“The Ethics and Aesthetics of Shelley’s ‘The Cenci’.” See also Hugh Roberts, “Mere poetry and strange 
flesh: Shelley’s The Cenci and Calderón’s El Purgatorio de San Patricio.”  
61 See the footnote on page 176 of Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, which briefly covers the malarial 
associations with the Campagna. 
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Limits tighten around such a place, however, even as Cenci demands a pile of 
great height. His is not a domain of pure expanse—the pile he calls for is vertically 
extensive, perhaps, but not horizontally vast.62 Cenci’s world has constraints placed on it 
by his predatory habit, and his family members begin to repeat his own violent terms and 
habits. Thus Cenci can pile his wealth, but his place of power and piled-up wealth 
becomes a place of entrapment for himself as well. 
Beatrice, on the other hand, introduces a more expansive place, and Gothic 
dramatic conventions often interweave such enormous and enclosing places. “Play after 
play,” Jeffrey Cox writes, “traces a movement from an enclosed, prison-like structure 
dominated by an evil aristocrat to an open space where the lovers can be united and the 
crimes of their oppressors revealed” (128). This combination of oppressive enclosure and 
freeing openness suits Shelley’s preoccupation with habits that confine versus the wider 
places of benevolent habits that might sympathetically connect with others—which 
Beatrice, speaking of universal space, envisions. Count Cenci imprisons others, and his 
avarice drives him to expand in limiting ways that could never satisfy him, could never 
offer him freedom, and ultimately traps him. All this supports a drama of conflicting 
places, with the heroine Beatrice accessing, if only in soberly imaginative speech, the 
more universal, open place.63  
Yet for all Shelley’s advocacy of soberly willed habits of imagination, 
aestheticized addiction has come to seem like a Romantic legacy. Scholars acknowledge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Such a huge but entrapping place recalls the places imagined in other nineteenth-century literature of 
addiction, such as De Quincey’s scene based on the labyrinthine image of Piranesi’s staircase, in which 
stairs seem to repeat infinitely in a maze. See Thomas De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium 
Eater and Other Writings (78). 
63 By motivating tyrannical poetic patterns that structure the world, intemperate habit also suits what Cian 
Duffy identifies as “the Shelleyan sublime,” which emphasizes “the historical and political implications of 
the landscape” (9). 
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that a combination of medical and literary work from this period first articulated much of 
what would be considered addiction. Susan Zieger has described the almost total 
dominance of De Quincey over later nineteenth-century addiction writing.64 Clifford 
Siskin writes that De Quincey’s “Confessions, for example, was taken by the Eclectic 
Review in 1822 to be primarily a medical treatise; although today’s physicians certainly 
would not accept that classification, it remains in many cases the chief authority behind 
even their knowledge of opium’s effects” (183). Alethea Hayter observes in Opium and 
the Romantic Imagination, “Generalizations as to how opium affects the mental 
operations of all addicts began and continued to be made from the individual cases of De 
Quincey and Coleridge” (36).  
The Cenci, however, emphasizes through Beatrice willed habits that confront 
oppressive and toxic habits; Beatrice resists a habitually alcohol-drinking tyrant who uses 
the language of requirement, of compulsion—specifically, the word “must”—when 
describing his sadistic intentions: “It must be done; it shall be done, I swear!” Cenci says 
while preparing an assault (I.iii.178) as well as: “I said / I would not drink this evening; 
but I must” (I.iii.169–170). The habits that give form to Cenci’s cruelty anticipate 
addiction, then, but Beatrice directs her imaginative work in opposition to all that. By 
dramatizing habitual entrapment overcome by Beatrice’s final sense of expansive, divine 
justice and universal sympathy, Shelley’s tragedy gives voice to the possibility that we 
may poetically shape into existence a preferable social order.65 Against the dangerous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  “Distinguishing oneself from De Quincey was a problem for every nineteenth-century drug 
autobiographer,” Susan Zieger notes (39). 
65 A related radical strain has been noted elsewhere in the Gothic. See E.J. Clery, “Horace Walpole’s The 
Mysterious Mother and the Impossibility of Female Desire,” in which Clery observes Walpole’s initiation 
of the Gothic as a major phase in English drama, and finds in Walpole’s play a foregrounding of rebellious 
female desire. Clery notes “hints that female desire has its own, autonomous and selfish volition, that it 
might be impervious to the social desiderata of reproduction and the patriarchal family” (36).  
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world forged by habitual intoxication and predatory habits, Shelley thus poses 
sympathetic—if addiction-like in its intense orientation to the unattained—patterning. 
 
The Possibility of a Better Place 
Beatrice’s envisioned liberation challenges the rule of Count Cenci, who has held 
her captive in terms of noxious dietary habits, keeping her “in damp cells / Where scaly 
reptiles crawl”; he “starves her there, / Till she will eat strange flesh” (III.i.46–48). She 
fights back against such tyranny, though it comes close to eliminating her before she can 
pursue justice. Cenci’s abuses nearly digest his daughter’s physical being. She says: 
    There creeps 
A clinging, black, contaminating mist 
About me . . . ‘tis substantial, heavy, thick, 
I cannot pluck it from me, for it glues 
My fingers and my limbs to one another, 
And eats into my sinews, and dissolves 
My flesh to a pollution, poisoning 
The subtle, pure, and inmost spirit of life!  (III.i.16–23) 
There is in the language a sinister wrapping-around; the words “creeps” and “dissolves” 
creep and dissolve through enjambment into their following lines, and “substantial, heavy, 
thick” adjectives describing that “clinging, black, contaminating” wrapping are weightily 
slowed down by caesuras, creating emphatic lists of three that mirror the good list of 
“subtle, pure, and inmost.” In these lines, material, dietetic concerns match spiritual fears, 
all of which repeatedly and poetically coil around the victim, creating the lyrical form of 
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a bad habit.66 The language here clings, it contaminates, it is heavy, it is thick. The 
repetitions get increasingly worse for Beatrice. Habitual poisonous consumption (echoing 
the alcohol habit and also the meat-eating that Shelley criticized in his “Vindication of 
Natural Diet”), taking the form of vicious poetry, corrupts the spirit trapped in Cenci’s 
prison.   
Beatrice, however, converts this terrible place imaginatively, producing poetically 
a sense of a grander realm. “I was just dreaming,” she says after her father’s death, “That 
we were all in Paradise. Thou knowest / This cell seems like a kind of Paradise / After 
our father’s presence” (V.iii.9–12). She speaks here in terms of benevolent dreams, using 
repetitive language (“Paradise . . . Paradise”) to reinforce a sense of a differently 
perceived place, one no longer designed through carnivorous or poisonous patterns. 
Beatrice has been thinking before this moment in terms of Cenci’s horrible realm and her 
own desired escape into a larger place. She has described her traumatized state in 
architectural terms of bewildering imprisonment: “The pavement spins under my feet!” 
she cries. “The walls / Spin round!” (III.i.9–10). She observes here that her “putrefying 
limbs / Shut round and sepulcher the panting soul,” but even in this moment she suggests 
a sense of imagined, ideal escape into a vaster realm, for hers, she says, is a soul “Which 
would burst forth into the wandering air” (III.i.26–28). 
That greater place, in Beatrice’s mind, becomes imagined in terms of sympathetic 
patterns. Before she and her mother are to die—having killed Count Cenci—Beatrice 
asks her surviving brother to create a better future through better habits:  
be constant to the love 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See Laura Wells Betz, “‘At once mild and animating’: Prometheus Unbound and Shelley’s Spell of 
Style.” She describes a tendency to view the repetitions in Shelley’s poetry as spells, a similarly repetitive 
language that establishes some control.  
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Thou bearest us; and to the faith that I, 
Though wrapt in a strange cloud of crime and shame, 
Lived ever holy and unstained. (V.iv.146–149) 
She calls for a constancy that Shelley had personally experienced through multiple 
representations of Beatrice: the constancy of love and sympathy for the resister of 
tyranny, a constancy that in turn helped form the inspiring version of Rome encountered 
by Shelley. Beatrice speaks of a superior and more sustainable habit, a constancy that can 
alter the world for peaceful ends, and she does so with mention of her own “ever holy,” 
habitual self. And to ease her mother’s fears near the close of the tragedy, she offers a 
“dull old thing, / Some outworn and unused monotony, / Such as our country gossips sing” 
(V.iii.124–126). Sympathetic poetic recurrence here encourages thinking in terms of 
expansive place (the country, the fields of rural Italy) by monotonously directing her 
mother to consider connections to those things that lie beyond her immediate 
circumstances. There is comfort to be had, and a wider world to be conceived of, through 
thoughtful repetitions. 
Earlier, after Cenci has celebrated (with wine) the deaths of his sons, Beatrice 
interrupts his banquet and asks the guests anaphoric questions that urge critical thought. 
“What, if ‘tis he who clothed us in these limbs / Who tortures them, and triumphs? What, 
if we, / The desolate and the dead, were his own flesh” (I.iii.102–104). These are patterns 
full of critical suggestions about this tyrant’s abuses, building to a fundamentally 
important question about the play’s conflict between imprisonment and the outside 
world’s enormity: “Shall we therefore find / No refuge in this merciless wide world?” 
(I.iii.106–107). Beatrice, from the start, has her thoughts trained on a vaster place, toward 
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the “wide world.” Throughout the play, before and after overthrowing Cenci, she 
repeatedly speaks of such a wider world, a more open place, or, at last, a “kind of 
Paradise.” 
It is a probing, sympathetic intelligence that leads Beatrice to think outward, and 
she also urges Cenci’s banquet guests to “think” about things (rather than, as her father 
urges, to “enjoy”): “Oh, think what deep wrongs must have blotted out / First love, then 
reverence in a child’s prone mind / Till it thus vanquish shame and fear! O, think” 
(I.iii.108–110). A new poetic habit takes shape in her repetitions of “think . . . think,” a 
critically sympathetic habit, quite different from the habit of consumption urged by her 
father. Shelley, in his Defence of Poetry, equates studiously applied, rhythmically 
articulated thoughtfulness with sympathetic poetry, describing Francis Bacon as a poet 
because his “language has a sweet and majestic rhythm . . . it is a strain which distends, 
and then bursts the circumference of the hearer’s mind, and pours itself forth together 
with it into the universal element with which it has perpetual sympathy” (514–515). For 
Shelley, sympathetic thinking could, poetically, connect universally; the Italian reception 
and transmission of Beatrice’s story had demonstrated one example of this phenomenon. 
Shelley’s Beatrice patiently endeavors to think sympathetically, even of the evil 
Cenci. She says that she has “excused much, doubted; and when no doubt / Remained,” 
she “sought by patience, love and tears / To soften him” (I.iii.114–116). And though 
these tendencies do not save her life—she ultimately turns to violent revolt to overthrow 
her father and is then executed—they underlie her thoughtfulness and her ability to 
communicate an imagined realm shaped by sympathy. Before her execution, she begins 
to speak more confidently of the ideal realm free from hungering, patriarchal abuse and 
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constructed of a wide-ranging sympathy. “O, not to Rome,” Beatrice’s mother Lucretia 
cries to her, while despairing over the place associated with Cenci’s injustice and 
torments. “O, take us not to Rome,” she repeats (IV.iv.158). Again, repetitive expression 
in Count Cenci’s world can reinforce a sense of entrapment (“to Rome . . . to Rome”). 
Beatrice, however, demonstrates that she knows how material places can be altered by 
such spoken patterns and performed habits. She responds by repetitively sounding out a 
different place, one of universal interconnection: “Why not to Rome, dear mother? There 
as here / Our innocence is as an armed heel / To trample accusation. God is there / As 
here” (IV.iv.159–162).  
While Lucretia despairs at the claustrophobic sense of Roman justice, Beatrice 
repetitively contemplates the world in all its interlinking variety, its related “heres” and 
“theres,” as opposed also to Count Cenci, who relentlessly pursues the sameness of his 
murderous wishes. Beatrice may perceive and proclaim similarities, but these similarities 
offer a comforting expanse, an interconnected universe of different places, both “here” 
and “there.” Stuart Curran observes that “the tragedy Shelley created . . . is invested with 
a universality of alarming dimensions” (43), but Beatrice sees promise in universality. 
She declares herself “universal as the light” (IV.iv.48), and seeks to comfort different 
people, such as her mother, in terms of universalism. From that perspective, Beatrice 
thinks critically about the local, human-made place that terrifies Lucretia.67 The place-
making poetic repetition evoked by Beatrice—indeed, used by Beatrice when she speaks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Such connections between poetic recurrence and reflexive place-making, including the place-making of 
psychological self-imprisonment and abstracted escape, are noted by Keach. In Shelley’s Style, he describes 
the reflexivity of Shelley’s poetry with regard to Satan’s belief in Paradise Lost that “The mind is its own 
place, and in itself / Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n” (I.254-5) (qtd. Keach 90). Keach writes 
that for Shelley, the mind escapes such a mental, solipsistic imprisonment “by reenacting the mind’s 
necessarily reflexive condition in a verbal artifact. The mind ‘defeats’ its ‘curse’ by repeating and 
articulating it at a higher level of self-consciousness” (91).  
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of constancy and monotony, reiterates “there and here,” and describes a universal place 
or Paradise—ultimately undermines Cenci’s rule effectively. True, Beatrice remains 
trapped by her father’s despotism until she turns to violence and meets a violent end 
herself, but her descriptions of sympathetic constancy provide longer-term solutions to 
the problem of the out-of-control reiterations of the Cenci patriarch. She asks for what 
would, as Shelley knew, come to pass: an audience “constant to the love” for her, an 
audience thus more sympathetic toward the oppressed (V.iv.146).  
Gilles Deleuze, summarizing and elaborating upon Hume, describes in Difference 
and Repetition a repetition that functions much as Beatrice’s sympathetic monotonies and 
constancies do. This is a creative repetition, not destructive, based on the idea that 
consciousness might grow through repetitions and not strictly devolve into addicted 
stupor. “The repetition,” Deleuze notes, “changes nothing in the object . . . On the other 
hand, a change is produced in the mind which contemplates: a difference, something new 
in the mind” (70). After undergoing this change, the mind can recognize distinctions as 
well as similarities—both of which are required for sympathy. Such a mind, furthermore, 
understands that no repetition can stably maintain what it repeats: a change occurs 
through the mere consciousness of repetition, and sameness is thus always loaded with 
difference. The Shelleyan proto-addict lacks much of that consciousness, driven too 
mindlessly toward toxic sameness. For Beatrice, on the other hand, reiterations can 
encourage heightened consciousness and respect for the relationship between sameness 
and difference. Her repeated expression of “there as here” critiques Count Cenci’s rule, 
for example, by asserting a sameness across different terms, where the ravenous 
consumer would hope only to consume sameness without regard for any kind of 
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difference. While her father destroys life, Beatrice’s articulated repetitions thus support 
something new, speaking into existence the terms for a place of sympathetic awareness. 
Her repetitions of Count Cenci’s behavior, by adding a deeper sense of tragedy, can only 
increase pitying reflection in the world she seeks to re-pattern. 
Shelley had seen this powerful place-making. He had been steered through Rome 
by echoes of Beatrice—in visual art, in architecture, in literature—and had seen how a 
specifically Italian place drew from echoing sentiments toward Beatrice, transmitted by 
generations of Italians and by visitors. Shelley observes in the preface to The Cenci, “On 
my arrival at Rome I found that the story of the Cenci was a subject not to be mentioned 
in Italian society without awakening a deep and breathless interest” (141). Alan 
Weinberg describes how Beatrice “had become, in the minds of Italians, a national figure 
and Shelley, who admired such excellence of character, strove to do justice to her Italian 
qualities” (79). In other words, Beatrice had sentimentally, repetitively, become part of 
Italy’s self-conception, part of how it communicated itself to visitors, and The Cenci is 
attentive to such place-creation.  
Near the play’s close, as Beatrice strives to imagine a better world into poetic 
being, she self-consciously considers, “what a world we make, / The oppressor and the 
oppressed” (V.iii.74–75). By evoking sympathetically patterned response in an audience, 
Beatrice does what she can to ensure that this world might become at least more aware of 
the oppressed. Perhaps poetic world-shaping, when motivated by intoxicated impulses, 
might work as an addiction that drains humanity. Yet Beatrice’s soberly and merely 
addiction-like poetic strategies urge repetitive experience that is sympathetic, by which 
her audience across centuries might routinely contemplate the perils of oppressive habits 
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as well as the need for liberating patterns that can remake the world. The Cenci thus 
lucidly illustrates the vast gulf separating actual intemperance or addiction from the 
addiction-like literary strategy for patterning possible worlds around intense repetitions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ADDICT’S LABYRINTH IN DE QUINCEY’S CONFESSIONS OF AN 
ENGLISH OPIUM-EATER 
 
I went back to my car again and sat and sat. The top dripped on my knees and my 
stomach burned from the whiskey. No more cars came up the hill. No lights went on in 
the house before which I was parked. It seemed like a nice neighborhood to have bad 
habits in. 
 -Raymond Chandler, The Big Sleep (33) 
  
 Private investigator Philip Marlowe sits outside a criminal’s lair, where he will 
later discover—along with a corpse, Chinese décor, and a drugged witness—what he 
thinks might be laudanum (34–36). The scene, with its association of opium, crime, and 
Asia, recalls British literature of the nineteenth century, from Thomas De Quincey’s 
Confessions of an English-Opium Eater to the Sherlock Holmes stories.68 Even the basic 
shape of The Big Sleep’s narrative matches those earlier writings. Marlowe’s movements, 
punctuated and inflected by coffee and alcohol, work like the investigations pursued by 
De Quincey—while addictively consuming, both of these seekers repeatedly, desirously 
explore worlds full of related, ongoing repetitions. In this chapter, I examine how De 
Quincey in particular deployed addiction-like strategies for charting labyrinthine worlds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Conan Doyle’s “The Man with the Twisted Lip,” for instance, involves an addict specifically compared 
to De Quincey. 
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of sustained, habitual possibility-pursuit.69 Such strategies constituted a revision of 
aesthetics that valorized stable habitual experience. 
In The Big Sleep and Confessions of an English Opium-Eater, addictive habits 
provide patterns that give narrated worlds both their repetitive forms and their air of 
intensely mysterious possibility. Marlowe, for instance, drinks and investigates and 
drinks and investigates—that is much of the plot of The Big Sleep. His drinking and his 
investigative habit are interlinked. The thirsty and inquisitive detective is rarely wholly 
satisfied, rarely accepting of immediate appearances, and thus (reflecting his own 
experience of repetitiously “sitting and sitting” and drinking) conjectures in the above 
scene about a possible world of other bad habits—that “nice neighborhood to have bad 
habits in,” a world in which he will repeatedly investigate.  
Marlowe returns to that crime scene’s “nice neighborhood.” There he has already 
found a corpse next to the drugged daughter of a wealthy general, and there he next finds 
that the corpse has gone missing. He discovers still more mystery through reiterated 
investigating, through continuous, habitual pursuit in his realm understood both 
conjecturally and in terms of “bad habits.” The result—the entirety of The Big Sleep—is 
one of the more complete examples of addiction-like narrative.  
De Quincey does something similar in his Confessions of an English Opium-Eater, 
where he depicts labyrinths of endless possibility understood in terms set by addiction’s 
endlessly repetitive pursuit of possibility. In this chapter, I pay closest attention to one 
example from the Confessions: the labyrinthine staircases of an image by Giovanni 
Piranesi, as described by De Quincey. This imaginary realm provides De Quincey with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 When referring to the Confessions of an English Opium-Eater, unless I note otherwise, I refer to the 
edition edited by Barry Milligan (London: Penguin, 2003), 3–88. 
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another place of habitual possibility-pursuit, a place of endless repetitions to ponder 
repetitively. It’s also a place that exists only in language for De Quincey, who never saw 
the Piranesi image of replicating staircases but learned of it from Coleridge’s account 
(see Burwick 45–46). De Quincey, we know, had come to accept that Coleridge’s 
thinking and responses were shaped by his difficulties with opium, and so he would have 
easily seen correlations between opium habit and Coleridge’s aesthetic reception of an 
image of endless staircases. Consequently, while writing about his own experiences of 
addiction and other compulsive habits, De Quincey uses this Coleridgean-Piranesian 
image to characterize addiction-like experience; he takes the reader through that 
Piranesian realm supporting intensely repetitive possibility-pursuit, and he does so in the 
similarly addiction-like, repetitive language of pursuit.  
De Quincey’s addiction-like tactics in his Piranesi scene are representative of the 
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater’s broader narrative of young De Quincey 
exploring dream-like (or nightmarish) possibility. For instance, he devotes particular 
emphasis to his early education and flight into impoverished wandering, which he 
believes to be reflected by the misadventures and pained cravings of his years of opium 
use (39–40). He writes of these early years of poverty as a time of escapist, imaginative 
yearning:  
. . . oftentimes on moonlight nights, during my first mournful abode in 
London, my consolation was (if such could be thought) to gaze from 
Oxford-street up every avenue in succession which pierces through the 
heart of Marylebone to the field and the woods; for that, said I, travelling 
with my eyes up the long vistas which lay part in light and part in shade, 
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‘that is the road to the North . . . and if I had the wings of a dove, that way I 
would fly for comfort.’ (40)  
The irony, as De Quincey next mentions, is that in the north his addiction would 
commence, and so there even more potent desires (for opium, especially) and intensified 
imagined vistas would occupy his mind; this would be the period, he tells us, when the 
“second birth of my sufferings began” (40). In the thrall of addiction, he will be 
“persecuted by visions as ugly, and as ghastly phantoms as ever haunted the couch of an 
Orestes” (40). The addiction De Quincey narrates intensifies his preexisting tendency to 
imagine possibility from a condition of yearning. In this later period, while each 
successive dose of opium fails to satisfy, he is increasingly beset by dreams alluding to 
vaster and vaster realms of unreality. As he transitions from a pleasurable early phase of 
opium use to the period of pain, these become repetitive nightmares of enormous scale, 
and De Quincey describes them in richly addiction-like, repetitive language. Such 
language, I will show, lived up to De Quincey’s sublime aesthetic ideals and supported 
the DeQuinceyan kind of literature in which explorations of otherness occur 
unremittingly. 
The creative tactics De Quincey derives from a condition of intensified 
orientation toward possibility support the claim that “stories happen, are enacted in 
certain kinds of possible worlds” (Doležel 31). De Quincey’s frightening, confessional 
“stories” of addiction—known to be some combination of fact and hallucinatory 
fiction—demonstrate how intensified literary creation can emerge from a stronger, 
addiction-like commitment to the possible. Though I will focus on the one scene of the 
infinite staircases, De Quincey’s Confessions produces multiple related worlds. This was 
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a breakthrough for a number of reasons—De Quincey’s Confessions was one of the 
earlier texts of any kind to insist on the addictive, entrapping properties of opium, and it 
simultaneously clarified a literary, aesthetically registered version of addiction, which 
opened up new senses of exploratory adventures into possibility.  
Doležel observes a similar relationship between exploratory pursuit and literary 
production; he notes that writing is a matter of both “making and understanding a world” 
(42). Trying to navigate and understand that which is not immediately grasped, the 
argument goes, supports articulation of related possibilities in the form of a possible, 
narrated world. This is what happens with Chandler’s bibulous Marlowe, who both 
desirously studies and articulates a possible neighborhood in terms of ongoing, perilous 
habits.70 In the addict’s repetitive pursuit of possibility, De Quincey too found a model 
for producing literary worlds of intense possibility. The De Quincey of the Confessions 
would, like Chandler’s detective, regard possible worlds due to and in terms of his 
compelling habits, but like the realm of habits contemplated by Philip Marlowe, De 
Quincey’s addiction-like, imagined worlds are murkily comprehensible, conjectural 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Pursuit of knowledge is, for Doležel, central to a basic category of narrative modalities; these are 
“epistemic modalities,” which “release their story-generating energy because of uneven distribution of 
knowledge among fictional persons” (126). 
71 Much scholarship on De Quincey in recent decades has centered on one of two focal points: De 
Quincey’s attitudes toward empire, particularly in his discussions of Asia (Barrell; Leask) and his 
recursiveness—his endless reflections on himself, things he has read, or things he has internalized (Clej; 
Russett). De Quincey in the Confessions focuses on both the external world and the internal concerns of his 
isolated, familiar self. In this chapter, I hope to resolve some of the tension between those two points, 
arguing that De Quincey’s addictive, exploratory preoccupation with the possible entails, always, one foot 
in the familiar, one foot stepping out into the unknown. 
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De Quincey’s Aesthetic Habits 
Thomas De Quincey was no idle addict; his obsessions, in general, could be quite 
productive. He read as hungrily as he wrote, and when he encountered poets he admired, 
he showed little restraint, fashioning himself into a writer after their examples. The 
enthusiasm was apparent at a young age. In an early diary entry, under the heading of 
“POETS” he lists “S. T. Coleridge” and “Wordsworth!!!” (Diary of Thomas De Quincey 
145–146). This Lake-Poets obsession started in January 1801, when the fifteen-year-old 
De Quincey bought a copy of the Lyrical Ballads and became so enamored with the 
poetry that he sought out the anonymous poets’ names (and later, with mixed results, 
their friendship), making Wordsworth, as one De Quincey biographer writes, a “chief god 
of Thomas’s pantheon, with Coleridge a close second” (Lindop 49). In 1803, De Quincey 
wrote to Wordsworth, “I have no other motive for soliciting your friendship than what (I 
should think) every man, who has read and felt the ‘Lyrical Ballads’, must have in 
common with me” (qtd Sackville-West 65). He would express an obsession with 
Coleridge that same year: “I walk home thinking of Coleridge; – am in transports of love 
and admiration for him . . . I begin to think him the greatest man that has ever appeared” 
(Diary of Thomas De Quincey 191–192). 
Letters were exchanged and something like friendship grew between De Quincey 
and the poets of the Lake District. De Quincey’s career as an essayist gradually 
flourished under their influence (and while he endured the effects of opium addiction 
along with his various neuroses). In 1809, Coleridge described a troubled De Quincey 
with warm, yet critical, amusement: 
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I both respect and have an affection for Mr De Quincey; but saw too much 
of his turn of mind, anxious yet dilatory, confused from over-accuracy, & 
at once systematic and labyrinthine. . . 
 
But so it is!  We cannot be perfect.  I do far worse both for myself and 
others by indifference about my compositions & what is thought or said of 
them, than he by over-irritability— His is a more natural fault & linked to 
better qualities. (Coleridge Letters III.205–6) 
Coleridge saw a psychological labyrinth in his acolyte’s prose, a characteristic he related 
to “better qualities.” The poet seems to have recognized a particular kind of obsessive 
maze-making going on in De Quincey’s head.  
In writing about addiction, De Quincey would deliberately display that maze-like 
thinking Coleridge described. His opium addiction began in the early years of the 
nineteenth century, and he would fashion literature out of addiction’s patterns in his 1821 
Confessions, sublimating the condition into a work famed for its labyrinthine worlds. And 
in his essays on the Lake Poets, when De Quincey diagnoses Coleridge, he relates 
Coleridge’s opium-addiction to labyrinths of Coleridge’s own (it is also there that De 
Quincey creates scenes whose uncharitable tones remind us that he had destroyed his 
friendships with his former idols). He describes Coleridge as a lost man, dizzy, with 
“apparent difficulty in recovering his position amongst day-light realities” (Recollections 
44). He depicts Coleridge as an opium addict “burying himself in the profoundest 
abstractions, from life and human sensibilities” (Recollections 93). De Quincey and 
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Coleridge saw similar mental dungeons in each other’s thoughts. For De Quincey, those 
dungeons seemed especially expanded by addiction. 
Opium addiction would have been all the more labyrinthine to addicts in De 
Quincey’s day, in part because there was no reliable system for escaping to recovery. The 
torments of addiction would color much of De Quincey’s adult life, extending beyond the 
period covered in Confessions of an English Opium-Eater, as he himself mentions in the 
sequel, Suspiria De Profundis.  He writes there that at the close of Confessions of an 
English Opium-Eater, “the reader was instructed to believe . . . that I had mastered the 
tyranny of opium. The fact is, that twice I mastered it, and by efforts even more 
prodigious, in the second of these cases, than in the first” (91). He would always struggle 
to cast off addiction. He writes in Suspiria De Profundis of “one error I committed in 
both” attempts to quit: “I did not connect with the abstinence from opium – so trying to 
the fortitude under any circumstances – that enormity of exercise which . . . is the one 
sole resource for making it endurable” (91–92). De Quincey had few ways of knowing 
beforehand that quitting habitual use of narcotics would require a massive amount of 
stamina and effort. This was an era when often the “habit was . . . excess of a normal 
indulgence, as drunkenness was.  Even the doctors were not sure how dangerous it was, 
and the general public took it for granted” (Hayter 34). Habitual opium-consumption was 
usual; it was normal. And while the enslaving nature of opium and the habitual potency 
of alcoholic inebriety had been cited before De Quincey wrote, drug addiction remained 
largely a mystery. “It was not till The Confessions of an English Opium Eater was 
published,” Alethea Hayter writes, “that opium addiction began to be considered as a 
separate medical and psychological phenomenon which ought to be studied” (34).  
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Addictive properties of opium were, though, at least acknowledged by some in the 
early nineteenth century. In Opium and the People, Virginia Berridge and Griffith 
Edwards observe that the addictive properties of opium were discussed as early as the 
eighteenth century, such as in Dr. John Jones’s Mysteries of Opium Reveal’d, from 1700, 
and George Young’s Treatise on Opium from the 1750s (xxiv–xxv).72 Yet, Berridge and 
Griffith write, “At the opening of the nineteenth century . . .  doctors and others still 
thought of opium not as dangerous or threatening, but as central to medicine, a 
medicament of surpassing usefulness” (xxv). Addiction was slowly becoming known, in 
other words, but not greatly feared or deeply understood, which could only have made it 
more difficult to recover in the ways we now know. Thus De Quincey’s recovery from 
opium habituation was even more experimental, even more of a continuation of his 
general addiction-like process of repetitive pursuit. 
Something else also encouraged De Quincey to create literary labyrinths patterned 
after addiction: he wrote when addiction would have seemed not just labyrinthine, but 
especially literary, and not only because he had seen Coleridge’s habit up-close. 
Gluttonous consumption had become linked to excessive reading habits in the Romantic 
consumer. The early nineteenth century saw the growth of mass literary culture, and the 
Romantics also looked back upon an over-brimming English literary tradition.73 As 
Andrew Piper writes in Dreaming in Books, “Romanticism is what happens when  . . . 
there are too many books to read” (12). There was now a readerly version of excessive 
consumption; Patrick Brantlinger in The Reading Lesson describes how novel-reading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Louise Foxcroft describes the basic understanding of addiction that did indeed precede Romanticism. She 
writes that “eighteenth-century physicians investigating the consequences of taking opium regularly . . . 
knew very well what they were dealing with” (117).  
73 I refer in part to what Walter Jackson Bate calls “the burden of the past” in The Burden of the Past and 
the English Poet. 
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among an increasingly literate populace in the nineteenth century was often viewed as an 
addiction (3). There was some panic over a massively shared loss of control to an early 
entertainment industry, nervousness about readers losing their grips on lucid rational 
thinking and disciplined, respectable behavior due to their habits of over-indulgence in 
the effusions of sentimental and thrilling literature. 
De Quincey, a writer for periodicals—and one of the most committed Romantic 
readers—encountered intensely repetitive literary habit up-close and made sure to relate 
that literary habit to his own addiction. Margaret Russet notes that addiction was for De 
Quincey “first a condition of reading” (18). Throughout the Confessions of an English 
Opium-Eater, De Quincey describes opium in literary ways, referring, for instance, to 
“eloquent opium! that with thy potent rhetoric stealest away the purposes of wrath” (55). 
Opium, altering emotions and habits, works for De Quincey in a manner he can only 
think of as linguistic, as a manner of potent rhetoric and mighty eloquence. The function 
of opium addiction thus reminds De Quincey of his other preferred form of emotionally 
effective, mind-altering experience: language-based experience. 
De Quincey’s sense of linguistic communication and literary production that 
matches addictive consumption conflicted with the stated ideals of his heroes, however. 
In the Biographia Literaria, Coleridge writes of the “self-sufficing power of absolute 
Genius” (31). For Wordsworth in his preface to the Lyrical Ballads, the poet has a 
“power in expressing what he thinks and feels, and especially those thoughts and feelings 
which, by his own choice, or from the structure of his own mind, arise in him without 
immediate external excitement” (420).74 De Quincey the Romantic reader and obsessed 
fan, on the other hand, always sought external excitement, whether in literature or in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 This is a quote from the 1802 preface. 
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opium. His Confessions shows a particularly vexed, addicted union between mind and 
world, in which the world is provisionally known in ways that never satisfy, through 
repetitive experiences that flow on endlessly. Literal addiction resembled De Quincey’s 
obsessive-explorer’s version of aesthetic experience, and the Confessions of an English 
Opium-Eater shows De Quincey clarifying that resemblance. 
De Quincey’s narrative of addiction is, then, rich with aesthetic, impassioned 
reverie—he describes how he desirously imagines greater and greater possibilities while 
sometimes charmed, sometimes distraught by opium-use. But not all readers have viewed 
De Quincey as so emotionally volatile. In “The Death of the Author,” Roland Barthes 
cites De Quincey as an unperturbed sort of being, as an example of the affectless 
“scriptor,” one who “no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, 
but rather this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt: 
life never does more than imitate the book” (146–147). Meanwhile, in contrast to what 
Barthes would say about the passionless, humourless “scriptor,” De Quincey in the 
Confessions writes, “You will think, perhaps, that I am too confidential and 
communicative of my own private history.  It may be so.  But my way of writing is rather 
to think aloud, and follow my own humours” (69). Barthes argues that one who writes 
through imitations of an “immense dictionary” “no longer bears within him passions, 
humours, feelings, impressions” (147), but De Quincey believes his narrative is shaped 
by his humours, his bodily inflected emotions—it just so happens that that his humours 
connect affectively to so much else (both literary and narcotic influence). De Quincey, 
the prime example of a Romantic reader, recognized his tendency to link himself to the 
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experience of otherness, and his Confessions shows him especially recognizing that 
tendency. 
 De Quincey is therefore difficult to categorize. He seems both Romantically 
inclined to follow his humours and also prone to viewing those humours as part of a web 
of readerly and opiate consumption, based on his readings of Wordsworth and Coleridge 
along with his narcotic adventures.75 Joel Faflak, for one, contends that De Quincey’s 
work represents a Victorian, clinical critique of Romantic concepts, an example of “how 
the Victorians react to an internalized Romanticism” (27). In his Confessions of an 
English Opium-Eater—especially in De Quincey’s carefully noted dosage (“I now took 
only 1000 drops of laudanum per day” (61) and later, “the poison of 8000 drops of 
laudanum per day”(65))—we do find a clinical sort of experimentation. Such attitudes 
toward experiment had, however, already been embraced by those including Coleridge 
who experimented with nitrous oxide at the Pneumatic Institute under the guidance of 
Thomas Beddoes. This experimentation had been known to sustain Romantic poetic 
fervor.76  
Yet De Quincey, perhaps suggesting a pseudo-Victorian, pseudo-Romantic status, 
notes in the Confessions mixed results from his own experiments. By the end of the 
narrative, he seems to have clinically (in the manner of a proto-Victorian) learned 
something about the dangers of literal addiction, but he also has a dreadful, Coleridgean 
sense of more to come. “I triumphed,” he writes about his reduction of opium intake, “but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75Alina Clej writes, “Nothing is more difficult than placing De Quincey’s work within a literary movement 
or under a well-defined aesthetic rubric” (6).  
76 For more on this time, see Mike Jay’s Atmosphere of Heaven. The scientific method of repeated (often 
delighted) experimentation exemplified by the work of Thomas Beddoes, Davy, and Coleridge at the 
Pneumatic Institute suggests ongoing, reiterative desire such as that described by Slavoj Žižek in Looking 
Awry, a desire whose “realization    . . . does not consist in its being ‘fulfilled,’ ‘fully satisfied,’ it coincides 
rather with the reproduction of desire as such, with its circular movement” (7). 
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think not, reader, that therefore my sufferings were ended” (87). He would continue to 
suffer at the time of the composition of the Confessions. He writes that “the dread swell 
and agitation of the storm have not wholly subsided: the legions that encamped in them 
are drawing off, but not all departed” (88). No matter how much is known, something 
more always remains in this literature of addiction, some potentially thrilling, fearful, or 
desired reiteration. The labyrinthine textual worlds De Quincey patterned after drug 
habits display an intensifying sense of the Romantic reader’s incessantly sought, 
imaginative possibility—intensifying to the point where categories like “Romantic” or 
“Victorian” are no longer as helpfully applicable as the aesthetic category of addiction. 
 
The Possibilities of Habits 
The intensity and attendant yearning of the habit informing his writing 
exemplifies De Quincey’s departure from the popular aesthetics of habit that had 
influenced him. De Quincey’s addiction aesthetic, while coming from a familiar, 
Romantic context, suggested new kinds of thinking about art by intensifying perception 
of its possibilities. De Quincey—an obsessive consumer of texts and opium, who 
described his habits linking him repeatedly to otherness and novelty—revised earlier 
senses of aesthetic habits that produce something more static than a continual adventure 
toward new developments.  
Earlier Romantics, such as Wordsworth, had argued for the value of a more stable 
sort of habit in aesthetic experience. Wordsworth’s principle of writing in a state of 
tranquil recollection, a process that he describes in his preface to the 1800 second edition 
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of the Lyrical Ballads, requires habit that produces calm emotion, which he terms 
enjoyment: 
 . . . the emotion is contemplated till by a species of reaction the tranquility 
gradually disappears, and an emotion, similar to that which was before the 
subject of contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually 
exist in the mind.  In this mood successful composition generally begins, 
and in a mood similar to this it is carried on; but the emotion, of whatever 
kind and in whatever degree, from various causes is qualified by various 
pleasures . . .  so . . . the mind will upon the whole be in a state of 
enjoyment. (183) 
Although the mind eventually experiences an emotion similar to the one the poet wants to 
describe, this is only a mellow repetition—safer, ready for enjoyment—because the mind 
has continually, habitually processed it. Wordsworth chooses verse to convey such 
enjoyment, because, he argues in his Lyrical Ballads preface, “by the act of writing in 
verse an Author makes a formal engagement that he will gratify certain known habits of 
association” (172).77 Habit in this case can secure familiarity, much like the habit and 
custom advocated by Edmund Burke. 
Yet it is true that Burke—another hero of De Quincey’s—had related strangeness 
to repetitive behavior. In his text on the sublime, Burke outlines an aesthetic of repetition 
that suggests incomprehensible vastness. A “source of the sublime,” Burke writes, “is 
infinity,” which he proceeds to connect to reiteration (Philosophical Enquiry 64–67): 
“Whenever we repeat any idea frequently, the mind by a sort of mechanism repeats it 
long after the first cause has ceased to operate” (Philosophical Enquiry 67). Burke adds, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77I here quote the 1800, second edition’s preface. 
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“This is the reason of an appearance very frequent in madmen; that they remain whole 
days and nights, sometimes whole years, in the constant repetition of some remark, some 
complaint, or song” (Philosophical Enquiry 67–68). This habit takes control of an 
individual, and it suggests some infinite power in its ongoing iterations. 
Burke does, however, also assert that there were limits to all this strangeness 
linked to habit. He argues that the most sublime repetitions themselves do not change, 
even if they intimate infinity; in the Philosophical Inquiry, he writes, “Succession and 
uniformity of parts, are what constitute the artificial infinite” (68). Burke here describes 
repetition in uniformity as necessary for a variety of sublime experience  
because if the figures of the parts should be changed, the imagination at 
every change finds a check; you are presented at every alteration with the 
termination of one idea, and the beginning of another; by which means it 
becomes impossible to continue that uninterrupted progression, which 
alone can stamp on bounded objects the character of infinity. (68)78 
This sublimity requires repetition that is steady, pure, and perfect—adjectives that have 
almost nothing to do with De Quincey. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Burke, promoter of custom’s repetitions, believer in the sublimity of repetitions, did nonetheless 
recognize the threat of habits that in their potency might change things. While the contemporary sense of 
addiction was not a factor for him, he still alludes to intoxicants, including liquor and gas (in a passage 
obliquely referring to the work of the pneumatic chemists, who would count Coleridge among their 
experimenters), to characterize unrestrained revolutionary passion:  
When I see the spirit of liberty in action, I see a strong principle at work; and this, for a while, is 
all I can possibly know of it. The wild gas, the fixed air, is plainly broke loose: but we ought to 
suspend our judgment until the first effervescence is a little subsided, till the liquor is cleared . . . 
(Reflections 90) 
The tendency toward (mostly metaphorical) intoxication could, Burke feared, seize even traditional 
authority, which necessitated certain bracing measures: “To secure any degree of sobriety in the 
propositions made by the leaders in any public assembly, they ought to respect, in some degree perhaps to 
fear, those whom they conduct” (Reflections 129). Sobriety was not guaranteed in even customary 
authority; some fear, or at least a suggested jolt, would be needed to keep leaders walking a steadier line. 
And so, Burke was concerned with what something like regular intoxication might mean for customary 
power.  
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Burke asserted that habitual reiteration could provide a kind of stability, which 
had an aesthetic as well as a political dimension for him—he saw power in habitual, 
sublime reiteration.79 As an admirer of Burke, De Quincey also prized sublimity as a 
means to, in his words, “power.” In an essay in which he praises Burke as a prophet, De 
Quincey explain this sort of power; he writes, “Many persons think Dr. Johnson the 
exemplar of conversational power.  I think otherwise . . . far sooner I should look for such 
an exemplar in Burke” (“Conversation” 270). And De Quincey elsewhere describes 
powerful literature as Burke would describe sublimity, as a path for accessing infinity. 
See, for example, the following, from an essay on “The Poetry of Pope,” where De 
Quincey refers to power as an attribute of sublime Miltonic literature that links us to the 
infinite: “What you owe to Milton is not any knowledge,” De Quincey writes, “of which 
a million separate items are still but a million of advancing steps on the same earthly 
level; what you owe is power,—that is, exercise and expansion to your own latent 
capacity of sympathy with the infinite” (“The Poetry of Pope” 56).  
But in that last quote we can also see De Quincey’s departure from Burke’s sense 
of sublimity or power. De Quincey notes that a million points merely sit on a flat and 
unpromising level without the Miltonic ability to pose links across differences, to suggest 
commonality and repetitive similarity from one plane to another and another. By posing 
links across differences, we might “expand sympathy” with otherness, and the ultimate 
otherness (the point beyond which there is no more otherness) is infinity. For De Quincey, 
Milton brings separate items into relation to things on different levels in a way that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Fusion of social sympathy with authoritative sublimity in particular is Burke’s idea of successful 
governance; as Tim Fulford observes, “sympathy is directed by the careful arrangement of the performance 
towards the awestruck submissiveness that Burke makes a characteristic of the sublime response” (43).  
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guides the reader toward a more elevated, broader understanding, toward closer, 
emotional connection to the infinite. Such literature alters the reader’s understanding 
consistently, and it does so through power that locates sympathetic repetitions between 
self and ultimate otherness (infinity). De Quincey saw sublime power in repetitions, but 
his repetitions appealed to changes and differences on their way toward linking the self 
sympathetically with infinity. 
The sympathetic movement away from “the same earthly level” works in an 
addiction-like manner by repetitively leading to recognition of something new and 
previously unattained. There is a sense of growth in De Quincey’s aesthetics of addiction-
like repetition. In Suspiria De Profundis, De Quincey describes his own prose as 
constituted by a related, repetitive movement to novelty, by “those wandering musical 
variations upon the theme – those parasitical thoughts, feelings, digressions, which climb 
up with bells and blossoms round about the arid stock; ramble away from it at times with 
perhaps too rank a luxuriance” (97). Repetition and digression, reiterated theme and 
wandering variation, are insisted upon and formally present throughout De Quincey’s 
texts on addiction, where he takes readers into the familiar recesses of the mind and then 
expands philosophically and hallucinatorily. J. Hillis Miller writes that De Quincey’s 
essays “trickle off into digressive irrelevances, like a stream dispersing itself in sand.  
Rare is the work of his which pursues its announced course and reaches its predicted goal” 
(28). Yet Miller notes that De Quincey does not ever lose coherence: “if we look back 
over the pages we have just read we can find no place where the thread of connection was 
broken” (Disappearance of God 28). Continuity amid digression, a quality De Quincey 
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boasts to be the object of his confessional prose, is the same quality that he finds in his 
admired prose-writers like Burke (even if Burke saw sublimity work rather differently).  
In different essays, De Quincey cites a tendency of Burke’s language to develop, 
to grow, to move into new forms and meanings. “Burke’s motion . . . was all a going 
forward,” De Quincey notes in an essay on “Dr. Samuel Parr” (134). And in an essay on 
“Conversation,” De Quincey praises what he sees as Burke’s aesthetic of mutating, 
unstable repetition: “The very violence of a projectile as thrown by him caused it to 
rebound in fresh forms, fresh angles, splintering, coruscating, which gave out thoughts as 
new (and as startling) to himself as they are to his reader. In this power, which might be 
illustrated largely from the writings of Burke, is seen something allied to the powers of a 
prophetic seer” (“Conversation” 270). This is a rebounding in fresh forms; De Quincey is 
insisting on the productive power of rebounding repetitions. In his text modeled on 
addiction, he likewise would portray indelibly the possible worlds generated by 
especially desirous repetitions.80 
De Quincey is oriented toward a more mysterious sublime than Burke’s; his is the 
Romantic sublime that Thomas Weiskel writes of as “a revelation of the unattainability of 
the Other” (163). Yet De Quincey maintains the earlier writer’s interest in habit and 
routine, and thus there are several passages in Confessions of an English Opium-Eater 
where De Quincey describes his habit in terms of a repetitive exploration. For instance, 
there is the exacting observation of his increasing laudanum doses. Routine intoxication 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 De Quincey also makes frequent mention of religious authors similarly capable of ambitiously digressive 
statements. In a later edition of the Confessions, De Quincey writes, “‘Philosophy:’ – At this point it is that 
the main misconception would arise.  Theology, and not philosophy, most people will fancy, is likely to 
form the staple of [Donne, Chillingworth, Sir Thomas Browne, Jeremy Taylor, Milton, South, Barrow].  
But I have elsewhere maintained, that the main bulk of English philosophy has always hidden itself in the 
English divinity” (55). See Thomas De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (Edinburgh: 
Adam and Charles Black, 1862). 
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guides his narrative in the most measured yet out-of-control of ways. De Quincey 
elsewhere in the Confessions compares himself to an explorer, processing new 
knowledge through his habitual examinations of his world’s strangeness:  
Some of these rambles led me to great distances: for an opium-eater is too  
happy to observe the motion of time. And sometimes in my attempts to 
steer homewards, upon nautical principles, by fixing my eye on the pole-
star, and seeking ambitiously for a north-west passage, instead of 
circumnavigating all the capes and head-lands I had doubled in my outward 
voyage, I came suddenly upon such knotty problems of alleys, such 
enigmatical entries, and such sphynx’s riddles of streets without 
thoroughfares, as must, I conceive, baffle the audacity of porters, and 
confound the intellects of hackney-coachmen. I could almost have believed, 
at times, that I must be the first discoverer of some of these terrae 
incognitae, and doubted, whether they had yet been laid down in the 
modern charts of London. (53) 
De Quincey’s habits lead him to explore new, shadowy places full of mystery, places 
always coming into vividly narrated being with every additionally articulated observation. 
He describes himself as “observing” on multiple “rambles,” using established 
disciplinary guidelines such as those of “nautical principles.” He attempts to untangle, 
like a committed researcher, “knotty problems” and “enigmatical . . .riddles.” These 
problems are all those of a mysterious world, of “alleys,” “entries,” and “streets”—his 
scientifically repetitive exploration leads him to a sense of places loaded with possibility. 
This is not Burke’s ideal world of habit and custom; De Quincey draws from language of 
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routine that conveys exploratory digression—his is the language of the Romantic reader 
and the Romantic scientist. The terms of addiction have provided De Quincey a suitable 
vehicle for articulating and intensifying the combination of a Romantic, mass-culture-
consuming reader’s routine diversion and the Romantic scientist’s routine exploration.81 
Thus does De Quincey develop an addict’s sublime (an aesthetic of long-lasting vitality, 
judging by the existence and title of Richard Klein’s 1993 book, Cigarettes Are Sublime). 
De Quincey was not the first to reflect on regular intoxication and see the 
suggestion of a union between imaginative digression and regular intellectual exploration. 
Coleridge had experimented regularly with nitrous oxide at the Pneumatic Institute and 
saw poetry and science as related due to their similar orientation toward the possible.82 
Richard Holmes, in The Age of Wonder, describes the nitrous-oxide-inhaling Humphry 
Davy’s scientific method, too, which combined wild intoxication with routine habits. 
Holmes writes of Davy’s nitrous oxide use that “in many of his extreme experiments 
Davy had deliberately pushed himself into unconsciousness, and he knew this could be 
done without harm” (282). This was repeated, conscious investigation of the sublime 
unknown, of unconsciousness. Given such developments in Coleridge’s circle, the 
combination of science and addiction in imaginative literature may seem to have been 
inevitable for the Romantics once addiction became increasingly recognized, and De 
Quincey—himself a repeater, a Coleridgean copier who yearned to produce works of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 When these repetitive digressions are applied to De Quincey’s story of repetitive digression in addiction, 
form joins with content—and De Quincey believed in the value of a coincidence of the two. He maintains, 
in part four of his “Style” pieces, that  “style, or, in the largest sense, manner, is confluent with the matter” 
(227). He is also explicit about the scientific ramifications of this literary aesthetic in his “Style” essays. 
There, in part four, he compares imaginative literary endeavor to a “subjective science,” created out of the 
solitary subject’s mind in order to understand better how that mind makes sense of its world (220). This 
subjective science—suggesting Nietzsche’s Dionysianism—works through repetitive digression to reveal 
the mind’s nature and imaginative capabilities. 
82 Or, more specifically, toward hope. See Coleridge, Letters I.557. 
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literary genius—was especially ready to embrace an aesthetic strategy of ardent 
repetitions that lead to surprising otherness.  
 Freud, writing about repetition compulsion in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
argues that behavioral reiterations serve a fundamental drive toward something rather 
worse than knowledge of possibility: death. He relates repetition to human instinct, 
describing how instinct moves “to restore an earlier state of things” (43). The first 
Freudian instinct, then, is to return to the earliest instant, or “the inanimate state,” which 
in turn would suggest that “the aim of all life is death” (46). For De Quincey, behavioral 
and linguistic repetitions did seem at times to work similarly to Freudian compulsions. 
Writing about addiction leads De Quincey in his Confessions to repeat and recall, as each 
iteration relates to those that preceded it, combining anteriority with later thoughts and 
hallucinations. He hallucinates at last in the Confessions about antiquity, about a nearly 
ultimate “earlier state,” after many rounds of drug use, and he is terrified especially by 
the vast time preceding his repetitions.83  “The mere antiquity of Asiatic things,” he 
writes, “of their institutions, histories, modes of faith, &c. is so impressive, that to me the 
vast age of the race and name overpowers the sense of youth in the individual” (81).  
 Yet De Quincey’s figures for infinity or anteriority are rarely fully suggestive 
of his own death—they are realms in which one can get lost, places for losing oneself in 
the strangeness linked to the familiar. De Quincey had become a writer in the company of 
Romantic experimenters and amid the overflow of mass-produced texts in the early 
nineteenth century, and he located in repetitive experience something other than 
Enlightenment stability or Freudian death: a field densely filled with potential.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Kierkegaard, in Repetition, observes the way repetition brings past and future together; he writes, 
“Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected 
has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward” (131). 
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The Addict’s Labyrinth 
 I now want to examine more closely one particular DeQuinceyan realm: the 
endless Piranesi labyrinth, where repetitively familiar, infinitely replicating staircases 
continually contort toward more and more. At one point in the Confessions, De Quincey 
characterizes his opium-altered condition by relating it to Giovanni Piranesi’s Carceri—
to an image of endless staircases. De Quincey had not seen the image, but Coleridge had, 
and it had haunted the addicted poet’s “visions” (78). Accordingly, De Quincey compares 
his own literary representation of Piranesi’s labyrinth to his experience of addiction. He 
reflects on the vicariously seen image in addiction-like terms, using language of 
recurrence that bridges the internal with the external by moving from second to third to 
first person. The baroque passage needs to be quoted in its entirety: 
Creeping along the sides of the walls, you perceived a staircase, and upon  
it, groping his way upwards, was Piranesi himself: follow the stairs a little 
further, and you perceive it come to a sudden abrupt termination, without 
any balustrade, and allowing no step onwards to him who had reached the 
extremity, except into the depths below. Whatever is to become of poor 
Piranesi, you suppose, at least, that his labours must in some way terminate 
here. But raise your eyes, and behold a second flight of stairs still higher: 
on which again Piranesi is perceived, but this time standing on the very 
brink of the abyss. Again elevate your eye, and a still more aerial flight of 
stairs is beheld: and again is poor Piranesi busy on his aspiring labours: and 
so on, until the unfinished stairs and Piranesi both are lost in the upper 
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gloom of the hall. – With the same power of endless growth and self-
reproduction did my architecture proceed in dreams. (78) 
The passage enacts what it describes, winding through repetitions linguistically as it 
denotes repetitious, winding stairs. Participles appear again and again, creeping, groping, 
standing, and aspiring, each conveying a struggle to move through an imagined domain 
that will never resolve itself into total clarity, never move from “aspiring” to “attained.” 
The method matches De Quincey’s ideals of sublime, powerful prose that repeats and 
digresses—the addiction-like passage here realizes an intense version of what his 
Romantic-reader aesthetic called for. And the lines are, emphatically, addiction-like—
they are given not merely to represent a sole hallucination, but to provide an analogue for 
an ongoing condition, an endless procession of distressing sensations and thoughts. 
 Appropriately enough for an image of addiction, a tyrannical element persists 
in the Piranesi passage, too, in language of compulsion, of imperative verbs—“follow,” 
“suppose,” “raise.” The verbs repeatedly direct the reader’s thoughts; the language 
compels the reader to imagine endless possibility through intensely dense patterns. There 
are other addiction-like attributes in this passage, too, and they also show, through their 
linguistic recurrence, possibility expanding: the union between internal selfhood and 
external architecture, for instance, becomes blurred repetitively. Second person, third 
person, and first person blend together, from the “you” who reflects on Piranesi to 
Piranesi himself in the maze to the authorial “I” whose mind works like that maze: all 
combine to present mind and otherness melting into one another as we follow the course 
of those participles and imperatives. The observer becomes directed by the observed, 
changed by what is studied; De Quincey becomes Piranesi, “with the same power of 
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endless growth and self-reproduction” in the architecture of his dreams—and the reader, 
following De Quincey through his winding thoughts, is termed the “you” that De 
Quincey has been as well, when he was the vicarious viewer of the Piranesi image.   
 Here, in the labyrinth of the addict’s imagination, self and other meet 
repeatedly, and so do the vast and the tiny, as the staircases replicate while 
simultaneously compressing the reader-viewer’s attention into a maze.84 Hayter observes 
that architecture is referred to more than other art-forms in the work of the opium-using 
poets, and the spaces of such architecture are predominantly vast, or labyrinthine—
including the “huge flights of stairs” (89).85 These are spaces suggestive of enhanced 
possibility, however repetitive they are; these are addiction-like places for repetitive 
urges toward more. 
 De Quincey was himself quite aware of the peculiar new possibilities found in 
space via his drugged investigations. He comments in the Confessions of an English 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Others have noted how repetitions operated through science and culture to chart similarly vexed global 
space in the nineteenth century. Tim Fulford, Debbie Lee, and Peter Kitson write in Literature, Science and 
Exploration in the Romantic Era of a knowledge “instrumental as much as theoretical: it told people how to 
repeat what others had already done. In particular, it showed them how to go to foreign places and to come 
back safely—by systematising what the first successful explorers had done and seen” (27). Habits 
established precedence that solidified understandings of space and place, allowing the individual explorer 
to pursue with some connection to what came before, and thus to return to the familiar even while 
venturing into the new. De Quincey, however, collapses the enormous with the familiarly small-scale. In 
The Infection of Thomas De Quincey, John Barrell relates De Quincey’s unsettled/unsettling nature to an 
overwhelming anxiety the opium-eater has regarding Asia: 
The argument of this book is not simply that De Quincey expresses and intensifies the fears that 
govern his perceptions of his private life by representing the objects of his fear as oriental . . . My 
argument is also . . . that he expresses and rationalises his fears of the Orient by treating the 
history and politics of India, China and elsewhere as a series of narratives which seem to repeat 
those of his mythologised personal history. (76)  
De Quincey’s health concerns are his geopolitical concerns, in other words. The relationship between 
Orientalism and opium use in De Quincey’s writing has also been covered by Barry Milligan in Pleasures 
and Pains: Opium and the Orient in Nineteenth-Century British Culture and by Nigel Leask in British 
Romantic Writers and the East. 
85 Hayter notes many related clichés of addiction literature, often ones that involve bridging a position of 
isolation with something enormous, such as the “intention but failure to write a great philosophical work” 
(27) and “the pleasure-dome, the airy music, the sorceress, the half-living statue, the embracing lovers in 
the icy wind” (102). She emphasizes opium itself and its intoxicating properties as the cause of these 
dreams, but I am arguing that De Quincey uses, specifically, the repetitive structure of addiction and 
addiction-like thinking to shape those spaces that Hayter finds central to the literature of opium use. 
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Opium-Eater, “The sense of space, and in the end, the sense of time, were both 
powerfully affected. Buildings, landscapes, &c. were exhibited in proportions so vast as 
the bodily eye is not fitted to receive” (76). Yet, again, there is minuteness in such 
experience—these alterations occur in his head, even though it seems that “[s]pace 
swelled, and was amplified to an extent of unutterable infinity” (76). The collision of 
infinity and mental solitude—the individual’s personalized experience of enormity 
arising from endless contemplation of possibility—characterizes both the addiction-like 
labyrinth De Quincey represents in the Piranesi passage and the aesthetic power he 




 In Illness as Metaphor, Susan Sontag describes metaphorical uses of illness for 
discussing cultural problems. She writes that “our views about cancer, and the metaphors 
we have imposed on it, are so much a vehicle for the large insufficiencies of this culture” 
(87). Yet addiction in De Quincey’s case (as well as in the world of The Big Sleep) does 
not so simply represent a cultural problem. Nor is addiction in these cases strictly a 
metaphor. Addiction models the kind of patterns De Quincey both deploys in his 
Confessions and loves as an aesthete. These are linguistic patterns that convey evolving, 
repetitive pursuit of exaggerated possibility. Such addiction-like formal devices, as we 
see in De Quincey’s Piranesi scene, forge labyrinthine worlds of potential endlessness.  
 Obviously, repetitive forms can stultify or madden—think of any mind-
numbing commercial jingle or the shrieking insistence of a neglected car alarm—but De 
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Quincey’s work reminds us that they don’t necessarily have that effect. Writers have 
recognized this continually since De Quincey published his Confessions of an English 
Opium-Eater; Jorge Luis Borges, an avowed admirer of De Quincey, brought De 
Quinceyan strategies of repetitious pursuit into the creation of his own fictions of 
labyrinths, of endless reading and interpreting and recreating and seeking. Such 
addiction-like aesthetic experience, through its repetitions, sustains a desire-like, 
speculative orientation, an orientation that supports enhanced contemplation of 
potentiality without all the problems of literal addiction.86
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 For examples of the Borgesian interest in De Quincey, see some of the references to the opium-eater 
listed in the index of Borges’s Selected Non-Fictions (551); also of note in this same collection is Borges’s 
essay on “The Labyrinths of the Detective Story and Chesterton,” in which he explicitly links those 
labyrinths to “appetite” (of different varieties) (112). 
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CHAPTER 4 
INSATIABLE SEEKERS IN THE DOUBLE POEM: ALFRED TENNYSON, 
CHRISTINA ROSSETTI, AND THE AFFECTING EXPERIMENTS OF 
FICTIONAL ADDICTS 
  
In 1874, Alfred Tennyson wrote of a “waking trance I have frequently had, quite 
up from boyhood, when I have been all alone”:  
This has generally come upon me thro’ repeating my own name two or 
three times to myself silently, till all at once, as it were out of the intensity 
of the consciousness of individuality, the individuality itself seems to 
dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this not a confused state, 
but the clearest of the clearest, the surest of the surest, the weirdest of the 
weirdest, utterly beyond words . . . (Hallam Tennyson I.320) 
Linguistic repetition intimated boundlessness, Tennyson claimed, throughout his life, “up 
from boyhood.” Habitually repeating words did not, as one might expect, impose limits 
on his thinking. Instead he found great potential coiled in the constraints of ongoing 
pattern, potential for recognizing “the weirdest of the weirdest,” or that which is “utterly 
beyond words.”  
The above passage resonates with Tennyson’s earlier poetry, too, as this chapter 
will show. There, in the poetry, we find examples of another repetitive experience that 
leads to sustained pondering of grander possibility; in poems such as “The Lotos-Eaters” 
and The Princess, Tennyson specifically portrays addictive consumption that compels 
addicts to consider more and more experiences, and thus moves them toward some 
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reflection on their worlds’ potential. The patterns of addiction, moreover, constitute the 
patterns of Tennyson’s poetic forms and the patterns by which his characters articulate 
understanding of their world. Tennyson’s readers, then, are offered addiction-like 
experiences through language; the reader is repeatedly directed to ponder possibility 
without the physiological or psychological threat of literal addiction. Tennyson’s lotos-
eaters, on the other hand, do not inhabit some paradise of infinite awareness; they are 
sluggish, trapped, and isolated. Yet they find at least some music, hope, and pleasure on 
their island, an aesthetic consolation in their world both explored and articulated in terms 
of their addictive habits. And the poetry derived from their experience provides a sober 
and more conscious access to the kind of thinking the lotos-eaters access unhealthily. 
That combination of rigidly habitual thinking and creative potential has been cited 
as a structuring principle in a great deal of Victorian poetry. Isobel Armstrong has 
described this principle in terms of the Victorian “double poem”—the poem that presents 
standardized, consensus thinking while offering “the possibility of challenging . . . 
consensus through the double-reading” (16; emphasis added). These double poems are 
poems of contradictions, of reified habits that suggest creative re-patterning, of (in the 
terms of this dissertation) addicts whose condition produces addiction-like forms for 
potent thinking outside the strictures of addiction. In what follows I describe one 
particular tradition of that double poetry emerging with regard to addiction discourse. I 
focus on two Victorian poets: Tennyson and Christina Rossetti. Both were committed to 
ideals of stable, reiterated experience that contribute to the acquisition of greater truth—
religious ritual appealed to Rossetti, and Tennyson had an interest in the scientific 
method. Both were also drawn to tropes of addiction. They both produced double poems 
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with regard to a revised view, sanctioned by addiction discourse, of reiterated experience, 
the view of habitual behaviors as both stable and not, bound and boundless, always the 
same and always—for the desirous repeater—constituting a movement toward possibility 
and difference. While negotiating such contradictions, these poets made use of what I 
refer to as addiction-like forms—forms that offer addiction’s intensely repetitive 
orientation toward the possible without the risks of the condition itself. Writers like 
Tennyson and Rossetti clearly disassociated literal addiction from the addiction-like 
aesthetic experience of their exploratory, repetitive poems. They did so by displaying 
literal addiction as chiefly harmful while presenting the addiction-like obtained in their 
poetry as a way of living thoughtfully in a world of both repetitive actuality and wild 
possibility. 
As discussed in previous chapters, both science and pleasurable pursuit were 
frequently understood in the nineteenth-century in terms of habits by which we work 
toward something more, and addictive self-experimenting clarified the fundamental 
similarity between the two. To explore how Tennyson and Rossetti registered that 
similarity, I will first consider how Tennyson joined experimental repetitions with 
aesthetic ones—specifically, how he described addiction-like repetition that always 
proceeds toward possibility in both pursuits of pleasure and in experimental pursuits of 
meaning and knowledge. Addiction, as represented in Tennyson’s poems such as The 
Princess and “The Lotos-Eaters,” models addiction-like patterns for pursuit of both 
knowledge and aesthetic experience, patterns that the reader (rather than the represented 
addicts) can make the most of. Next, this chapter will consider another poetic approach to 
addiction, one that more specifically addresses how ongoing commercial consumption 
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intimates much more; this is the approach we see in Christina Rossetti’s Goblin Market. 
There, habit-forming consumption also brings with it worldly knowledge while providing 
useful literary patterns for further imaginative thinking and speaking.  
The point here is that, in the case of either “The Lotos-Eaters” or Goblin Market, 
aesthetic and knowledge-producing encounters with possibility merge through addictive 
habits, yet those habits ultimately prove disastrous; both poems, consequently, present 
instead addiction-like patterns of poetic language as superior paths toward that 
aesthetic/epistemological experience. While addictive habits entrap, they also suggest (in 
a contradictory, double-poem kind of way) patterns for repetitive encounters with 
possibility. Writers like Tennyson and Rossetti drew from those patterns for ambitiously 
poetic ends, provoking reflection on a world in which habit and its opposite so often join.  
 
Tennyson and Addiction 
Herbert Tucker in Tennyson and the Doom of Romanticism uses the term 
“addictive” to characterize a persistent hunger in Tennyson’s poetry; he writes of 
Tennyson’s attraction to the theme of “the addictive narcissism of erotic idealization” 
(97), for example, and describes the “addictive momentum” demanded as “the 
Tennysonian self requires continuous effort for its preservation” (126). This momentum 
went beyond poetry: Tennyson was no stranger to addiction in his personal life. A famed 
smoker (there has even been a “Tennyson” brand of cigars), the poet also had a bleak 
family history of alcoholism. Ann Colley writes that Tennyson had “a nagging fear that 
the unstable Dr. Tennyson [his father] was consciously drinking himself to death” (36). 
Dr. Tennyson suffered from “schirrus” of the liver, indicative of alcoholism (Ricks 5). 
And the doctor’s son would strive to refute slanderous suggestions that he was himself 
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addicted to narcotics. Yet, for all Tennyson’s own “attempts to allay rumors,” writes 
Roger Platizky, his “outward appearance . . . along with his artistic temperament, habitual 
pipe smoking, and trance-like imagery, all lent themselves to his unwelcome 
characterization as a possible drug user” (209). 
Addiction—whatever the terminology used to describe drug habits—was a reality 
and genuine worry for Tennyson, in other words, yet he maintained a conviction in the 
poetic possibility offered by overpowering repetition, that possible access to “the 
weirdest of the weirdest, utterly beyond words.” Reconciling worries about addiction 
with a happy view of repetitive literature might not seem like a difficulty at all; we might 
remind ourselves that addiction and poetic repetition are quite different things. But those 
in the nineteenth-century who had read De Quincey, who were familiar with popular 
concerns about overindulgent reading habits, and who were cognizant of certain details of 
Coleridge’s life had registered a link between literary repetitions and addictive repetitions. 
If they had read De Quincey especially closely, however, they also saw ways in which 
one might write about addiction while providing access to addiction-like forms through 
which one can think more intensely about possibility. They might have seen, as Tennyson 
did, addiction-like methods for attaining knowledge of possibility and aesthetic pleasure, 
and they might have, as Tennyson did, show addiction-like behaviors structuring poetry 
that allows for intensified, repetitive appreciation of the possibilities in materiality.  
And in fact, Tennyson was a great admirer of De Quincey, holding the opium-
eater’s prose in highest regard, calling it “as fine as any verse” (Hallam Tennyson II.414). 
Like De Quincey, too, Tennyson had an interest in exploratory thinking that matched his 
aesthetic ideals. According to his son, Hallam Tennyson, “While he talked of the 
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mysteries of the universe, his face, full of the strong lines of thought, was lighted up”: 
When conversing with my brother and myself or our college friends, he 
was, I used to think, almost at his best, for he would quote us the fine 
passages from ancient or modern literature and show us why they are fine, 
or he would tell us about the great facts and discoveries in Astronomy, 
Geology, Botany, Chemistry . . . (II.408) 
This is an appreciation of science with strikingly affective properties, an appreciation that 
causes the face to “light up” and accompanies aesthetic concerns relating to ancient and 
modern literature.  
Tennyson linked art and science frequently—a linkage that he describes in terms 
of incessant (addiction-like) hunger in, for example, The Princess. There, a prince, who 
with his friends has infiltrated the women’s academy overseen by Princess Ida, avidly 
attends lectures in an amphitheatre, hearing talks of “[e]lectric, chemic laws” (II.362) 
mixed with “quoted odes” (II.355) and “scraps of thunderous epic” (II.353).  The prince 
remarks that he and his friends took in this mix of poetry and science with something 
comparable to physical hunger: “like three horses that have broken fence” who “glutted 
all night long breast-deep in corn” (II.364–365). Ravenous appetite is a simile for 
delighted intellectual curiosity here. In this passage we see, fully formed, Tennyson’s 
fusion of aesthetic pleasure with science in addiction-like, intensely appetitive terms. 
Tennyson clearly saw scientific progress in his poetry of thirsty pursuit. In a letter 
to Edward Moxon in 1844, he writes, about Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural 
History of Creation, “it seems to contain many speculations with which I have been 
familiar for years, and on which I have written more than one poem” (Lang and Shannon 
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I.230, qtd  Zimmerman 70). More recently, a number of scholars have explored the 
connection between Tennyson and science. Tennyson’s “scientific readers,” notes John 
Holmes, “frequently identified him as wholeheartedly in [science’s] favor” (656).87 In 
Memoriam, particularly, is full of imagery and patterns that recall Lyell’s geology 
(Tomko; Zimmerman 67). Jason Rudy describes how science permeated Tennyson’s 
broader, social concerns, as well; he writes that in 1833, Tennyson “attended the third 
annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science” and took this 
as an opportunity for political reflection, for “at least part of the inspiration for the British 
Association was the desire to mediate the political turmoil of the day” (Rudy 46).  
More encounters with scientific associations awaited the poet. Tennyson “was 
elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1865” and his nomination “declares him to be 
‘attached to Science & anxious to promote its progress’” (J. Holmes 658). John Holmes 
argues that this reception from the scientific community was due to the poet’s aesthetic 
production as much as any social ideals for scientific advancement. What qualified 
Tennyson as a science-inclined poet seems, Holmes writes, to have less to do with 
specific scientific inquiries or achievements than with his “minute and detailed 
observation of nature” (661).88  
Other critics have recognized the close observation and continual skepticism of 
the scientist in Tennyson’s poetry; as Christopher Ricks has observed, “Tennyson is 
supremely a poet of doubt” (128). Embedded in the Princess’s world of aesthetically 
charged learning, the Prince wonders, “do I chase / The substance or the shadow? Will it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Holmes names Thomas Henry Huxley and the astronomer Norman Lockyer as examples. Huxley had 
called Tennyson “the only poet since the time of Lucretius, who has taken the trouble to understand the 
work and tendency of the men of science” (L. Huxley II: 359). 
88 Jason Rudy particularly notes the formal effects of Tennyson’s scientifically, physiologically engaged 
poetry—poetry in which “readers are asked to imagine communication as physiologically felt” (Rudy 62). 
	   	   	   	   	  
	   105	  
hold?” (II.386–387) That endlessly skeptical pursuit of aesthetic pleasure and mysterious 
knowledge characterizes another work of Tennyson’s, his “Lotos-Eaters,” in which such 
a pursuit also becomes plainly addictive. The island of Tennyson’s lotos-eaters is a lurid 
poetic domain of aesthetic languor, habitual pondering, and narcotic listlessness. Aidan 
Day notes a related, skeptical ambiguity in the poem, where “it is precisely the absence of 




“The Lotos-Eaters” clarifies the addiction-like properties of Tennysonian, 
skeptical-aesthetic experience. The poem tells of an island known through alluringly 
addictive physical experience—specifically through consumption of the island’s lotus 
that attracts the eaters, makes them groggy, and guides them about without leading them 
to a “settled scheme.” This is the basic way in which Tennyson’s eaters explore and 
poetically articulate their new locale, and their desired lotos has seemed a rather obvious 
opiate-analogue to readers. Life on the lotos-island proves deeply narcotic. Among its 
notable features is the ledge where “the poppy hangs in sleep” (56).90  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Alan Sinfield describes anxiety in Tennyson’s poetic pursuit of metaphysical certainty, of some firm 
grounding for identity and being: “Tennyson’s concern with his own name, and with the possible existence 
of ‘the Nameless’, appears as an anxiety about the constructedness of reality in language, and as an attempt 
to move beyond it” (236).  
90 Isobel Armstrong notes that Tennyson’s lotos-eaters match opium-eaters: “It is no accident that the 
mariners’ need for the Lotos is to allay the horrors of labour, for opium was often taken by industrial 
workers for the same reason” (87). Catherine Barnes Stevenson adduces a great deal of evidence to 
demonstrate that Tennyson was thinking specifically of De Quincey and opium when he wrote “The Lotos-
Eaters.” This includes Tennyson’s family problems with the condition. “About four years before,” writes 
Stevenson, “his father, George Clayton Tennyson, began taking opium (in the form of laudanum)” (119).  
“Dr. Tennyson, whose violent, erratic behavior and heavy drinking made his family’s life insufferable from 
the mid-1820s to his death in 1831, seems to have continued to use laudanum throughout this period” 
(Stevenson 120).  
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In this, a most direct poetic depiction of addictive experience, an unreached home 
evades Tennyson’s group of stranded Homeric sailors. They fall into a fantastical 
indolence, establishing a new sense of place in language characterized by their condition: 
Most weary seem’d the sea, weary the oar, 
Weary the wandering fields of barren foam. 
Then some one said, “We will return no more;” 
And all at once they sang, “Our island home 
Is far beyond the wave; we will no longer roam.” (41–45) 
Something persistently remains beyond the horizon: the sturdier grounding of home. But 
addictive consumption has brought these mariners into a new, addiction-like social 
context. In the above passage, alliteratively sensory language emphasizes physical 
sameness even as novel meaning and emotional significance develop: “weary seem’d the 
sea,” we are told, in language of exhaustion overloaded with sameness, with internal 
rhyming and alliterative sibilance.  
The poem could end here, perhaps in despair at this addictive state. Much 
scholarship on the poem does characterize the stagnancy of its drugged eating 
(Armstrong describes it as a numbed response to labor, for instance (87)). But instead of 
allowing its narrative to end with an expression of addiction’s dominance, the poem 
offers a close study of the island in flavorful, physical terms, as the sailors settle into their 
addicted condition rather more thoughtfully. They begin to notice things to which their 
addiction directs them: 
 The Lotos blooms below the barren peak, 
 The Lotos blows by every winding creek; 
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 All day the wind breathes low with mellower tone; 
 Thro’ every hollow cave and alley lone 
 Round and round the spicy downs the yellow Lotos-dust is blown. (145–
149) 
Blooming and blowing, the lotos gives patterned form to the island. Through strongly 
alliterative language, that repetitive physical action is recreated as poetry. Here, too, is a 
sensed mellowness in physical constancy, allowing the place to be drowsily felt as well 
as understood. The poet describes that felt constancy and monotony, the most repetitive 
sort of quotidian existence: “All day the wind breathes low,” passing “[t]hro’ every 
hollow cave and alley lone,” carrying with it the lotos. And yet the habitués’ habitual 
attention runs to discrete entities. The sameness of their languorous efforts leads their 
thoughts to difference. Hollow caves, lone alleys: these are physical zones of isolation 
and separateness explored here through language of uniformity.  
Such knowledge of particular physical reality comes about not simply by way of 
addiction, but through poetic form patterned after addiction. Consider the repeated 
mention of the lotos, the “round and round” of the lotos-dust pursued by drugged 
eaters—in such passages, the eaters’ addictive desire for sensory, reiterated experience 
expresses itself in patterns that give communicable, structured form to the field of details 
the hungry eaters encounter. These inhabitants see themselves as ancient gods, who “find 
a music centred in doleful song / Steaming up, a lamentation and an ancient tale of wrong, 
/ Like a tale of little meaning tho’ the words are strong” (162–164). Song might “steam 
up” to those on this island, poetry can emerge from material location in material terms, 
with dramatic possibility made apparent to them through aesthetic experience. For though 
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this island is described as “land where all things seem’d the same” (24), there is also 
great apparent material difference and possibility, evident in all the suggestive physical 
details that the eaters recognize in their habitual pursuit. Many of these details, described 
carefully, promise so much more, intimate possibility useful for poetic imagination, 
because such physical properties conceal as “veils” or only partly break through 
“wavering lights”—this is 
A land of streams! Some, like a downward smoke, 
Slow-dropping veils of thinnest lawn, did go; 
And some thro’ wavering lights and shadows broke, 
Rolling a slumberous sheet of foam below. (10–14) 
The alluring island may produce and reproduce sameness, then, but its allure also 
guides the sailors to study their island in terms of particularity that lead them to sense and 
speak of more than just sameness. There are risks that come with living and studying in 
this way—the island can be a melancholic, at times frightfully isolating place, and the 
eaters sing dolefully. Yet those same lotos-eaters can also smile and declare that “sweet 
music here . . . softer falls / Than petals from blown roses on the grass” (46–47).  
Even when it seems the lotos-eaters speak of slipping wholly into drugged stupor, 
they continue to learn things and articulate what they know lyrically. Their addiction thus 
becomes both poetic and in a way scientifically useful. The eaters can reflect on 
How sweet it were, hearing the downward stream, 
With half-shut eyes ever to seem 
Falling asleep in a half-dream! 
To dream, and dream, like yonder amber light, 
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Which will not leave the myrrh-bush on the height 
To hear each other’s whisper’d speech (99–104) 
The lotos-eaters fall into sweet sleep, but that sleep suggests the amber light cast upon the 
myrrh bush; it is a dreamy experience of material specifics, a sense of materiality loaded 
with possibility, with the fluctional properties of hallucination and the specificity of 
empirical observation. If the lotos-eaters are sleeping, who else is there to register the 
richness of these natural details but the poet and the reader? The real 
epistemological/aesthetic rewards go to those who can have a merely addiction-like, 
readerly experience of this island. The addicts cannot return home; they are bogged down 
in their longing. The reader, on the other hand, has options, expanded now through an 
intensified encounter with material possibility. 
 
Shelley, Tennyson, and Romantic Longing 
Tennyson’s representation of addiction brings to mind his poetic debts to an 
earlier poet who thought about intemperate habit—the teeotaling, diet-obsessed Percy 
Shelley, who had earlier reflected on aesthetic habits that might alter the world and shape 
knowledge of it. Shelley wrote of the risks and rewards that attended an aesthetic 
epistemology of habit. He had depicted poetic idealists and monstrous tyrants whose 
power, in either case, came from the ability to manipulate affecting patterns that could 
give form to the material world—those who could legislate through language’s patterns. 
Through the character of Count Cenci and in his own essays on vegetarianism, Shelley 
described such patterns as especially destructive when associated with selfish, tyrannical 
evils the poet had discerned in carnivorous predation and alcohol abuse. That sinister 
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version of poetic pattern affected Tennyson, it seems; Michael O’Neill and Christopher 
Ricks have observed passages in which Tennyson recalls Shelley’s demonic addict as the 
dark side of a poet. “Tennyson,” writes O’Neill, “when his ‘light is low’, has an appalled 
knowledge of a shadow self and that knowledge is pointed up by the echo of Cenci’s 
words” (184).  
O’Neill, following Ricks, cites echoes in Tennyson’s In Memoriam of Cenci’s 
especially physiological claim that “My blood is running up and down my veins; / A 
fearful pleasure makes it prick and tingle: / I feel a giddy sickness of strange awe” 
(IV.i.163–5). Those Tennysonian echoes read as follows: 
Be near me when my light is low, 
 When the blood creeps, and the nerves prick 
 And tingle; and the heart is sick, 
And all the wheels of Being slow. (II. 1–4) 
Both Shelley’s deranged addict and Tennyson’s disturbed, melancholic poet derive a sick 
energy from routine bodily experience. Both live through a Gothic aesthetic experience 
comprising compulsive, bodily habits. This is physiological poetry of the kind Jason 
Rudy has described—blood creeps, nerves prick and tingle, and the stanza becomes 
formed by recurring emphasis on physiological phenomena. The passage is a low point 
for the poet, or more specifically for Tennyson’s “light,” but Tennyson swerves from the 
Cencian to more outwardly directed, thoughtful patterns, asking for another to “be near 
me,” rather than reveling too long in isolation, as the self-obsessed Count Cenci would 
ultimately hope to do. 
But, whether slyly protecting his image or actually in denial, Tennyson rejected 
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the notion that he had a debt to Shelley; he did, however, acknowledge his admiration of 
the earlier poet (see O’Neill 183 and 194–195). And Michael O’Neill has detailed 
precisely where terms and ideas run through shared language from Shelley to Tennyson, 
especially with regard to a fascination with a lack of surcease. For both poets, this 
emphasis on endless recurrence can lead to despair (see: the miseries caused by the 
incessantly predatory Count Cenci or Tennyson’s devastating melancholy) but both 
maintain hope in the possibility that endlessness suggests. O’Neill notices how “in 
Shelley, attention is focused on hope rather than attainment, on hope’s endlessly various 
modes of coming into being” (O’Neill 192). It’s a tendency that anticipates those closing 
lines of Tennyson’s “Ulysses”: “To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield” (70).  
Shelley and Tennyson also exhibited a shared fascination with emotionally 
charged, repetitively experimental pursuit. Tennyson participated in a scientific 
association and claimed to have, over the course of decades, frequently repeated words in 
a way that suggested a near-infinity of possibility, while Shelley studied not just 
physiology, but chemistry and other experimental sciences during the course of his own 
poetic development. In other words, both saw poetic sublimity in habitually, repetitively 
experimental experience of material reality. Tennyson, notes O’Neill, considers in his 
elegiac poetry such as In Memoriam “the meaninglessness that may lurk at the back of 
creation, but his anguish is unimaginable without Shelley’s sense of the ‘vacancy’ ([Mont 
Blanc] I. 144) that would yawn, were it not for the imperiled ‘human mind’s imaginings’ 
([Mont Blanc] I. 143) that are dependent on and constitutive of the very materialist 
‘secret strength of things’ (I. 139) which his poetry has conjured into being” (O’Neill 
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195–196). “Mont Blanc” and In Memoriam (as well as “Lotos-Eaters”) reflect similarly 
on that grandly undefined or unattained potentiality within material actuality.  
Addiction was, however, a real threat for both Shelley’s and Tennyson’s sense of 
a world known through sensitivity to possibility. Addiction is the diseased version of the 
repetitive pursuit they both embraced as aesthetically promising, the life-destroying 
version of routine questing through materiality. Nevertheless, in the work of both poets, 
addiction’s habits remain overshadowed by whatever it is that the addict cannot wholly 
consume. The reflective, thoughtful Beatrice defeats Count Cenci, for example, and the 
Tennysonian knower might reach a more lucid sense of the world’s generous fullness by 
way of addiction-like patterns. 
Yet Tennyson does not simply mirror Shelley in his sense of repetitive possibility-
pursuit, and the difference between the two poets says a great deal about the development 
of popular addiction discourse in the nineteenth century. Shelley warned about alcohol 
habits and, troubled by them, devised healthier habits of sobriety that might use the 
power of addiction without the attendant loss of will. By Tennyson’s day, addiction had 
come to be increasingly and more directly associated with De Quincey, and De Quincey 
was not the only one to see investigative pursuit of possibility through the patterns of 
addiction. Tennyson’s erudite Princess uses language of habitual enslavement and 
drinking to describe a movement toward liberating knowledge: 
            Knowledge is now no more a fountain seal’d! 
Drink deep, until the habits of the slave, 
The sins of emptiness, gossip and spite 
And slander, die. (II.76–79) 
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Intellectually fulfilling consumption, metaphorically “drinking deeply” with a conscious 
aesthetic sense of materiality (such as those “chemic, electric” matters studied through 
odes and epic language at the Princess’s university), might cure enslaved habits, 
according to the Princess. The cure here is strongly suggestive of the illness—of 
addiction or habitual enslavement—but the resulting consciousness allows a broader 
perspective than the addict’s. Both Tennyson’s Princess and Shelley’s Beatrice appeal to 
more critically aware patterns of monotony; they seek healthier responses to addiction by 
way of ongoing poetic patterns that affectively encourage expanded awareness. 
Tennyson’s poetry just shows those patterns stemming a little more directly from 
addiction, rather than as a sober response to addiction. The lotos-eaters convert their 
addictive feelings into poetic song, for example, by which the reader may benefit from 
addiction-like experience. Unlike Shelley’s heroine, the lotos-eaters are themselves 
addicts; the lotos-eaters create what they can and understand what they do through their 
unhealthy habits, and the result is something rather more thoughtful than mere 
intoxication. 
Addiction for the lotos-eaters is thus both a damaging condition and a model for 
poetic enlightenment, both a stultifying habit and an inspiration for conscious exploration. 
These contradictions make the poem a crucial example of what Armstrong would call the 
double poem, the poem of dual, ambiguously resolvable meanings that she finds central 
to Victorian poetics. The double poem “draws attention to the fact that meaning is 
decided by cultural consensus even while its ambiguity offers the possibility of 
challenging that consensus through the double-reading” (Isobel Armstrong 16). “The 
Lotos-Eaters,” similarly, draws attention to addiction as a health problem while offering 
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the possibility that such unhealthy habits can still support awareness that comes from 
pleasurable pursuit of knowledge through repeated experience. The poem replays 
consensus creatively, finding a consensus version of addiction rich with possibility, rich 
with intimations strangeness. 
Tennyson wrote after De Quincey, after the rise of Romantic periodicals, at a time 
when addiction-like habits had suggested literary potential to many.91 Through his 
addicted lotus-eaters, then, he could address that potential made clear by one of his era’s 
dominant aesthetic epistemologies, that of periodical culture, wherein one would 
pleasurably derive information about difference and possibility through habitual 
experience.92 This periodical mode, so deeply DeQuinceyan, supports Tennyson’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Jon Klancher describes how repetitive, desirous experimenting was the basic project of the Romantic 
periodicals emerging at the same time as De Quincey’s career as a writer for periodicals. Mass periodical 
culture thus arose in Britain along with De Quincey’s more positive strain of addiction discourse, both 
inextricably tied to each other as commercially inscribed habits of desirous pursuit. Those who study the 
emergence of periodicals consistently characterize it in terms of insatiable repetition. Klancher writes that 
for Blackwood’s, “the ‘power of thought’—and the style that confirms it—reveals itself by a repetitive but 
intensifying reach after that ‘inaccessible nucleus’ of meaning (59). This, as Jon Mee points out, is part of 
how a “print culture endlessly echoes its own empty impulses” (Mee 61). The endless echoes make 
possible and cement certain recurring tropes that a culture hopes can give meaning to the repetitive noise. 
Klancher writes, “Both readers and writers searched the empire of signs for a map, a stance, a code with 
which to grasp historical transformation and a middle-class audience’s role in it. The master-sign discourse 
[such as, Klancher notes earlier, “mechanism” as Carlyle uses the term] represents this search most 
recognizably for a later-twentieth-century reader because it remains today so popular a form of social 
criticism for a middle-class reading audience” (73). Addiction, most mechanical and repetitive of all, was 
positioned to become the master of all master-tropes, a popular tool for understanding how understanding 
works in a world of repetitively consumed mass media, intensified consumption of surplus goods, and 
sympathetic habits of communication.  
92 The periodicals established in the Romantic era would structure addictive reading (and in De Quincey’s 
case, actually apply the form of addictive experience, as I describe in chapter three). These were some of 
the most influential British publications of the century, including: Blackwood’s (the Tory home for much of 
De Quincey’s work), Fraser’s (publisher of canonical Victorians such as Carlyle), the Edinburgh Review 
(the leading voice of reaction against Wordsworth-and-Coleridge Romanticism), and the Westminster 
Review (which published work of Utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and which 
later in the century would publish George Eliot), all founded between 1800 and 1830. David Stewart’s 
Romantic Magazines and Metropolitan Literary Culture describes how a boom in magazine publishing was 
a uniquely Romantic phenomenon—and one of the chief ways in which Romanticism initiated popular 
culture. Developments such as the steam press had further sped up the publication process by the 
1830s (see Klancher 88). Commercial circulating libraries such as Mudie’s also drove new, serialized 
literature, expanding rapidly in the mid-Victorian period (Hoppen 386). Charles Mudie developed the clout 
to influence the novels he circulated, particularly limiting narrative emphasis on that which could be 
interpreted as immoral, in response to what he viewed as basic audience concerns (Hoppen 386). Readers’ 
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nuanced take on addiction, in which the health condition is shown to inspire rewardingly 
addiction-like experience.93   
 
Addiction-like Enjoyment and Nineteenth-Century Periodicals 
Tennyson—an enthusiastic reader of De Quincey and a generally interested reader 
of scientific publications—also found a place for himself in periodicals, as Kathryn 
Ledbetter has described. “The Lotos-Eaters” was written and revised over a period in the 
1830s in which Tennyson became increasingly involved in periodicals, such as the 
annuals the Gem and the Englishman’s Magazine (Ledbetter 16–17). Tennyson would 
become a frequent writer for publications like Macmillan’s, too, which was both a source 
of readerly pleasure and an outlet for scientific writers like Huxley, Lewes, and others. 
But as early as “The Lotos-Eaters,” Tennyson was exploring the investigatory potential 
of periodic consumption. De Quincey had already dramatized such an experience through 
prose in his Confessions, and Tennyson’s “Lotos-Eaters” enhances the sense of 
repetitions that drive toward possibility. The poem does so with intensified, sonorous 
repetitions patterned after physical hunger. Its eponymous sailors come to understand and 
participate in a mysterious place that can never be static, never completely known, as 
long as it remains rhythmically, musically in process.  
Just as periodicals would serially report on habitual experience (quite obviously 
when publishing De Quincey’s work), Tennyson’s lotos-eaters speak repetitively about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
habitual preferences and enjoyments were now, though perhaps in a skewed and limited way, shaping what 
was read, as writers responded to their market (or what they interpreted to be their market) in order to feed 
certain habits. 
93 See Linda Hughes and Michael Lund’s The Victorian Serial for greater detail on how the serial novel 
matched capitalist desires for sustained repetition and a sense of regimented time initiated by railways and 
accelerated trade. 
	   	   	   	   	  
	   116	  
their own repetitions. Distinctions between that which is known and the ways in which it 
is known become blurred in such a milieu. Armstrong notes that “The Lotos-Eaters” “is 
both the expression of the addictive desire in which drug requires further drugging, and 
an analysis of the conditions under which the unhappy consciousness and the unhappy 
body come into being” (87). Analysis matches expression when the thing being analyzed 
is itself the addictive desire that drives both analytical exploration and articulation. Both 
expression and analysis approach the possible without achieving static actuality in this 
case, which only enhances the poem’s orientation toward ambiguity. 
That ambiguity characterizes the lotos-eaters’ bodily poetry of exploration and 
drugged defeat—poetry manifested in emphatically physical sounds about an 
emphatically physical subject, poetry rich with the rhythms of physiological experience, 
harmonizing with, providing knowable form to, and contributing to the eaters’ physical 
surroundings.94 Repetitive rhythms of poetic music change the lotos-eaters’ place in quite 
physical terms, making it hard to establish that place as simply one thing: 
There is sweet music here that softer falls 
Than petals from blown roses on the grass, 
Or night-dews on still waters between walls 
Of shadowy granite, in a gleaming pass; 
Music that gentlier on the spirit lies, 
Than tired eyelids upon tired eyes; 
Music that brings sweet sleep down from the blissful skies. (46–52) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 As Jason Rudy writes, “Tennyson’s poetry takes steps toward embodied poetic form, a poetic practice in 
which bodily experience is not simply referenced but enacted” (46). 
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Alliteration and heavily stressed rhythms forge narcotic patterns in the above passage. An 
echo-location technique establishes a somniferous, in-process place, as positional 
coordinates are called out (“there,” “here,” sweet sleep being “brought down” by music, 
and so on) through words that intimate wearily drugged droning. Poetic place-making 
springs from the patterns and bodily tendencies of addiction here, and such a place can be 
studied if not ever defined simply. The weary lotos-eaters are stuck in this ambiguous 
realm, always addictively driven about their island, where they encounter different things 
and constantly know more and more about what they encounter. Meanwhile their readers 
at least have the opportunity to reflect soberly on the musical pleasures and learning 
attained by such repetitiously productive aesthetic enjoyment. For the reader, this is 
merely an addiction-like experience with all the rewards of lotos-eating and none of the 
drawbacks.  
 
The Addiction-Like Solution in Goblin Market 
Christina Rossetti’s Goblin Market also tells of knowledge gained through 
desirous habits of consumption. It’s the story of a consumer lured into reiterated 
devouring, and it has also been read as a tale of addiction (see, for instance, Shelley 
O’Reilly’s essay on absinthe in the poem). Published in 1862, Rossetti’s fantastical 
narrative of temptation and recovery has been read in light of her religious views,95 yet 
the poem arrives at results remarkably similar to those of the irreligious “Lotos-Eaters.” 
Rossetti’s poem, for one, is just as clearly based around a habit-forming substance; as 
Shelley O’Reilly has emphasized, the poem’s goblins are selling wormwood, an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 As Dinah Roe notes, “In her devotional prose and poetry, Rossetti invites her reader to engage with a 
sophisticated network of biblical allusion, in which Christian doctrine is re-thought and sometimes re-
forged” (7). 
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ingredient in absinthe.96 Their product is also enjoyed through repetitive consuming and 
expressing: one of the goblin’s targets, Laura, drinking what the goblins are selling, 
“sucked and sucked and sucked the more” (134).97 Expression matches the thing 
expressed in this narrative of addiction, much as it does in “The Lotos-Eaters”; Laura, 
like the lotos-eaters, consumes and consumes and consumes, and the language reflects 
those repetitions.  
Goblin Market begins with reiterative enticement that initiates the protagonist’s 
exploration of her world through such repetitive consumption. “Come buy, come buy” (4) 
the goblins shout, urging a consumer’s thirst in the most jingly, redundantly reused terms. 
But as in “The Lotos-Eaters,” that sustained sameness leads to contemplation of material 
differences. The consumer’s eye is led to varied produce: “Plump unpecked cherries / 
Melons and raspberries, / Bloom-down-cheeked peaches” (7–9) that are “ripe together / 
In summer weather (15–16). The goblins urge again and again that the consumer seek 
more; speaking in patterns, they shape the terms for a habitual, endless chase after 
novelty.  
This sales strategy thus carries imaginative weight. As the goblin’s list goes on, 
they cite a range of tantalizing items, which bring different attending associations, and 
they eventually name “[c]itrons from the South”  (29). Their products suggest a realm, a 
region, a world. The summer weather through which the fruit achieved ripeness therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See Shelley O’Reilly, “Absinthe Makes the Tart Grow Fonder: A Note on ‘wormwood’ in Christina 
Rossetti’s ‘Goblin Market’.” 
97 Megan Norcia writes of how “Goblin Market” provides lessons about how to live in a bustling 
metropolis; Terrence Holt emphasizes the economic terms used throughout the poem. Rebecca Stern 
observes a particular commercial context surrounding the consumption problems of “Goblin Market”: “the 
widespread [Victorian] problem of food adulteration provides apt framework for this tale of a young 
woman sickened by the food she consumes” (Stern 482). 
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works as part of their sales pitch, part of the product. Laura, charmed by the goblins, 
similarly ponders the locales that might produce such fruit. “How fair the vine must grow 
/ Whose grapes are so luscious; / How warm the wind must blow / Thro’ those fruit 
bushes” (60–63). This is all conjecture, however, and phrased as such: “how? how?” The 
act of questioning (rather than knowing) follows the possibility proffered by the goblins 
and leads Laura to imagine such places (those of the frugiferous vines and warm winds). 
She truly doesn’t know how fair the vine grows, or how warm the wind blows through 
those fruit bushes, yet she is not asking about such matters in the expectation of an 
answer. She is asking rhetorically, speaking anaphorically, in the rhythms laid out in the 
beginning of the poem by the goblins, answering their calls in a strange sort of 
affirmative—with intensifying interrogation that repeats itself, suggesting worlds that are 
remote, merely possible. While the goblins perniciously sell a corrupted product, in other 
words, the consumerist, addiction-like thinking they promote also supports expansive 
imaginative poetry, wherein material patterns suggest without completely offering total 
knowledge and thus open up imaginative space for the creative contemplator. Here again 
is doubleness; here are opposed meanings springing from habitual consumption. 
Addictive consumerism is both dangerous in Rossetti’s poem and leads to contemplation. 
It does so, as in “The Lotos-Eaters,” by inspiring thoughts about the possible from within 
a perilous actual.  
In Rossetti’s poem, addictive thinking is more emphatically consumerist and 
commercial than in Tennyson’s,98 and those same commercial patterns become in Goblin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 For a discussion of Rossetti’s use of marketing language, see Herbert Tucker’s “Rossetti’s Goblin 
Marketing: Sweet to Tongue and Sound to Eye.” Tucker writes: 
The eldritch embroidery of ‘‘Goblin Market’’ has probably attracted more, and more various, 
commentary during the last two decades than any other poem of its time. It proves on recent 
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Market the most condensed forms for poetic patterning. “Come buy, come buy” is 
repeated throughout, propelling the poem’s rhythms, and respondent desirous repetitions 
create a world around materials of exchange. The goblins are not even human merchants, 
but rather themselves repetitions or reflections of merchants. They are imitations, matters 
of art and skewed mimesis in grossly physical terms. “One had a cat’s face, / One 
whisked a tail, / One tramped at a rat’s pace, / One crawled like a snail” (71–74). More 
telling is the passage in which we learn that “One parrot-voiced and jolly / Cried ‘Pretty 
Goblin’ still for ‘Pretty Polly’” (112–113).  Parrots are already mimics, lacking human 
consciousness of the words they repeat; this goblin is then a parrot of a parrot, a mimic 
who utters language of repetition further removed from a source of that repetition. The 
goblins are so mindlessly repetitive in their sales-chants that one of them can cry “pretty 
goblin,” which is plainly a terrible sales strategy unless one intends to sell a goblin. Their 
commercial chatter has intensified into nattering self-involvement, a mere celebration of 
repetitive goblin-ness.  
The goblins can also be capable manipulators, however. Their art consists of 
language’s patterns, the mimicry and echoing of sounds, all flooding around the sensory 
enjoyments of the fruit they sell, and Laura is sold on the idea of consumerist repetition 
itself, on wanting to consume more and more and more. Grounds for exchange are then 
found in unexpected places: “Good folk, I have no coin,” Laura says, “To take were to 
purloin” (116–117). The goblins are unbothered by this. “‘You have much gold upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
examination to be a poem about communal sorority and also about patriarchal dominion; about the 
Christian Eucharist and also free self-actualization; about diffusive jouissance and also the 
therapeutic consolidation of a split soul; about anorexia nervosa, vampirism, the adulteration of 
foodstuffs, absinthe addiction, and the pros and cons of masturbation” (117).  
My overarching idea in this present chapter is that these concerns about isolation and community, selfhood 
and transcendence, jouissance, vampirism and diet, revolved around a concern with addiction.  
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your head,’ / They answered all together” (123–124). Laura clips off “a precious golden 
lock” and sheds “a tear more rare than pearl, / Then sucked their fruit globes fair or red”: 
Sweeter than honey from the rock 
Stronger than man-rejoicing wine, 
Clearer than water flowed that juice; 
She never tasted such before, 
How should it cloy with length of use? 
She sucked and sucked and sucked the more 
Fruits which that unknown orchard bore . . . (126–135) 
This overwhelming consumption is specifically compared to desirous enjoyment of wine. 
Laura is on her way to addiction almost immediately, and she describes her yearnings as 
an addiction. “I ate and ate my fill,” she tells her sister after consuming so much fruit—
“Yet my mouth waters still” (165–166). Even the experience of the fruit initially 
motivates thoughts about a world beyond the fruit, leading her to think of honey, wine, 
and water, none of which can compare to this substance that could never “cloy with 
length of use.” She wants more and more; she is thinking as the goblins’ chants would 
have her think.  
Her sister Lizzie urges Laura to forget that thirst, however, and they fall asleep, 
then go about a day of routine: 
   Laura rose with Lizzie: 
  Fetched in honey, milked the cows, 
 Aired and set to rights the house, 
  Kneaded cakes of whitest wheat, 
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  Cakes for dainty mouths to eat, 
  Next churned butter, whipped up cream, 
  Fed their poultry, sat and sewed; 
  Talked as modest maidens should . . . (202–209) 
These are patterns of easy contentment, particularly in the mind of Lizzie, who speaks 
“with an open heart” while Laura sits “in an absent dream” (210–211). Both delight in 
materiality’s patterns; Lizzie just enjoys them in a sober way, as routine enriched by a 
fuller awareness. They are, at this stage, quite different: “One content, one sick in part; / 
One warbling for the mere bright day’s delight, / One longing for the night” (212–214). 
Laura’s mind, awakened to pleasures that Lizzie knows not, wants in a way that disrupts 
contentment, and the remainder of the poem will track Laura’s pursuit of a way out of 
this tormenting addiction. 
Influenced by the goblins, Laura’s mind continues to tilt toward “that unknown 
orchard,” that imagined place, that realm of possibility suggested by all these patterns 
that lead to no satiety.99 Yet the market seems to have vanished. “She dreamed of melons, 
as a traveler sees / False waves in desert drouth / With shade of leaf-crowned trees, / And 
burns the thirstier in the sandful breeze” (289–292). The punchier, “iterated jingle” (233) 
of the goblins becomes the longer poetic lines of unfulfilled want here, leading her to the 
contemplation of vanished enjoyment, comparable to a traveler passing through a place 
of fantasy.100 Once again remote worlds are conjured in the language of desire; once 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Steven Connor writes, “The poem institutes an energetic but self-validating sign-system, the incremental 
accumulation of terms acquiring internally a kind of parodied sacramental value. But repeatedly, as we 
have seen, images designed to quell difference end up reactivating it” (447). 
100 The irregularity of Rossetti’s lines, more typically short, was one of the technically unorthodox features 
that struck readers; in a biography of Christina Rossetti, Kathleen Jones observes that her “technical 
innovations such as the short, irregularly rhymed lines and simplicity of expression were seen as a 
refreshing departure” from Tennyson, the dominant poet-celebrity of the era (112). 
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again literary creation matches addictive impulses. The poem, in this way, shows how 
material habits can inform the creation of possible worlds—by always compelling one 
toward something left out of previous iterations, and by representing form itself, the 
reiterations of a pattern. That patterned language simplifies the surface of Rossetti’s 
poetry, thereby having the effect of suggesting more than is stated, contributing to a 
suggestive milieu much like that of the lotos-eaters. As Antony Harrison has observed, 
Christina Rossetti’s “consciseness” lends itself “to dramatic intensity, to deliberate 
ambiguity, and, even more notably, to [her] often open-ended symbolic modes of 
expression” (Christina Rossetti in Context 10).  
That open-endedness has long conflicted with Rossetti’s reputation as a religious 
writer. To many critics, there’s a curious division here between stern theological dogma 
and poetically indulgent free-for-all. There have been several attempts to isolate one lucid 
way to understand the work. Some, such as Germaine Greer, have seen Goblin Market as 
a coping mechanism; Rossetti, she writes, “used the aspirations of piety as a metaphor for 
her own frustrated sexuality” (Greer 360).101 Others have emphasized different forces at 
work in the bodily suggestive language of the poem. Antony Harrison describes a more 
general concern with illness held by Rossetti, who suffered from a range of maladies. He 
writes, “Rossetti’s unrelenting attacks upon the indulgence of sexual desire, often troped 
as an illness or represented as an addiction that produces malaise, disease, or death for 
narrators and characters in her poetry, are directly related to the experience of illness—
and her understanding of the experience of illness—in her own life” (“Christina Rossetti: 
Illness and Ideology” 416–417). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Diane d’Amico’s Christina Rossetti: Faith, Gender, and Time covers much of the recent history of 
Rossetti scholarship, including Greer’s (8). 
	   	   	   	   	  
	   124	  
Recently, there has also been a resurgence in scholarship that takes Rossetti’s 
piety seriously. Diane d’Amico, referring to criticism such as Greer’s, writes that “a 
poem so clearly about body and soul is often read as focusing only on the body” (69). 
d’Amico notes, about Goblin Market, “if we read these lines with Rossetti’s Christian 
faith in mind, they point not to the pleasure to be experienced in satisfying any of the 
sensual appetites, but rather to the impossibility of ever finding full satisfaction by 
attempting to satisfy the body” (69). Rossetti, in this sense, would be assuming some of 
the aesthetic orientation depicted by Tennyson, only now with a religious understanding 
of addiction: the sheer impossibility of addiction’s satisfaction suggests something 
divinely grander, something divinely unattainable and sublime (a numinously 
inaccessible thing).  
As a Tractarian, Rossetti engaged a religious movement in Britain that sought a 
return to material rituals. John Henry Newman was a representative figure for 
Tractarianism, also called the Oxford Movement due to affiliations with the university’s 
community (the “Tractarian” name came from the movement’s central publication, 
Tracts for the Times). Mary Arseneau’s recent study of Christina Rossetti addresses her 
Tractarian beliefs in “intense incarnationalism” as well as “their sacramentalism, a term 
that refers to both their reverence for the sacraments of the Church and to the broader 
concept of their awareness of the transcendent as sacramentally and analogically present 
in the material world” (12). Goblin consumption, in its suggestion of materiality that only 
leads to thirsting for more materiality, misses the point of Rossetti’s incarnationalism, but 
it intimates that point nonetheless. It is a wicked reversal of the incarnationalist path 
toward recognized divine bounty in material experience; goblin consumption drives 
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toward mere pursuit of material enjoyment. That incessant pursuit for enjoyment is made 
possible by and alludes to some greater bounty within materiality.102 Suzanne Waldman 
writes that the goblins represent “a primary source of superegoic pressure within 
utilitarian society, which is its ‘violen[t] and obscen[e]’ way of inciting one to indulge in 
a ‘boundless and aggressive enjoyment’” (Waldman, The Demon and the Damozel 63).103 
A key word here is “boundless”—the word and its synonyms are full of import for the 
religious writer. For a Tractarian, the boundlessness suggested by ritual material 
consumption might point toward a different kind of enormity, that of a deity. Writes 
Arseneau, “Underlying the Tractarian emphasis on the sacraments and the renewed 
interest in ritual, ceremonial, and ecclesiastical decoration is an assumption of the 
interconnection between the physical and spiritual realms” (100). The goblins’ manner of 
consumption suggests something more that eludes every act of consuming—it is 
addictive and thus will not produce a content sense of that “more” as divinity, but it 
emphatically does suggest that there is something more.  
  The forces behind the culture of repetitive, goblin-like consumption—forces that 
included expanded commerce, leisure fed by accumulated surplus, and urbanization that 
collected consumers ever more closely—would accelerate and intensify rapidly in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Drug addiction had already been offered as a new sort of cultural ritual, a foundational component for a 
culture of habitual pleasures, as in De Quincey’s “church of opium” (Confessions 47). The relationship 
between church and drug was noticed famously by Marx, who called religion “the opium of the people” 
(131). Sometimes the language of addiction’s religious implications could be a little less direct, but still 
discernible. Later in the century, for instance, when drugs were becoming increasingly criminalized and 
regulated in the United States, one “Dr. William Muir of Brooklyn, speaking for the New York 
Pharmaceutical Association, showed the plight of the honest retailer . . . ‘A good many people are killed by 
automobiles; but there is [also] a good deal of pleasure gotten out of them,’ he said” (Musto 46–47). The 
doctor is describing martyrs to the cause of enjoyment, essentially arguing for human sacrifice to maintain 
“a good deal of pleasure.” This secular religion of Dr. Muir had its rituals, its repetitions, carried out by 
commercial customs, through transportation routes and in devoted acts of eating. 
103 Waldman is using phrases from page 92 of Joan Copjec’s Read My Desire: Lacan against the 
Historicists (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994). 
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Rossetti’s time.104 Thomas De Quincey had articulated that ascendant culture and the 
corresponding all-important role of drug addiction in his Confessions, where he wanders 
around the city and hallucinates about the source of opium while taking the drug, all in 
order to clarify “the doctrine of the true church on the subject of opium” (Confessions 47). 
This secular church’s congregation grew in the decades following the publication of his 
Confessions. For the Tractarian believer in physical ritual as a path to greater spiritual 
awareness, material ritual that suggests some greater power could be neatly articulated 
with regard to its reversal, the then popularly understood sense of the addict’s version of 
material ritual that suggests more.  
 Goblin Market, along these lines, echoes religious scripture and practice in its 
story of addiction-recovery. d’Amico points out various moments of Biblical language: 
Laura believes that the goblin fruit is “Sweeter than honey from the  
rock.” Such a comparison echoes Ps. 81:16: “And with honey out of the 
rock should I have satisfied thee.” In the language of Christian symbolism, 
the rock is read as a reference to Christ . . . Not surprisingly, after Laura’s 
feast, we are told that ‘her tree of life drooped from the root.’ In 
Revelation, the tree of life is promised ‘to him that overcometh’ (Rev. 2:7), 
in other words, to those who follow Christ and his commandments. 
Laura’s physical decline is to be read as emblematic of a spiritual one . . .” 
(d’Amico 71) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 For an account of the rise of leisure in the Victorian era, see Peter Bailey, Leisure and Class in Victorian 
England: Rational Recreation and the Contest for Control, 1830–1885; urbanization was, also, one of the 
most startlingly observable changes during the nineteenth century: “Between 1801 and 1891 the urban 
population increased sevenfold, the rural only by a quarter” (Hoppen 56). 
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Laura is led to that decline through material consumption that leads to sickness rather 
than religious epiphany.105  Yet while Laura’s addiction is a danger, it at least intimates a 
sense of great potential in materiality. If only her addiction didn’t make her so solitarily 
sick. What is needed, then, is something merely addiction-like. And the poem at last 
produces that addiction-like thinking through the help of the Lizzie character, as 
discussed below. The result is another version of Armstrong’s double poem, confirming 
cultural consensus (addiction is an evil) while finding possibility in that consensus for 
something different (the addiction-like can be beneficial, offering broader awareness). 
Salutary imaginative possibility is found in the patterns of Goblin Market’s physical 
experiences despite the dangers of those experiences.  
 That payoff of addiction-like patterns recalls De Quincey, again. Jan Marsh, in a 
biography of Christina Rossetti, has contended that De Quincey seems a most noticeable 
influence on Rossetti’s work in another passage of hers dealing with truly ravenous 
appetite—the crocodile cannibalism of her poem, “My Dream” (Marsh 167). There, 
Rossetti describes a dream of standing beside the Euphrates, where she sees “crocodiles, 
a gaunt blunt-featured crew” (7); “one there was who waxed beyond the rest, / Wore 
kinglier girdle and a kingly crown, / Whilst crowns and orbs and sceptres starred his 
breast” (15–17). This king begins to eat other crocodiles.  
An execrable appetite arose, 
He battened on them, crunched, and sucked them in. 
He knew no law, he feared no binding law, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 D.M.R. Bentley has related the goblins to “the Christian’s three traditional and mortal enemies—the 
flesh, the world, and the devil . . . Considered more closely, however, Rossetti’s initial depiction of the 
cupidinous goblins and their ‘free-born’ fruit” could suggest a relationship with Christian theological 
attitudes toward free will (66–67). 
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But ground them with inexorable jaw: 
The luscious fat distilled upon his chin, 
Exuded from his nostrils and his eyes, 
While still like hungry death he fed his maw (25–31) 
 De Quincey, notes Marsh in her biography of Rossetti, wrote of crocodiles as well 
in his Confessions, crocodiles who “were hideous beasts swarming through de Quincey’s 
drugged ‘oriental dreams’, self-created creatures of loathing by which he was pursued . . . 
It was surely from such sources that Christina, whether she knew it or not, derived her 
cannibal crocodile” (167). Her crocodile is not merely a monstrous presence in an 
“oriental dream,” however—and such characteristics are not the only attributes that recall 
de Quincey. The monster is defined by hunger, ravenously destructive and unethical even 
as he represents a certain height of aesthetic glory: “crowns and orbs and sceptres starred 
his breast. / All gleamed compact and green with scale on scale, / But special 
burnishment adorned his mail” (17–19). The language of the crocodile’s DeQuinceyan 
consumption proves similar to the language of excess and consumption in Goblin Market, 
too. The crocodile does not simply devour his food; it covers him, “luscious fat” oozing 
down his chin, much as the juice of the goblins covers Lizzie, when she finally visits the 
goblins and fruit “syrupped all her face, / And lodged in dimples of her chin” (434–435).  
In either case, there is an exaggeratedly sensory substance sought by intense 
appetites. Rossetti, clearly enough in the crocodile passage, does not lose sight of the 
dangers brought about by living with this kind of consumption. In the first stage of 
Laura’s own addiction to the materials gotten from the goblins, she becomes lost to her 
sister; she dreams of possibilities; she loses herself in abstraction. While Lizzie, after she 
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“plucked purple and rich golden flags” (220), hurries home, “Laura loitered still among 
the rushes” (226). She is less industrious:  
She no more swept the house,  
Tended the fowls or cows,  
Fetched honey, kneaded cakes of wheat, 
Brought water from the brook: 
But sat down listless in the chimney-nook 
And would not eat. (293–298) 
Habits of hard work and wholesome consumption have vanished. 
 But addiction does not need to be a dominant threat, either, in the world of Goblin 
Market. Lizzie proves this. She visits the goblins’ market with hopes of reviving her 
ailing sister, and she deals directly with addictive substances: “for the first time in her 
life,” we are told, she started “to listen and look” (327–328). Lizzie is only now an 
attentive empiricist, thinking like her consumerist sister while maintaining some critical 
distance. Greater knowledge and a cure for addiction soon come from Lizzie’s distanced 
encounter with addiction-feeding commerce. It starts when the goblins spot her, and she 
asks to make a purchase—now with silver (324) rather than tears or hair. She is not going 
to deal as directly or physically with addiction, not as her sister had done. This upsets the 
goblins, who try to force-feed her, but Lizzie resists, and “laughed in heart to feel the drip 
/ Of juice that syrupped all her face” (433–434).  
Though Lizzie perceives the sensory strangeness promoted by the goblins, she has 
not consumed the fruit. The goblins, defeated, flee into material solidity: 
Some writhed into the ground,  
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Some dived into the brook  
With ring and ripple, 
Some scudded on the gale without a sound, 
Some vanished in the distance. (442–446) 
They are in full retreat, back to the slime from whence they came and which they 
represent as purveyors of oozing substance. 
 Lizzie returns to Laura, then proceeds to assist with her sister’s detoxification by 
replacing the previous addiction with consumption that binds the two together: 
 Hug me, kiss me, suck my juices 
 Squeezed from goblin fruits for you, 
 Goblin pulp and goblin dew. 
 Eat me, drink me, love me; 
 Laura, make much of me . . . (468–472) 
This is productive consumption—it “makes much of” Lizzie and causes a return of 
affectionate consciousness. D.M.R. Bentley notes, “Lizzie simply assists in restoring and 
enlightening faculties (reason, will) and qualities (love, duty) that Laura possessed in 
some measure originally and lost in some measure at her fall” (76–77). She does so, 
again, by introducing controlled and more sympathetically applied uses of the addictive 
juice that had intoxicated Laura. This is addiction-like thinking, whereby the patterns of 
intensified appetite are used to ends different from—more enlightening than—incessant 
self-feeding. 
 Laura, cured, finds herself disgusted by her previous addiction: “She loathed the 
feast” (495). A new sort of physiological experience takes over Laura, one that directs her 
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more intensely toward the indescribable, as a series of similes fails to do adequate justice 
to her new experience of disgust. Note the namelessness characterizing the condition of 
the more powerful force surpassing addiction: 
 Swift fire spread thro’ her veins, knocked at her heart, 
 Met the fire smouldering there 
 And overbore its lesser flame; 
 She gorged on bitterness without a name: 
 Ah! Fool, to choose such part 
 Of soul-consuming care!  
Sense failed in the mortal strife: 
 Like the watch-tower of a town 
 Which an earthquake shatters down, 
 Like a lightning-stricken mast, 
 Like a wind-uprooted tree 
 Spun about, 
 Like a foam-topped waterspout 
 Cast down headlong in the sea . . . (507–520) 
The unnameable, the “bitterness without a name,” the distant and vague place to which 
Laura’s addictive habits have recurrently directed her mind, overtakes her now as she 
tastes the juices at a level mediated by her sister. Thinking now merely in an addiction-
like way, she has a clearer view of her experiences—superior knowledge. 
And the goblins have been defeated. They could not control the material in which 
they traffic and have sunk back into that material. By repetitively selling their fruit, they 
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unwittingly engaged the patterns of material experience that could also aid a creative 
cure: the addiction-like, repetitive appreciation of the unnameable, the ungraspable, 
beyond material patterns of consumption, which in turn compels endless attempts to 
name, to form, to create verbal connections and similes and poetry.106  
Rossetti, like Tennyson, produced poetic patterns that reflected those of addictive 
pursuit, and both poets used those patterns to characterize intense aesthetic exploration of 
possibility in materiality. Their addiction-like poetry presents addiction as a disease 
whose patterns nonetheless structure useful epistemological and aesthetic approaches. 
Tennyson—studied in science, a reader of De Quincey, and savvy about periodical 
culture— emphasizes in “The Lotos-Eaters” the knowledge and aesthetic experience 
found simultaneously through intensified, habitual reiteration (most accessible to the non-
drugged, readerly experience of that reiteration); Rossetti, reviewing consumerist desire 
from a critical, religiously inflected perspective, ultimately supplants in her poem the 
consumer’s exaggeratedly patterned hunger with a content, soberly distanced awareness 
of possibility in materiality that is phrased in similar patterns. In either case, addiction-
like poetry—language repetitively manifesting pursuit of possibility—provides a chance 
for such sober expansion of thinking.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Suzanne Waldman notes a mixed role of repetitions in the poem, both establishing an oppressive order 
while offering access to the indescribable enormity toward which incessant repetitions drive; she describes 
“the quality of ‘repetition and insistence’ that can be found in so much of Rossetti’s poetry” (“‘O Wanton 
Eyes Run Over’: Repetition and Fantasy in Christina Rossetti” 535). There is, Waldman observes, an 
empowering, sublime sort of death drive in the patterning of such symbolic order. She notes a “motive to 
liberate desire,” which is “visible in Rossetti’s poetry of religious transcendence through death” (“‘O 
Wanton Eyes Run Over’: Repetition and Fantasy in Christina Rossetti” 536–537). This may not allude to a 
religious orientation, but, as Simon Humphries puts it, the poem’s “religious ground is itself much less sure 
than generally supposed” (391). 
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CHAPTER 5 
ADDICTION-LIKE STRUCTURE IN TWO KINDS OF VICTORIAN NOVEL: 
THE CASE OF BLEAK HOUSE AND MIDDLEMARCH 
In The Moonstone, shortly before the mystery of the eponymous gem is resolved, 
an opium-addicted doctor’s assistant named Ezra Jennings cites Thomas De Quincey 
while planning an experiment with opium, an experiment that might reveal whether the 
drug could have influenced the gem’s theft (400). And Wilkie Collins’ novel is far from 
the only fictional example of such narcotic, DeQuinceyan investigation. There is the 
cocaine- and morphine-taking Sherlock Holmes, for example. Arthur Conan Doyle’s 
“The Man with the Twisted Lip” opens with the description of Isa Whitney, an opium 
addict, who became addicted due to “some foolish freak when he was at college; for, 
having read De Quincey’s description of his dreams and sensations, he had drenched his 
tobacco with laudanum in an attempt to produce the same effects” (351). Even outside 
crime fiction, troubled intellectual and aesthetic pursuit relate to the original English 
Opium-Eater: consider Will Ladislaw’s explicitly De Quincey-like, youthful experiments 
with opium in Middlemarch (53).  
In each of those three cases, we see a relationship between learning—whether 
through investigation, college experimentation, or self-education—and participating in 
the habitual intoxication represented by De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium-
Eater. Addictive consumption’s patterns in these post-De Quincey instances also suggest 
acquisition of knowledge and pleasure—the patterns of intensified, repetitive 
experimentation and the patterns of intensified, intoxicating thrill.107 The addictive risks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Novels involving scientists often deal with addiction in Romantic terms, if not explicitly in terms related 
to De Quincey. Thomas Schmid notes the connection between isolated scientific pursuit and the isolation of 
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of narcotics were by this time increasingly understood and opiates were moving toward 
increased regulation—addiction was more and more a widely accepted medical 
problem—yet the intensity of addiction’s fusion of repetitive experiment with aesthetic 
enjoyment continued to suggest similarly intense, addiction-like storytelling. Specifically, 
this was storytelling about intensified pursuit of possibility, popularly but not only 
exemplified by the mystery genre, so often structured around addicted and addict-like 
characters. The addiction-like strategy modeled by De Quincey thus supported, once 
imported into novels, narratives of endless investigation similar to those seen in the 
Confessions. In the Victorian novel, with all its dialogic scope, that strategy could be 
deployed more broadly—in novels written around multiple addicted or addict-like 
characters, enhanced repetition underlies profuse variety, and this characteristic extended 
beyond the mystery genre. 
 This chapter looks at two novelistic developments resulting from the introduction 
of addiction-like narrative strategies into prose fiction: the mystery genre and the 
Darwinian realist novel. I argue that characters with drug or alcohol habits in two 
foundational examples of those genres pursue addiction-like investigations that contribute 
to the shaping of narrative worlds of repetitively registered possibility and strangeness. 
What I mean by “mystery genre” should be clear enough: Sherlock Holmes stories, The 
Moonstone, Raymond Chandler’s work, Dickens’s Bleak House. These are all stories 
populated by addicts—or, at the very least, by characters strongly, habitually inclined to 
intoxication—who repeatedly pursue knowledge according to the patterns of their thirsts. 
The connection between the mystery genre and addiction-like strategies, then, is the easy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
addiction in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. Earlier than Shelley, Benjamin Rush compared the consumption 
of Prometheus’ liver to alcoholism’s assault on the liver (Rush 8), and the destruction through excessive 
desire in either case resonates with the lonely desolation of Shelley’s “modern Prometheus.” 
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part of this chapter. The “Darwinian realist novel” designates a more specific, different 
tradition: the tradition of realism as represented and initiated by George Eliot. Eliot’s 
incorporation of Darwinian and otherwise scientifically inflected thinking into her novels 
is well known; typically her debt to Darwin and contemporary science is understood to 
involve her novels’ sense of interconnecting variety (George Levine; Beer) and an 
authoritative voice about such a richly various world (Rothfield). Eliot’s Middlemarch 
especially features authoritative views of its characters’ differing, emotionally loaded 
habits, habits that bring characters into new, always evolving, emotionally considered 
possibilities. I identify Middlemarch’s overall Darwinian narrative strategy as addiction-
like, as well, in part for the following reason: the novel shows its characters doing the 
same work required by its reader—those characters repeatedly, feelingly strive to make 
sense of a world rich with Darwinian variety and possibility—and the character who does 
this work most successfully is Will Ladislaw, a recovered addict whose formative 
intellectual experience with repetitive possibility-pursuit originated with experiments 
with opium modeled after De Quincey’s. 
Eliot uses tropes of addiction and addiction-like possibility-pursuit to create a new 
kind of realist novel, one in which truth is both felt and authoritatively known as 
expansively evolving possibility, a possibility that repeatedly, continually comes into 
actualized shape and is thus best appreciated by a character thinking in addict-like terms 
of repetitive pursuit of more and more possibility. Thus Middlemarch and Bleak House 
use addiction-like strategies to different ends, even if addict-like knowers in both Bleak 
House and Middlemarch shape their narrative worlds in similar ways. Bleak House’s city 
is a perilous labyrinth in which repeated desires urge ongoing repeated behaviors; 
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Middlemarch’s narrative world is similarly shaped by addiction-like habits, habits used 
for more reflective understanding of the Darwinian ways in which the repetitive links 
with the strange, the discontinuous, the surprising.  
Addiction-like characters know their worlds so well in these novels in part 
because their lived experience is closer to the very processes running through the 
construction of their worlds. Such addiction-like characters participate in the shaping of 
addiction-like textual realms through their endless efforts to know those realms. Michel 
de Certeau writes in The Practice of Everyday Life about the “mutation” of consumer into 
producer that “makes the text habitable, like a rented apartment. It transforms another 
person's property into a space borrowed for a moment by a transient” (Certeau xxi). 
Fictional consumers producing feverish patterns of possibility-pursuit—characters I have 
described as DeQuinceyan—likewise productively inhabit their narrative worlds by 
engaging intensely in its ongoing patterning, and this chapter looks at the way in which 
the patterns of their consumerist pursuit of possibility produces, specifically, fictional 
realms characterized (in either the serial mystery or the Darwinian realist novel) by 
repetitive variety. J. Hillis Miller in Fiction and Repetition describes that pervasive, 
unbalanced repetition in the Victorian novel specifically in terms of two versions of 
repetition—the first “grounded in a solid archetypal model which is untouched by the 
effects of repetition” (Miller 6). This is the smooth, perfect, stable repetition of successful 
mimesis. The second “Nietzchean mode of repetition posits a world based on difference. 
Each thing, this other theory would assume, is unique, intrinsically different from every 
other thing. Similarity arises against the background of this ‘disparité du fond’” (Miller 6). 
In Victorian novels discussed here, those two forms of repetition that never completely 
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separate or perfectly join become an especially relevant problem, once these novels’ 
addicted characters emphasize unstable, addiction-like repetition and begin to chart 
labyrinthine worlds.108 These serial-novel worlds, repetitive and labyrinthine, have 
addiction-like qualities that sustain repetitive movement toward more and more—and 
characters who are addict-like intensify and most intensely experience those qualities. 
To repeat, before I look more closely at Bleak House and Middlemarch: this 
chapter outlines how addiction-like narrative strategies shaped the serial mystery novel 
and the Darwinian realist novel. In the case of Bleak House, structuring a narrative 
around addict-like investigators results in a troubled realm of endless pursuit, while 
Middlemarch suggests some healthier, Darwinian knowledge of variety can emerge from 
reflective, considerate possibility-pursuit. In both novels, addict-like characters pursue 
possibility, learn about that possibility, and behave in ways that help intensify their 
inhabited novelistic mazes, places so windingly labyrinthine because they are based on 
the patterns represented and studied by endlessly desiring inhabitants. Both novels 
suggest broader understanding of possibility emerges from both affectively and 
intellectually engaging with worldly mystery, and both suggest that there is a world-
changing and world-understanding potency to the addiction-like patterns that structure 
their own narratives. 
 
Dickens and Labyrinthine Networks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 J. Hillis Miller explains how linguistic and narrative repetitions inevitably build a labyrinth in his 
Ariadne’s Thread: Story Lines. He describes “the blind alleys in thought to which repetition leads” because, 
“[n]o repetition is exact, but the meaning of a sign depends on taking it as the exact repetition of some other 
sign” (8). This same linguistic logic, leading down those interminable alleys of a labyrinth, shapes the 
experience of characters whose thought is intensely concerned with repetition. 
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Dickens maintained a typically Victorian attitude toward alcoholic 
intemperance—that is to say, he was inconsistent on the subject. On the one hand, he 
regularly drank alcohol to assist his own literary efforts. Fred Kaplan writes, “On reading 
days, at seven in the morning he had fresh cream and two tablespoons of rum . . . at three 
a pint of champagne. Five minutes before his performance he had an egg beaten into a 
glass of sherry” (525–526). At times, drunkenness held charming, convivial promise 
within his texts, too. In “Making a Night of It,” for example, an early periodical sketch by 
Boz, he describes a night out for two disastrously bibulous friends—a mess of a time, but 
also basically a matter of fraternal carousing.   
Still, this was the nineteenth century, the age of incipient temperance movements 
addiction’s institution as a medically accepted health problem. Elsewhere in Dickens’s 
writing, alcohol habit clearly meant disease and misery. “The Drunkard’s Death,” as the 
title suggests, is a rather more one-sided piece. There Dickens inveighs against 
“drunkenness — that fierce rage for the slow, sure poison, that oversteps every other 
consideration; that casts aside wife, children, friends, happiness, and station” (Sketches by 
Boz 463). In this case, drunkenness clearly contains an element of addictive desire and 
destroys social relations, even as, in “Making a Night of It,” it can also bolster them. 
Opposite senses of intense consumption also provide narrative tension for 
Dickens’s novels.109 Looking at Bleak House specifically, we see how addiction, 
addiction-like behavior, or otherwise intensified consumption tend to have two effects, 
often at odds with one another: the first effect is ruination and the second is a more useful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109Though Deidre Lynch compares the enjoyment of Dickensian character to that of a cigarette, noting a 
promotional project in which cigarettes were sold with portraits of Dickens characters. She describes the 
“collaboration between the collectible character and the cigarette—a luxury import that, through its 
addictiveness, at last becomes a daily necessity” (19).  
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patterning of characters’ repetitive thought processes. Correspondingly, Bleak House is 
characterized by a swamped city of interlocking perplexities derived from various desires 
and pursuits of more and more and more—these factors are seen, for instance, in the 
novel’s central and impenetrable Chancery suit, Jarndyce vs. Jarndyce, the outcome of 
which is awaited especially by three wards with no promise of a clear resolution110—but 
the novel’s intense desirers and intense consumers do also develop refined senses of this 
murky realm’s possibility through their addiction-like pursuits.111 Such intense 
consumers include investigators as well as a manipulative, claret-drinking “friend” to the 
wards’ caretaker. They ceaselessly and self-interestedly seek to understand and drink 
from the possibilities of their world, and their ongoing actions reinforce the nature of 
their realm as one of endless pursuit, craving, investigation, and mystery. Richard 
Carstone, the ward of Jarndyce seduced to his destruction by the money-owing, often-
drinking manipulator Skimpole, calls the version of reality he has been led into a 
“labyrinth” (646). 
Dickens’s novel, to be clear then, is not a celebratory look at the epistemological 
power of addiction-like investigation, which in Bleak House does not typically lead to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 My reading of Bleak House elaborates upon recent work that thinks of the novel in terms of its social 
network and as a text detailing investigation—specifically recent studies by John McBratney, Caroline 
Levine and Brooke Taylor. McBratney argues that Bleak House’s investigators discover social 
interconnection (59), Levine that network theory can shed light on this interconnection (517), and Taylor 
that the knowledge gained in this world is very much imaginative (172). Reading Bleak House in terms of 
addiction synthesizes such readings by positing its socially embedded consumption habits as imaginative 
ways of knowing the world. 
111 I use the phrase “intense consumers” here to characterize those who regularly consume addictive 
substances but who may not be strictly termed “addicts.” Gail Turley Houston notes that Esther “navigates 
between the Scylla and Charybdis of the consuming and consumed self in a novel that represents both 
appetitive self-centeredness and negation of appetite” (124). Addiction’s joys and the need to discipline 
addiction (due to its dangers) surround much of the drama of this novel. That in-between navigation of a 
world rich with out-of-control pursuit of pleasure has been noticed by others writing about Dickens; Dirk 
den Hartog has argued in Dickens and Romantic Psychology that Dickens and other Victorian novelists 
“involve themselves in the conflict of Romantically legitimated freedom and traditionally authorized 
restraint” (7). 
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absolute clarity of understanding. Obscurity is everywhere here. Fog famously blankets 
the investigations of Bleak House, investigations that insist on the messy, the recondite, 
the baroquely confusing.112 Commercial and social forces of addiction-like, intensified 
consumerist desire contribute to the Dickensian city littered with too much stuff.113 
Esther, for instance, understands London as an overfilled maze of commerce when she 
travels through it with the detective Bucket. They journey 
through such a labyrinth of streets, that I soon lost all idea where we were; 
except that we had crossed and recrossed the river, and still seemed to be 
traversing a low-lying waterside, dense neighbourhood of narrow 
thoroughfares, chequered by docks and basins, high piles of warehouses, 
swing-bridges, and masts of ships. At length we stopped at the corner of a 
little slimy turning, which the wind from the river, rushing up to it, did not 
purify . . . (717)  
The tools of the global trade in, especially, drugs such as tea, coffee, rum, opium, and 
tobacco—tools including ships, docks, and warehouses—have accumulated in this slimy 
labyrinth, with its warehouses especially over-brimming. Some characters, like Bleak 
House’s Nemo, become lost and submerged in this cluttered realm of excessive stuff, 
succumbing to the ruinous effect of addiction and becoming “no one.” Others, like the 
habitually wine-drinking, investigative lawyer Tulkinghorn, try to stay afloat by thinking 
strategically and intensely about their realm’s possibilities. Then there is the claret-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 “Chancery—fog—madness: this is another theme,” observes Nabokov in his lecture on the novel (68). 
113 John Ruskin found his contemporary Victorian city to be a rather imprisoning, mechanical labyrinth. 
Addressing workers in the twenty-eight letter of his Fors Clavigera, he describes the 
pound or labyrinth which the Greeks supposed to have been built by Daedalus, to enclose the 
bestial nature, engrafted on humanity. The Man with the Bull’s head. The Greek Daedalus is the 
power of mechanical as opposed to imaginative art; and this is the kind of architecture which 
Greeks and Florentines alike represent him as providing for human beasts. Could anything more 
precisely represent the general look of your architecture now? (394). 
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drinking Skimpole, who manipulates those around him by declaring a drunkard’s sense of 
incomprehensible possibility, or “perplexities” (which he says are an “opportunity” for 
those around him to help him) (66–67). Skimpole makes tactically savvy use of a trope of 
bewilderment in this realm where bewilderment is all—this place of fog and murk and 
infinite clutter, where desirous seekers endlessly meet with dumbfounding possibility. 
 
The Strangeness Discovered by Habitual Investigation 
Skimpole, shortly after telling Mr. Jarndyce that “you know the world (which in 
your sense is the universe), and I know nothing of it” (68), begins to ply Richard and 
Esther with friendliness, so that they might help him out of debt.114 He flatters them by 
saying Esther’s “quiet habit of method and usefulness” is much needed (69). Here is 
Skimpole’s strategy for ruining others to his benefit: he first declares that the world is 
unfathomable, then he turns conversation toward habit that might make the whole mess 
useable, sensible, enjoyable, and inhabitable, which proves quite persuasive to those 
around him (and leads them into his labyrinth of loss and parasitism). Esther remarks, 
“We were all enchanted” (67).115 Those enchanted by Skimpole fall in line and reproduce 
the habits he suggests, habits that his own customary thirsts require. Habits, Skimpole 
seems to recognize, can sustain movement toward possibility. By speaking of his 
confusion and calling for habits in order get a bigger cut of that confusion, Skimpole 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 In Alexander Welsh’s words, Skimpole has “a profound awareness of the interdependency of human 
society” (Dickens Redressed 96); Skimpole shows us how the knowing addict, always approaching 
something other, something outside and never fully internalized in a satiating way, can manipulate this 
interdependency quite successfully. 
115 Alexander Welsh has observed Skimpole to be a kind of binding sympathetic force, “very much a part 
of Esther’s first acquaintance with her guardian” Jarndyce (Dickens Redressed 92). 
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cleverly deploys addiction-like tactics that reflect his addictive consumption but are used 
more savvily than literal addiction. He is a masterful addict-like thinker. 
The character of Skimpole was based on the Romantic poet and editor Leigh Hunt, 
whom Dickens had (first lovingly, then warily) observed to be a sentimentally inclined, 
clever, manipulative addict. Rosemarie Bodenheimer notes, “The original attraction was 
a sentimental one: Dickens was moved by a comment Hunt made about the inscription 
Dickens had placed on the grave of his beloved sister-in-law Mary Hogarth” (63). 
Dickens would, however, come to “tease Hunt” about his drunkenness and later would 
observe in the old friend of Shelley’s a tendency to indebtedness resolved by appeals to 
friendship (Bodenheimer 63). Dickens’s fictional, habitually drinking Skimpole, 
accordingly, also brings together drunken or addiction-like tendencies with a sly pursuit 
of more and more comforts, enjoyments, and financial betterment. He rhetorically 
deploys an addiction-like, intense orientation to mysterious possibility (he claims to know 
nothing; he claims he is perplexed) while persuading others to perform habitually in ways 
that can further help him along toward possibility and gain.  
The novel’s investigators establish a related approach to mystery via habit. They 
move constantly toward the possible as detectives, and they seek the replication of habits 
in order to maintain with regularity their movement toward that possibility. The sharpest 
of them all, the detective Bucket, strives quite habitually to categorize, organize, and 
order people in terms of their habits. He tells Snagsby, for example, that he is “a man of 
the world” and “a man of business” (286–287)—informing Snagsby of what he 
customarily is while interpreting what Snagsby is at the same time. Later Bucket tells 
George, who has said he was in fine spirits: “That’s your sort! . . . Why should you ever 
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have been otherwise? A man of your fine figure and constitution has no right to be out of 
spirits” (627). Just as Skimpole loudly observes habits in order to encourage others to 
continue enacting habits (and thus reliably bring him to more claret, coffee, and 
newspapers (65)), Bucket’s habitual declaration of others’ customs flatters them, 
compelling them to behave accordingly. Ongoing patterns develop in this way, patterns 
for such characters’ pursuit of gain and information. Near the conclusion of the novel, 
Bucket gushes about pattern while addressing Esther. “‘You’re a pattern, you know, 
that’s what you are,’ said Mr. Bucket warmly; ‘you’re a pattern’” (745). Here, Bucket at 
once praises Esther as a model fit for imitation and suggests that she also fits a mold, fits 
a pattern.116 Like De Quincey, Bucket repetitively recognizes patterns; habitually, he 
announces that he perceives habit. Bucket does not seem to find anything wrong with this, 
and indeed, he achieves a certain amount of success as an investigator, orchestrating 
patterns that he can then continually interpret. In Skimpole’s case, such thinking is all the 
more clearly addiction-like, because he is himself pursuing possibilities of addictive 
consumption, and through a number of characters like Skimpole and Bucket, the novel 
continually presents habits used in this manner, as narrative-world-producing pathways to 
possibility.  
In his own life, Dickens himself was a creature of habits who compulsively 
rearranged the things around him. “He was an obsessive organizer of his surroundings, 
even rearranging the furniture in hotel rooms,” writes Claire Tomalin, echoing the 
Certeauvian consumer who inhabits a text like a “rented apartment.” The obsessive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 John Jordan has written in a recent study, Supposing Bleak House, that Esther’s own patterning extends 
throughout the novel, producing a narrative that both reflects and re-enacts. He notes “the structure of 
repetition that characterizes Esther’s narrative,” which means that by “retelling it, she is in effect re-
experiencing it as she writes, and this re-experience has the potential to shed new light, for her as well as 
for the reader, on events that have already happened” (4–5). 
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organizing habits are described by Tomalin adjacent to his other obsessions: 
He smoked cigars, and often mentions his wine-dealers in letters, and the 
brandy, gin, port, sherry, champagne, claret and Sauternes delivered and 
enjoyed; and although he was very rarely the worse for drink, he sometimes 
confessed to feeling bad in the mornings after overindulging the night 
before. (xlv–xlvi) 
The reader of Bleak House passes through a London obsessively arranged by similarly 
hungry habitués.  
Unstable habits suggestive of ongoing change and always-emerging difference 
support in Bleak House an epistemology of habits used to navigate mystery. Guppy, 
another flawed investigator, speaks confidently of the deceased Krook that truth is “what 
we know of his habits” (429). But those habits, like so many others in the novel, are 
suggestive of much possibility and strangeness. Krook’s death of spontaneous 
combustion, for instance, is a relative singularity whose possibility Dickens vigorously 
defended in a later introduction to the novel (xxvii). Dickens, in that introduction, is 
adamantly convinced of the existence of routine spontaneity, or a regular irregularity. It is 
routine spontaneity that had, furthermore, been directly linked to alcohol habit, that most 
unstable form of routine.117 The addiction-like here most clearly resembles routine 
strangeness, or habitual encounters with something rather imaginative. This addiction-
like logic shared by so many characters and structuring the narrative of Bleak House 
combines both investigative study and imaginative adventure. Brooke Taylor describes 
this combination in her summary of the long-running debate over spontaneous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 A number of works by the nineteenth century’s novelists include scenes of alcoholics bursting into 
flames. Melville in Redburn, Gogol in Dead Souls, and Verne in Un capitaine de quinze ans all illustrated 
such an occurrence. For an overview, see Jan Bondeson, A Cabinet of Medical Curiosities, 18–19. 
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combustion in the novel—a debate running from G.H. Lewes’s early criticism of its 
unscientific basis through contemporary scholarly defenses of the scene’s metaphorical 
importance (172).118 Taylor argues that Dickens “had to insist science was on his side in 
order to make his case for the imagination” (172). 
Not everyone is so at ease with wild, imaginative science; Bucket’s almost 
anxious efforts to reduce everything to sets of habits and patterns (urging people to 
become even more patterned) intimates an attempt to avoid irregularity. Bucket 
represents an uneasiness with what many other characters in the novel experience or 
intuit: something thrilling and discontinuous accessed by way of so many habits. The 
physician Woodcourt notices that strangeness seeping through at the bodily, material 
level.119 When he bears the body of the orphan Jo through the city, Woodcourt “revolves 
in his mind how and where he shall bestow his companion. ‘It surely is a strange fact,’ he 
considers, ‘that in the heart of a civilized world this creature in human form should be 
more difficult to dispose of than an unowned dog.’ But it is none the less a fact because 
of its strangeness” (591).120 As a doctor, Woodcourt solves problems through 
professional routine. He recognizes the limits to this method, though. He understands that 
the body fails to conform reliably to idealized patterns. 
 
Skimpole’s Labyrinth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See Daniel Hack’s “Sublimation Strange”: Allegory and Authority in Bleak House.” Hack sees in the 
novel’s take on spontaneous combustion a rejection of science’s authority (see especially 134–135). 
119 And as a professional, Woodcourt is all the more familiar with approaching his strange world through 
repetitiousness: Mary Poovey describes how repetition constitutes nineteenth-century professionalized 
reality, articulated through “domains that mirror each other even as their practitioners proclaim the 
esoterica of specialization” (4). 
120Sympathetic narrative and disease intertwine here, through an uncanny strangeness wherein outside and 
inside join bodily. As Julia Epstein writes in Altered Conditions, “Human bodies are ‘carriers’ not only of 
pathogens but also of stories that explain our lives” (19).  
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 Skimpole speaks happily and routinely of that strangeness. He drifts about with a 
loudly proclaimed mystification at nearly everything, that mystification used to call for 
others to support his own addictive habits, including customary consumption of claret 
and coffee: “Give him the papers, conversation, music, mutton, coffee, landscape, fruit in 
the season, a few sheets of Bristol-board, and a little claret, and he asked no more” (Bleak 
House 65). He invokes bewilderment at the world generating so many pleasures; others 
then rush to take care of Skimpole in terms of the consumerist habits he has described to 
them.  
The Jarndyce circle is largely convinced by Skimpole’s speech, the habits he 
invokes, and his emotional confusion. John Jarndyce, who accepts Skimpole with little 
suspicion, approvingly tells Esther that the man is “all sentiment—and susceptibility, 
and—and sensibility, and—and imagination” (551). It takes a craftily “susceptible” 
character to pull this ruse off—a mind both imaginative and calculatingly focused—and 
Skimpole has access to just the right Shelleyan addiction-like strategies represented by 
earlier Romantics (namely Leigh Hunt), which he uses to inspire John Jarndyce to 
become a habitual enabler of his craving.  
Other addict-like knowers in Bleak House achieve more limited power. 
Tulkinghorn, the lawyer who pursues an investigation into the secrets of his clients the 
Dedlocks, “enjoys his wine,” and little else beyond power (284). Esther asks Lady 
Dedlock, of Tulkinghorn, “Has he so little pity or compunction?” to which Lady Dedlock 
replies, “He has none, and no anger. He is indifferent to everything but his calling. His 
calling is the acquisition of secrets, and the holding possession of such power as they give 
him” (475). His sole interests—wine-drinking and investigation—are those of intensified 
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movement toward more and more. He lacks, in other words, Skimpole’s expansive 
interests in multiple kinds of enjoyments and consumptions—Skimpole, then, is more 
broadly attuned to the addiction-like. Skimpole speaks of “the papers, conversation, 
music, mutton, coffee, landscape, fruit in the season, a few sheets of Bristol-board, and a 
little claret,” whereas Tulkinghorn speaks mostly of his investigation and enjoys mostly 
only his wine. And while Skimpole thrives masterfully as a strategic manipulator, 
Tulkinghorn is ultimately murdered by Hortense, the French maid he used in his 
investigation of her employer, Lady Dedlock. What Hortense wanted from Tulkinghorn 
all along was simply a new position. “I am not yet placed,” she says. “Place me well” 
(547). Tulkinghorn does not; Hortense kills him. Skimpole, more broadly contemplative, 
is quite adept at giving people a place, a function, or a role reinforced by his addiction-
like, compelling, intensely patterned language. Tulkinghorn is not, and he is thus trapped.  
Indeed, talking to Hortense, Tulkinghorn compares his lockable wine-cellar to a 
prison (548). And even his investigations have a flavor of too much literal addictive 
consumption; earlier, when Tulkinghorn enters the scene of Nemo’s death, he inhales the 
man’s narcotic remains. After he enters the room where Nemo (a mysterious figure 
whose true identity places him central to multiple storylines in the novel) has died, “there 
comes into the lawyer’s mouth the bitter, vapid taste of opium” (127). In this world 
understood to connect so bodily with its inhabitants through excessive substances of 
commerce (alcohol, tobacco, and opium), it proves perilous to come too close to those 
substances.121 The London of Bleak House is a dangerous place of oozing physicality, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Dickens himself had sought to understand vexing problems of justice in an age when crime was 
explicitly known in terms of habit (1869 saw the passing of the Habitual Criminals Act). Addiction may 
have become a property of Victorian investigation after De Quincey, but it also came to characterize 
Victorian criminality, as with the uncontrollable alcoholic or the skulking opium-eater.  
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and not just in terms of the substances consumed, but also with regard to fog, gaslights, 
dripping pipes, sooty streets—of so much stuff that obscures permanently graspable 
truth.122 For Richard Carstone, who eventually dies of consumption, the fog becomes too 
much. Led into this labyrinth—placed here—by Skimpole, the architect of his sorrows 
who brings Richard into company of the more explicitly predatory Vholes (495), Richard 
sinks into illness, and when it is suggested that he enlist in the aid of the more benevolent 
doctor Woodcourt, he responds that “he is only an outsider and is not in the mysteries. 
We have gone into them, and he has not. He can’t be expected to know much of such a 
labyrinth” (646). Unlike Hortense, Richard has been placed, and his place is the labyrinth 
cunningly built by Skimpole’s patterns.123 
Mieke Bal has noticed the role of narrative patterning in forming novelistic places 
in general: “The semantic content of spatial aspects can be constructed in the same way 
as the semantic content of a character,” she writes, and she lists repetition as one of these 
methods of constructing meaning for both character and space (135–136). The 
characterization and place-making in Bleak House’s depiction of addictive consumption 
show just how much formal and semantic narrative-work can be done by the intensified 
repetitions of Dickensian consumers of addictive substances. Those consumers pattern 
novelistic worlds intensely due to the intensity of their habits. Forging repetitive 
connections between disparate phenomena, altering themselves and their surroundings by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Nineteenth-century London, then, became described more emphatically as a city of chaotic multitude, of 
fog, of randomness. “For a city like London,” writes Raymond Williams in The Country and the City, 
“could not easily be described in a rhetorical gesture of repressive uniformity. On the contrary, its 
miscellaneity, its crowded variety, its randomness of movement, were the most apparent things about it” 
(153–154).  
123 It’s worth remembering that the slyly repetitious Uriah Heep in David Copperfield is no addict, but he, 
like Skimpole, seeks to control others by mastering linguistic patterning that alludes to some exalted 
mysterious power. He insists in spite of his ambition, “I’m a very umble person . . . I am well aware that I 
am the umblest person going . . . I am much too umble” (250).  
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repeating sequentially as they avariciously chase some impossible end, these addicts are 
effective story-makers and place-makers, engines for the most expansive, episodically 
repeated narratives of labyrinthine place.  
In The Mystery of Edwin Drood (another mystery novel in which opium has a 
role), Dickens describes yet another habitual consumer’s creation of a realm, through the 
character of Mr. Sapsea, who says,  
If I have not gone to foreign countries, young man, foreign countries have 
come to me. They have come to me in the way of business, and I have 
improved upon my opportunities . . . I see a French clock. I never saw him 
before, in my life, but I instantly lay my finger on him and say ‘Paris!’ I 
see some cups and saucers of Chinese make, equally strangers to me 
personally: I put my finger on them, then and there, and I say ‘Pekin, 
Nankin, and Canton.’ (26) 
Through the act of consuming, Sapsea has connected himself to a vaster realm, bridging 
Paris with China. He has done so steadily over time, through commerce that repeatedly 
links disparate places. Raymond Williams found this contradictory union between the 
obscurely unfamiliar and pattern to be Dickens’ great technical discovery, one that 
reflected developments in urban living. “Dickens’s creation of a new kind of novel,” 
Williams writes, “can be directly related to what we must see as this double condition: 
the random and the systematic, the visible and the obscured, which is the true 
significance of the city” (154). That city, where one endlessly makes one’s way through 
confusing twists and turns, where familiarity coexists with elusive, strange facts about 
materiality, is a murky labyrinth that can support an endless quest into the obscure. John 
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Kucich observes that “Dickens makes a form of radical release present for the reader, not 
as a single moment but as an experience repeated endlessly by the writing” (197), and 
such endless episodic movement toward the possible is lived out in Bleak House by 
multiple characters making their way through a mazy city. This intensely repetitive 
orientation toward possibility is, if not always represented by addicted characters, seen 
vividly in the addictive habits of those consumers who participate in structuring the 
novel’s labyrinthine world. 
 
George Eliot and Intoxicating Science 
Addiction-like behaviors sustain patterns of desirous cognition in Bleak House,124 
but such thinking is easy to find elsewhere, too, such as in the novels of George Eliot.125 
Middlemarch in particular exhibits the failure of dry intellectualism and unreflective 
feeling, all while showing more successful, addict-like thinkers in the novel who achieve 
some combination of thought with feeling. One of those thinkers benefits from an 
explicitly DeQuinceyan education in the consumption of addictive substances:  this is 
Will Ladislaw, who at last marries Dorothea Brooke after her marriage to the obsessive, 
failed scholar Casaubon.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 The union of subjective desire and scientific pursuit fascinated novelists of an earlier era, too. Michael 
McKeon in The Origins of the English Novel: 1600–1740 characterizes Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe as 
a “descent to the subjective roots of objective and empirical reality,” although it then turns “so productively 
to the stabilizing of that reality that it can be treated as though it had never happened (337).  
125 Eliot often calls for thinking in light of emotional, imaginative energy. “The driest argument has its 
hallucinations,” observes her Daniel Deronda, as he considers the enthusiastic ideas of the Jewish 
nationalist Mordecai (438). At this point in the George Eliot novel that bears his name, Deronda is well on 
his way to an imaginative yet reasoned identification with fellow Jews. Reflecting on impassioned 
arguments for such identification, he ponders how “even strictly-measuring science could hardly have got 
on without that forecasting ardour which feels the agitations of discovery beforehand” (438). The idea here 
is that even the most reasonable involvement with the world outside of one’s subjective self takes some 
emotionally imaginative drive. As George Levine has put it in “Daniel Deronda: A New Epistemology,” 
the novel demonstrates how “‘objectivity’ can never be divorced from feeling” (73). Richard Dellamora 
notes “an experimental approach to human relationships, in particular, to friendship” in Daniel Deronda 
(129).  
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Ladislaw has experimented with opium in a youthful attempt to follow De 
Quincey’s path, but after his opium experiments, we are told, “[n]othing greatly original 
had resulted from these measures; and the effects of the opium had convinced him that 
there was an entire dissimilarity between his constitution and De Quincey’s” (53). This 
turns out to have been a formative moment for young Ladislaw. He had, like De Quincey, 
witnessed in his physical being something far from “original.”126 This realization—that 
even one’s solitary selfhood is repetitive, unoriginal—guides Ladislaw’s thinking 
thereafter, as he becomes a thinker no longer addicted but addict-like. He is on two 
occasions compared not to De Quincey, but to Shelley, the famed vegetarian and sober 
poet, the expansively imaginative aesthete of healthier material habits (Middlemarch 224 
and 310). This wiser, sober Ladislaw behaves in more thoughtfully emotional ways, as 
his reasonable love for Dorothea shows.  
When Dorothea’s marriage to Casaubon fails, and when her own love for 
Ladislaw develops, she develops an interest in more expansive consideration of the 
strange, the surprising. She and Will unite in a moment of surprise, when together they 
reflect on something unexpected. They have been standing 
looking at the evergreens which were being tossed, and were showing the 
pale underside of their leaves against the blackening sky. Will never 
enjoyed the prospect of a storm so much: it delivered him from the 
necessity of going away. Leaves and little branches were hurled about, and 
the thunder was getting nearer. The light was more and more sombre, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Interconnecting matter, habitually experienced in Middlemarch, has been examined by Kate Flint, who 
writes of “the potential of material objects to bear witness to the processes of social history that underpin 
the world of the text, even though those may go largely unremarked upon by the narrator”—this can, in 
turn, “relate to the perceptual and emotional habits and responses of those who own, wear, observe, or 
dispose of them” (66). See “The Materiality of Middlemarch.”  
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there came a flash of lightning which made them start and look at each 
other, and then smile. (498) 
A moment of discontinuity disrupts their quiet attention—the lightning strikes—and they 
look at each other in an instance of sympathetically shared recognition of the startling.127  
The recovered addict and the recovered wife of an obsessive scholar understand 
and apply more expansive, addiction-like thinking toward the startling, the unknown; that 
is, they apply continuous attention to possibility. Middlemarch is shaped by such 
habituated characters who pursue knowledge and often suffer because of excessively self-
contained habits (Casaubon dies in a loveless marriage, as does the doctor Lydgate). But 
Ladislaw, the recovered opium-eater—who has become merely addict-like and 
Shelleyan—figures out how to live thoughtfully and sympathetically with strangeness. 
Ladislaw’s learning via repetitive, addictive encounters with otherness models the 
overall experience of reading Middlemarch, a narrative that looks over a multitude of 
characters in terms of their habits and thus locates proliferating difference in repetition: 
this is why it is useful to consider Middlemarch a text that employs addiction-like devices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Dorothea had not always been so skilled at this. Early in the novel, the narrator remarks,  
We are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves: 
Dorothea had early begun to emerge from that stupidity, but yet it had been easier to her to 
imagine how she would devote herself to Mr. Casaubon, and become wise and strong in his 
strength and wisdom, than to conceive with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but 
feeling—an idea wrought back to the directness of sense, like the solidity of objects—that he had 
an equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain 
difference. (135)  
Dorothea will, as the novel progresses, come to recognize such differences quite clearly, though with 
acknowledgment of continuities connecting these differences. Ladislaw provides a connecting thread 
through the experiences that lead to that recognition. After misguidedly believing that she has lost Ladislaw 
to Rosamond, Dorothea learns that, while in fact Rosamond is unhappy in her own marriage to Lydgate, 
Ladislaw remains unattached to her imagined rival. The initial sense of fury toward Rosamond transmutes 
to sympathy, by which greater knowledge is gained. In this epiphanic moment, difference connects to 
patterned sameness:  
All the active thought with which she had before been representing to herself the trials of 
Lydgate's lot, and this young marriage union which, like her own, seemed to have its hidden as 
well as evident troubles—all this vivid sympathetic experience returned to her now as a power: it 
asserted itself as acquired knowledge asserts itself and will not let us see as we saw in the day of 
our ignorance.  (485–486) 
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And because Ladislaw ultimately navigates his realm securely and wisely, the novel 
implies that addiction-like thought produces a fuller awareness of its world. Middlemarch 
provides, then, a happier sense of addiction-like thinking than Bleak House; the repetitive 
encounters with difference in Eliot’s novel lead not to a murky labyrinth for Ladislaw, 
but to a summarized happy existence by the novel’s close. Like Dickens, Eliot displays 
the addiction-like as an investigative, exploratory mode that also further shapes a world 
of repetitive difference, but her sense of investigation differs from Dickens’s. Studied in 
science—including Darwinian thought—Eliot would describe a more confident, scientific 
sense of variety emerging from habits.  
The addiction-like habits Eliot represents are often very much like Darwinian 
habits: through them—as Ladislaw demonstrates—characters alter themselves, change 
those around them, and study those changes. Two types of Darwinian habits concern us 
here: those of the scientist’s repetitive study (repeatedly reading, experimenting, and 
investigating) and those objects that the scientist actually studies (the habits of creatures 
that guide those creatures on their evolving paths). Figured as addiction-like, these habits 
become one—because addictive patterns both lead to thinking about possibility and alter 
the knower into a possible new form—and Eliot does combine both kinds of Darwinian 
habit in Middlemarch through characters like Ladislaw. In his case, addiction and 
addiction-like thinking lead both to change and enhanced awareness of a changing world 
of variety. The novel doesn’t rely strictly on a Darwinian strategy or addiction-like 
strategy, then—it applies both. 
 
Eliot on Affective Science 
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Eliot was familiar with an array of scientific texts that linked addiction-like, 
repetitive thrills with exploration. From Romantic science to positivist philosophy, she 
had encountered a multitude of statements on repetitive experiences that were supposed 
to provide both scientific understanding and the pleasure of formal continuity or 
sublimity.  
Eliot’s Daniel Deronda, with its insight into the connection between hallucination 
and dry argument, contains assertions that emotional imagination and science both 
emanate from and move toward some inexpressible thing. The novel starts by describing 
the relationship between science and poetry through shared orientation toward 
strangeness: 
Men can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning. Even 
Science, the strict measurer, is obliged to start with a make-believe unit, 
and must fix on a point in the stars’ unceasing journey when his sidereal 
clock shall pretend that time is at Nought. His less accurate grandmother 
Poetry has always been understood to start in the middle; but on reflection 
it appears that her proceeding is not very different from his; since Science, 
too, reckons backwards as well as forwards, divides his unit into billions, 
and with his clock-finger at Nought really sets off in media res. (3) 
This sense of imaginative sympathy combined with scientific work had its roots in 
Eliot’s study of science and philosophy. She and her eventual husband George Henry 
Lewes were mutually drawn to the ideal of a society founded upon both sympathy and 
science, stemming from their “enthusiasm for Comte’s Positivist Philosophy” (Ashton 
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106).128 Auguste Comte had in his Système de Politique Positive outlined a religion of 
humanity that would join scientific, systematic thinking with habitual sympathetic 
dreaminess—a religion combining system with the unsystematic. “The heart and the 
intellect concur,” for Comte’s religion, both “indispensable to the true love or the true 
understanding of the Great Being, the condition of such love or understanding being the 
right appreciation of the several periods of unsystematic preparation that must precede its 
systematic creation” (Comte 452). The union of heart and intellect under the religion 
envisaged by Comte would inspire habitual pursuit of knowledge: “To know in order to 
improve, the motto of our primeval ancestors, will equally, with our remotest posterity, 
be the expression used to indicate the bounden duty of the intellect to devote itself 
continuously to the service of society” (Comte 450). A key word here is “continuously”: 
Comte calls for regular, repetitive service through lovingly intellectual existence.129  
Knowledge and the passions had been linked by others already, including 
Romantic intellectuals who stressed that knowledge would occur with sensitivity to the 
unknown, the possible, the thrillingly mysterious. While once “laws of nature and 
nature’s God appeared . . . one and the same,” as Carl Becker observes in The Heavenly 
City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Avrom Fleishman has written that Eliot diverges from Comte in some key ways, especially in her 
anticipation of “much of the argument in philosophical hermeneutics on the distinction between the natural 
and the human sciences,” specifically with regard to her interest in “social history” and her suggestion “that 
particularistic attention to the complexity and subtlety of the common life may lie beyond scholarly 
accounts altogether, calling for another mode of writing (90).  
129 As Martha Nussbaum puts it, Comte contends “that the time for religion has passed. No longer need we 
explain our dealings with one another in the religious language of godliness and sin: instead, we learn to 
understand the laws of human social interaction through empirical research” (Nussbaum 8). The ethical 
laws Comte describes need a social structure that mirrors scientific, empirical research: “According to 
Comte, the new sympathy must, like traditional religion, include rituals that organize the day and festivals 
that demarcate the seasons of the year” (Nussbaum 9). Thoughtful and sympathetic repetitions of the 
reasonable scientist could replace ritual. Investigating reality scientifically thus might support a new, 
sympathetic, humane religion, one based on formal patterning that could accept the unsystematic and the 
routine, ongoing nature of a never-satisfied positivist science.  
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the course of the nineteenth century this optimistic outlook became 
overcast. . . Natural philosophy was transformed into natural science. 
Natural science became science . . . Professors of science ceased to speak 
with any assurance of the laws of nature, and were content to pursue, with 
unabated ardor [my italicized emphasis], but without any teleological 
implications whatever, their proper business of observing and 
experimenting with the something which is the stuff of the universe. 
(Becker 22) 
Immanuel Kant provided some of the groundwork for this tendency to study a 
sublimely mysterious universe through unabated ardor. He argued for a union of the 
sensitive imagination with empirical observation, finding the transcendent meeting of the 
two in aesthetic appreciation. Specifically, perceived formal pattern could awaken this 
transcendent aesthetic understanding. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant writes: 
The consciousness of the causality of a representation in respect of the state 
of the subject as one tending to preserve a continuance of that state, may 
here be said to denote in a general way what is called pleasure; whereas 
displeasure is that representation which contains the ground for converting 
the state of the representations into their opposite (for hindering or 
removing them). (Kant 51) 
The mind perceives in its world patterned continuity, by which the world can be known 
pleasurably, aesthetically, and formally. 
As Deleuze writes in Kant’s Critical Philosophy: 
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 . . . what representation can, in aesthetic judgment, have this higher 
pleasure as its effect? Since the material existence of the object remains 
indifferent, it is once again a case of the representation of a pure form. But 
this time it is a form of the object . . . Form is the aspect of an object which 
the imagination reflects, as opposed to the material element of the 
sensations which this object provokes in so far as it exists and acts upon us. 
(47) 
Pleasure and knowledge in this Kantian world come, again, from encounters with form 
derived out of the material realm, and there can be no form without some element of 
repetition, some calling back to that which precedes or is adjacent. When that formal 
appreciation leads to confrontation of something much bigger from which those forms 
emerge or in which those forms dissolve, a second type of aesthetic experience results, 
different from the more contained sort of pleasure found in neat forms, and this is the 
sublime aesthetic experience. 
Alexander von Humboldt, whose work represented a union between Kantian 
aesthetics and scientific exploration, insisted on joining sublimity with exploration of 
material phenomena. In Cosmos, Humboldt argues that there is a “magic power exercised 
upon our minds by the physical world, since the character of the landscape, and of every 
imposing scene in nature, depends so materially upon the mutual relation of the ideas and 
sentiments simultaneously excited in the mind of the observer” (Humboldt 5–6). Ideas 
and sentiments are excited simultaneously here, and that excitement depends on formal 
pattern and material variety. Humboldt, as one biographer puts it, “agreed with Kant that 
a different approach to science was needed, one that could account for the harmony of 
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nature that lay beneath the apparent diversity of the physical world” (Helferich 27). The 
aesthetically pleasing harmony of nature’s formal patterns and the thrills of nature’s 
material diversity can suggest one another; Humboldt, sensing this, was prepared to 
pursue knowledge with “unabated ardor,” registering harmonious patterns along with 
constant novelty. Humboldt’s Personal Narrative offers readers moments, as Aaron 
Sachs describes them, “of vision and confusion, of familiarity and strangeness, of ecstasy 
and nausea” (47). Sachs is responding to the Humboldt who writes, “Nature is an 
inexhaustible source of investigation,” and notes that Humboldt declares this “almost 
giddily,” excited by the prospect that “you can always find something new and bizarre” 
(Sachs 48). Always, the scientist can find something new; consistently, the scientist can 
find something inconsistent. 
 
Darwin, Humboldtian Science, and the Habitual Production of New Worlds 
The repetitive scientific adventure into strangeness took on new significance after 
Charles Darwin described the natural world as itself repetitively shifting into something 
new. The scientist, who via experiment repeatedly sought something new, thus became 
contained within what was studied—a world of repetitive change. Darwin had adopted 
Humboldt’s sense of ecological interconnection that suggests ongoing possibility and 
novelty—ecological interconnection that seems to promise worldly change along with 
scientific discovery. “In his later years,” as Iain McCalman writes, “Darwin was to say 
that the whole course of his life was due to having, as a young man, read and reread 
Humboldt’s Personal Narrative” (McCalman 41).130 Darwin in On the Origin of Species 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Like Humboldt, Darwin saw in his world “a web of complex relations” (Origin of Species 140).  As 
Sachs writes, “The closest readers of Darwin realized that large parts of his theories were in fact derived 
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emphasizes the ordinary linked to the extraordinary, in especially strong terms, by 
discussing habit that produces difference. He relates habit to in-process habitation, 
making his epoch-forming case about the effect of habitual movement toward otherness, 
also known as evolution. Darwin writes: 
It has been asked by the opponents of such views as I hold, how, for 
instance, a land carnivorous animal could have been converted into one 
with aquatic habits; for how could the animal in its transitional state have 
subsisted? It would be easy to show that within the same group carnivorous 
animals exist having every intermediate grade between truly aquatic and 
strictly terrestrial habits; and as each exists by a struggle for life, it is clear 
that each is well adapted in its habits to its place in nature. (207) 
This is no stable habitual repetition. This repetition is responsive to surroundings, 
profoundly related ecologically with environment, and pressing consequently toward 
mutation.131 The habitué, once again, alters its ecological surroundings even as its 
surroundings alter it.132 There are strange new worlds developing from all this habitual, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
directly from Humboldt, for evolution was essentially ecological. ‘We may all be netted together,’ Darwin 
mused in the late 1830s, and web-of-life imagery appears in much of his work” (241). And Darwin’s work 
in general reflected his early reading in the Romantics—he had broadly read and thought his way through 
British Romantic literature (Beer 26 and 27). Gillian Beer cites Wordsworth as one influence: “The idea of 
things held in common, of the extraordinary kinships implicit in the ordinary, is deeply felt by Darwin, 
whom we know to have immersed himself in Wordsworth's [Excursion]” (Beer 44). Beer notices a 
specifically literary, imaginative strain in Darwin’s work: “The Origin of Species,” she writes, “is in its way 
a polemical book, a work which drives through fiction and observation to achieve a condition beyond 
fiction” (46). 
131 Darwin also suggested that scientific pursuit could resemble continuous intoxication. Quoting Francis 
Bacon’s Advancement of Learning, he writes in an epigraph: “let no man out of a weak conceit of 
sobriety . . . think or maintain, that a man can search too far or be too well studied in the book of God’s 
word, or in the book of God’s works” (Origins 89). Engagement both with the book and the works are 
associated here with intellectually useful insobriety. 
132 There would be, in general, overlap between addiction discourse’s senses of habits and Darwinian views 
of habit. Earlier in the century, the pioneering expert on addiction Benjamin Rush had already connected 
habits with heredity, noting, “It is further remarkable, that drunkenness resembles certain hereditary, family, 
and contagious diseases” (Rush 7–8). Darwin would more thoroughly and definitively connect habit to 
heredity through inhabitation, to the place given an experienced shape by habits that alter habitués. This 
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interconnecting experience, in other words, worlds suggesting the sublime diversity seen 
by the aesthetically sensitive scientist Humboldt. Humboldtian science for Darwin had 
thus become a method for charting our world that repeatedly, continually shifts toward 
novelty.133 Through Darwin, Humboldtian science of repeated exploration allowed the 
registering of realms of similarly, repeatedly developed strangeness. The method matches 
that which it is used to study. George Levine has observed that a “Darwinian wrinkle in 
the scientific preoccupation with observation is that for Darwin, the observer becomes . . . 
the observed” (Darwin and the Novelists 15). The pursuit of knowledge works, in the 
case of the post-Humboldt scientist, as an intensely repetitive pursuit that leads to intense 
involvement in worlds that are already, similarly, repeatedly coming into new shape. 
 
The Darwinian Middlemarch 
In the case of Middlemarch, Darwinian knowledge of the world’s repetitive 
movement toward strangeness is achieved by living through that repetitive strangeness 
intensely—by opium experimentation, by marrying an obsessive scholar, or perhaps by 
simply reading Eliot’s narrative of habitual, varied characters. Eliot had pondered On the 
Origin of Species along with Lewes, first encountering the book in 1859,134 and a major 
strand of scholarship has focused on the ongoing conversation Eliot thereafter held with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
can seem brutally limiting, and it colored the concerns about bad habits in the nineteenth century. Athena 
Vrettos has noted, “Many feared that if the human psyche was biologically compelled to repeat mental 
experiences, and thus to trap the individual in predictable and inflexible patterns of behavior, this 
compulsion constrained possibilities for change and challenged conceptions of free will” (Vrettos 400). 
Susan Zieger discusses briefly how Darwin actually dealt with a more in-between sort of habit, part 
inherited, part willed (Zieger 8). 
133 “The grotesque, the beautiful and the wonderful in the everyday was a major Victorian imaginative 
theme. The study of ‘fact’ was for Dickens and for Carlyle and for Hopkins an exploration of the fantastic” 
(Beer 74–75). 
134 A.J. Lustig in an essay titled “George Eliot, Charles Darwin and the Labyrinth of History,” provides a 
brief overview of Eliot’s reading of Darwin in order to explore the two thinkers’ shared thoughts about a 
non-teleological, interconnected historical development.  
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Darwinian ideas.135 Gillian Beer, for instance, describes how Eliot’s narration emphasizes 
characters’ feelings while displaying Darwinian variety within rigid patterns: “Even 
while we are observing how closely human beings conform in the taxonomy of events,” 
she writes, “we learn how differently they think and feel” (Beer 143).136 The idea here is 
that Eliot, influenced by Darwinian science’s taxonomical, authoritative views of variety 
and otherness, shows how examining otherness can offer insight into the variety of 
feelings.137  
Middlemarch demonstrates this thinking-feeling union throughout its narrative; 
the taxonomizing, authoritative narrator shows thinking and feeling coming together in 
those who desirously seek to taxonomize and understand. Their various emotional 
orientations lead such characters to different thoughts and desires. Casaubon’s study is 
altogether too limited in its intensely focused passion; he behaves as a self-destructive 
investigator, obsessed with his study. Ladislaw has been through that self-destructive 
phase of habit-forming study and come out the other side a healthier, more sympathetic 
thinker, wiser about the interconnection to others that he now senses. Dorothea first weds 
Casaubon out of loving respect for his pursuit, then she too comes to recognize its 
shortcomings, its aridity. The better knower and more sympathetic husband is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See Beer’s Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and  
Nineteenth-Century Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Levine’s Darwin and the 
Novelists: Patterns of Science in Victorian Fiction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
136 In George Levine’s Darwin and the Novelists, he examines a broader influence of evolutionary science 
on the British novel. “Science enters most Victorian fiction,” Levine writes, “not so much in the shape of 
ideas, as, quite literally, in the shape of its shape, its form, as well as in the patterns it exploits and develops” 
(13). 
137 For a recent analysis of sympathy in Middlemarch, see Kornbluh’s “The Economic Problem of 
Sympathy: Parabasis, Interest, and Realist Form in Middlemarch.” Kornbluh specifically describes 
sympathy in the novel with regard to finance capitalism, especially in the wake of “Peel’s Act of 1844, the 
Limited Liability Act of 1855, and the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856” (942). David Trotter has 
examined the way Eliot’s world is navigated by emotional trajectories, specifically desire; Trotter points 
out that sexual desire exists through spatial movement in Middlemarch (see his chapter “Space, Movement, 
and Sexual Feeling in Middlemarch”). 
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recovered addict, who knows how bound he is to material externality and who can 
soberly think about the broader range of that externality. Like Darwin, Ladislaw has 
recognized that he is part of what is studied; like Humboldt, Ladislaw feelingly 
recognizes the broader, complicated nature of his realm. 
There are in Middlemarch—beyond Ladislaw’s example—a number of allusions 
to addictive substances related to experimental learning. Dr. Lydgate, for instance, was 
influenced 
by the publication of Dr Ware’s abundant experience in America, as to the 
right way of treating cases of alcoholic poisoning . . . Lydgate, when 
abroad, had already been interested in this question: he was strongly 
convinced against the prevalent practice of allowing alcohol and 
persistently administering large doses of opium; and he had repeatedly 
acted on this conviction with a favourable result. (433) 
The awareness of addictive substances’ dangers comes to Lydgate through repeated 
experiments; he knows about addiction through similar, correctively patterned 
thinking.138 Ladislaw, while self-medicating, learned the same thing, only Ladislaw more 
directly lives out a connection between addiction and medical experiment. His 
experimentation is that much more addiction-like because it is linked to his previous 
addictive experience. 
Lydgate’s failure poses a challenge to nineteenth-century ideals of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 In a conversation connected to Lydgate, the doctor who pursues grand scientific knowledge, Mr Brooke 
says, “every dose you take is an experiment—an experiment, you know” (Middlemarch 60). 
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professional, relatively unemotional physician.139 Victorians had seen the rise of 
professional medicine with stricter guidelines; legislation during the mid-Victorian period 
especially bolstered the professional nature and dominance of certified doctors. The 
Medical Act of 1858 resulted in the General Medical Council and the Medical Register, 
clarifying the nature of the Victorian medical profession (for more on this, see Debbie 
Harrison 55). Lawrence Rothfield in Vital Signs examines how this rise of the medical 
profession interacted with the development of the nineteenth-century novel in a way 
conducive to more comprehensive, authoritative, knowing narration. Clinical medical 
discourse, according to Rothfield, not only shows up repeatedly in realist novels; it works 
in accordance with a diagnostic point of view that characterizes realism—“both Balzac 
and Flaubert,” Rothfield notes, “compare themselves to ‘medical’ observers” (84–85). 
This medicalized narration would value clinical knowledge. Yet as De Quincey, Dickens, 
and Eliot show, rigorous investigation and medical experiment could be found to carry 
destabilizing elements, too, and in their work professional scientific investigation also 
worked as a vehicle for adventuring unpredictably into strange variety.140  
Middlemarch draws from such professional authority for its overview of 
emotional variety, and it complicates that authority in doing so.141 Much of the narrative 
is produced by knowers of professional habits—Lydgate and Casaubon, especially—yet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 See Alan Mintz’s George Eliot and the Novel of Vocation. Mintz writes that in Middlemarch, Eliot’s 
“focus on the experience of work and vocation” works as an antidote to “a moribund preoccupation with 
romantic love” (55). 
140 “Fiction in the second half of the nineteenth century was particularly seeking sources of authoritative 
organisation which could substitute for the god-like omnipotence and omniscience open to the theistic 
narrator,” Beer writes (149), yet those same sources of authority also connoted a loss of control to 
materiality. William St. Clair describes leading Victorian minds’ “hope that they could reject both the 
supernatural and historical claims of religion without at the same time opening the way to moral chaos or to 
an entirely materialist alternative world view. Wordsworth and Coleridge, and above all Shelley, seemed to 
offer a way through” (428). 
141 Rothfield writes, “Although the clinical perspective remains central, the novel [Middlemarch] makes 
room for entire sets of characters and plots imagined according to rules that do not match those of the clinic 
but that nevertheless have the ring of truth” (88).  
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these similarly patterned characters are different from one another and come to different 
ends. Barbara Hardy has noted this collision of ironic discontinuity and continuity in 
Eliot’s work via recurrence—Eliot’s “irony, her continuity, and her presentation of 
change and collision, depend to some extent on repetitions” (Hardy, The Novels of 
George Eliot 8).142  
Ladislaw, the former opium-eater, understands discontinuity in pattern, too. He 
senses that there is something unoriginal (and thus repetitive) in his solitary, singular 
experience, and he exhibits a more thorough feeling for others. He succeeds where some 
studiously professional characters fail. Barbara Hardy has observed that “Casaubon’s 
failure, interestingly enough, lies both in ardour and intellect, George Eliot’s concept of 
knowledge being one of integrated ardour and learning. The integration is there in 
Lydgate, as far as his science is concerned, but it is imperfectly sustained in his human 
relations” (The Novels of George Eliot 64). Ladislaw is as ambitious as the other two, and 
perhaps even more passionately hungry for knowledge. Again, however, his drug 
experiments have produced humility in him, a sense of his physical particularity being 
quite like that of others. “Nothing greatly original had resulted from [his opium 
experimentation],” as Eliot notes, “and the effects of the opium had convinced him that 
there was an entire dissimilarity between his constitution and De Quincey’s” (53). He has 
found that he is different in his constitution, yet not greatly original—unoriginally 
different.  
The addict-like Ladislaw makes his way wisely through a world of sameness-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 This is a form that can unite a swarm of egoists. Frederic Jameson notes in George Eliot’s work, “as 
compared with Dickens, for example . . . a significantly enhanced proximity to the relationships between 
individuals, a kind of intensified and virtually photographic enlargement of those barely perceptible 
adjustments to the Other” (Jameson, “Experiments of Time” 121–122). 
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within-difference, a Darwinian world of both never-ending patterns and never-eliminated 
novelty. That world has firm boundaries and categories yet maintains its uncharted 
discontinuities. Repeatedly, Eliot turns to the figure of the labyrinth to describe both this 
intellectual experience and the world around that experience, often shaped and produced 
by its inhabitants. Dorothea and the obsessive researcher Casauban, for instance, are 
observed to dwell in such a labyrinth.143 Dorothea “had looked deep into the ungauged 
reservoir of Mr Casaubon’s mind, seeing reflected there in vague labyrinthine extension 
every quality she herself brought” (16). This labyrinth is not, merely, Casaubon’s. 
Dorothea had, for example, previously been “hemmed in by a social life which seemed 
nothing but a labyrinth” (19). Those social labyrinths she thought she might escape with 
Casaubon are replicated in his intellectual labyrinth. But through marriage to a recovered 
addict, schooled in the labyrinths of De Quincey, Dorothea finds someone similarly 
interested in a stably sympathetic form of habitual existence, someone with whom she 
can settle into a cosmic sense of connection with “the number who lived faithfully a 
hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs” (515). The difference between Ladislaw and 
Casaubon is rather like the difference between a “maze-treader” (Casaubon) and a “maze-
viewer,” to use Penelope Reed Doob’s terms. Doob writes, “maze-treaders, whose vision 
ahead and behind is severely constricted and fragmented, suffer confusion, whereas 
maze-viewers who see the pattern whole, from above or in a diagram, are dazzled by its 
complex artistry” (1). Ladislaw is both Romantically and scientifically dazzled by the 
labyrinth. He thinks in an addiction-like way; he is merely and safely a maze-viewer. 
The maze-viewer’s is, in its purest state, a summary existence, absent of dramatic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Gillian Beer writes of “the web of the human body and its contiguous image, the labyrinth, which will 
become of such importance . . . in Middlemarch” (160). 
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up-close problems of selfishness. This is the existence of Ladislaw and Dorothea at the 
close of Middlemarch, neatly summarized as an existence alongside “the number who 
lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs” (515). Gérard Genette writes 
that summary was, “up to the end of the nineteenth century, the most usual transition 
between two scenes, the ‘background’ against which scenes stand out, and thus the 
connective tissue par excellence of novelistic narrative” (97). Dorothea’s narrative takes 
her through trying scenes that break the habitual flow of summary up until the final, 
summarized state with the post-De Quincey Ladislaw. The two find at last a sceneless life 
comprising habitual sympathetic existence; addiction-like thinking brings them to this 
sustained, maze-viewing summary.  
Earlier in the novel, the narrator offers more insight into why addiction-like 
thinking might produce such powerful understanding in this novel: the narrator locates 
the soul itself in overwhelming repetition. As Lydgate’s future unhappy wife, Rosamond, 
plays the piano, “A hidden soul seemed to be flowing forth from Rosamond’s fingers; 
and so indeed it was, since souls live on in perpetual echoes” (103). Through Ladislaw 
also, the narrator gestures toward the usefulness of disciplined addiction-like thinking for 
registering those intense, perpetual echoes, for approaching an array of similitudes across 
differences. This happier reward of addiction-like strategies reflects Darwinian insights 
on repetitive variety. It is the reward of a lucid realism denied the maze-treaders in Bleak 
House’s episodic mystery.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE OPTATIVE MOVEMENT OF DR JEKYLL AND MR HYDE’S ADDICTS 
 
We tend to speak of possibility in the moodiest of moods: the optative mood, 
typically phrased in those “if only we were” or “would that I could” constructions. This is 
the language for expressing desires, for evoking our sense of something unattained. It’s 
language that communicates, most basically, yearning. Addiction, as a condition that 
intensifies yearning, ought to intensify reliance on optative language. Yet there has been 
no critical investigation of the literary uses of the optative mood that emerged in response 
to nineteenth-century addiction discourse’s new sense of yearning.  
This chapter seeks to change that by looking at one Victorian text famous for its 
habitual, often unhealthy drinkers: Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde.144 I 
argue that a sense of optative movement—vicarious or dreamt-of wandering—shapes 
Stevenson’s novella, guiding thoughts and actions of its characters who regularly 
consume addictive substances. By the Victorian era, addiction had been associated with 
exploratory, scientific self-experimentation typified by Coleridge and others, but 
addiction was also linked with indolence; Stevenson reflects both associations in his 
inventive science-fiction tale, displaying thirsty but indolent explorers who chase after 
knowledge via avatars or dreams. Such investigators chart an innovative narrative: the 
novella outlines proto-cinematic experience, not only through its famous story of 
vicarious movement, but also, most explicitly, through one bibulous character’s dream of 
moving images, an enduring medium for optative, or wished-for, movement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Much of this chapter has appeared, in slightly modified form, in the journal Extrapolation. See “The 
Optative Movement of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’s Addicts,” Extrapolation 56.2 (2015): 215–234. 
	   	   	   	   	  




‘Alas,’ he cried, ‘is there anything in life so disenchanting as attainment?’ – 
Prince Florizel in “The Adventure of the Hansom Cabs,” from The Suicide Club 
(I.220).145 
 
Robert Louis Stevenson thought that his Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde 
would make a good trade for the poems of John Keats: when thanking his friend Will 
Low for Low’s illustrated edition of Keats’s Lamia, Stevenson sent him a copy of his 
novella. Low’s Lamia had impressed Stevenson, who effused about the illustrations: “My 
favourite is ‘Bathes unseen’ which is a masterpiece; and the next ‘Into the green recessed 
woods’ is perhaps more remarkable” (RLS Letters V.162). The images gave him ideas. 
He wished Low would illustrate the rest of Keats’s narrative poetry: “I should like to see 
both ‘Isabella’ and the ‘Eve [of St. Agnes]’ thus illustrated; and then there’s 
‘Hyperion’—O my God, yes, and Endymion” (RLS Letters V.162). He added, in an 
emphatically optative mood, “I should like to see the lot: beautiful pictures dance before 
me by hundreds” (RLS Letters V.162).  
Stevenson’s repetitively optative language of unmet desire (“I should like . . . I 
should like”) climaxed here in fittingly optative imagery: pictures dancing by hundreds, 
pictures hoped for yet unattained by the wishful Stevenson. Alluring passages of solitary 
luxuriance inspired Stevenson to yearn indolently for movement through more of those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 This quote comes from Robert Louis Stevenson: The Complete Short Stories, ed. Ian Bell (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1994). 
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realms, by way of proto-cinematic, flickering pictures.146 And appropriately, in the book 
that he sent in response to Low’s Keats, similarly optative language also describes an 
imagined sense of moving pictures. There, in the Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, 
the story of the monstrous Edward Hyde flashes “in a scroll of lighted pictures” through 
the bibulous lawyer Utterson’s mind as he lies on his “great dark bed” and considers 
Hyde’s possible relationship with his friend Jekyll (13). Utterson is part of a social circle 
of London men who eventually discover that Hyde is Jekyll transformed. Throughout his 
narrative, Utterson intently explores the world of Hyde but without the most vigorous of 
efforts; in this scene in the great dark bed, for instance, he merely dreams of movement. 
Reiterated desirous language delimits for the recumbent lawyer an imagined proto-
cinema: Utterson “would be aware of the great field of lamps of a nocturnal city . . . he 
would see a room in a rich house, where his friend lay asleep” (13). He would, he would, 
in the optative sense of “he wished to be aware” and “he wished to see,” given that 
Utterson does indeed wish to investigate the story of Hyde. Optative movement of 
imagined proto-cinema thus arises once more from yearning that thrives in indolence.147 
Much of Utterson’s exploration, moreover, occurs vicariously, accessed through gossip 
and letters (see 48–54 or 55–70); his dream especially engages in “vicarious seeing,” a 
phrase film critics have used to describe the basic experience of cinema (McCarthy and 
Wright 97). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Those lines in Lamia are given an indolently relaxed, dream-like context; they surround Keats’s 
assertion, of his mythical characters’ lives, that “[r]eal are the dreams of Gods, and smoothly pass / Their 
pleasures in a long immortal dream” (127–128). 
147 Scholars have already noted a cinematic tendency in Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (Stewart; Prawer 86–100; 
Annwn), and Stevenson did have a documented fascination with the projected image. He was particularly 
drawn to the magic lantern, the image-projector that, for instance, he brought with him in his travels in the 
Pacific (Colley 126). 
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 In what follows, I continue to explore how Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde portrays this 
proto-cinematic movement, typically accessed by optative sensibilities though not always 
phrased in the optative verbal mood. I argue that the novella does all this specifically in 
terms of indolent pursuit as understood via addiction discourse of the nineteenth century. 
Such inventive use of Victorian addiction discourse has yet to be examined, though 
important work already exists on Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’s engagement with addiction, 
work that especially emphasizes addiction’s blurring of boundaries between classes 
(Reed; Driscoll; Zieger). Here, I examine how addiction, the condition of intensely 
unsatisfied desire, shapes Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’s sluggish quests, including those of Dr. 
Jekyll himself, who compares his experimental habits to habits of a “drunkard” (63). The 
novella’s use of optative prose, its characterizations with regard to unmet desires, its 
plotting in terms of indolently mediated pursuit: such techniques conform to Stevenson’s 
characters’ addictive desire and addiction-like, repetitive investigations informed by 
repetitive desire. Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde thus shows how addiction discourse could 
suggest new modal orientation—consistently intense commitment to possibility rather 
than to lively actuality or attainment—that had formal ramifications. 
In Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, multiple layers of mediation support that commitment 
to possibility, because those layers of mediation feed repetitive desire for more 
information without bringing the desirer into immediate, actual contact with the desired. 
Jekyll’s adventures are mediated through the form of Hyde, Utterson’s through gossip 
and through texts that he reads. These investigators maintain distance from actual 
attainment through that mediation, and they are thus free to ponder a wider range of 
possibility. Modal logic and theories of possible worlds can elucidate such orientation 
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toward possibility that arises through intensified mediation. Jaako Hintikka cites Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde as an especially useful text for illustrating the possibility made 
evident by attempts at reference; he discusses the multiple possibilities of Hyde’s identity 
(138–139). Saul Kripke also explains a sort of possibility similar to that pursued by Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde’s community of thirsty investigators. Kripke describes proper names 
as a manner of reference spoken into being by a community always engaged with the 
possible, writing that “proper names are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) 
might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon 
(though he might not have been called  ‘Nixon’)” (49). The rigidity of proper names and 
their correspondence to actuality work because those names accommodate and support an 
array of possibilities, even the possibility that those names might have been discarded. 
Utterson’s references to Hyde occur with similar regard to possibilities—Hyde may be a 
blackmailer, a friend of Jekyll’s, a monstrous assailant—and this possibility becomes 
broader when experienced through proliferating attempts at reference (gossip and dreams 
especially). This dynamic referential modality animates Stevenson’s novella, in which 
indolent, addicted thinkers lazily but in a desirous manner always pursue something more 
through mediation—that is to say, they pursue slothfully, in the manner of filmgoers. 
Along with addiction discourse’s increasing prominence, other historical forces 
would have encouraged Stevenson’s cinematic depiction of optative, vicarious movement 
toward the possible. These include the development of photography. Nancy Armstrong in 
Fiction in the Age of Photography has described related visual exploration in Victorian 
realism, for instance, in which “fiction was already promising to put readers in touch with 
the world itself by supplying them with certain kinds of visual information,” thus doing 
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the same kind of work that photography was beginning to do (7). The thirsty characters of 
Stevenson’s fantastical Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, however, seek such visual information 
with an emphasis not strictly on the world itself, but on its possibilities, on still-to-come 
scenes and images of experiences that they always pursue but can never fully attain. A 
world of imagined motion results from and contributes to desires that can never reach 
static fulfillment; it is a world of images that move in a lighted scroll, a world devised by 
those always sensitive to possibility. In The Suicide Club, Stevenson’s Prince Florizel 
remarks on such an aesthetic power of ongoing yearning, noting that attainment 
disenchants (Stevenson, Complete Stories I.220). The addict’s sense of there always 
being more to attain would thus support narrative enchantment, and for Dr Jekyll and Mr 
Hyde’s addicted—or at least, habitually drinking—Utterson, the aesthetic enchantment of 
the world’s elusive promise, of ongoing pursuit conducted lazily, suggests sustained, 
imagined movement.  
The novella’s vicarious movement all starts with Utterson, who, just before his 
proto-cinematic reverie, talks to a friend of Jekyll’s, Dr. Lanyon, who is sitting “with his 
wine” (12). The very sociability that takes Utterson to Lanyon comes from his own 
leisurely, habitual consumption of alcohol: “At friendly meetings, and when the wine was 
to his taste,” we are told of Utterson, “something eminently human beaconed from his 
eye; something indeed which never found its way into his talk, but which spoke not only 
in these silent symbols of the after-dinner face, but more often and loudly in the acts of 
his life” (5). Those alcohol-inflected acts derive from an interest in others, also cultivated 
by Utterson’s drinking habit (5). Alcohol habit, then, supports Utterson’s interest in 
London, which he explores with a still more sociable “man about town,” his kinsman 
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Enfield, who will consequently inspire Utterson’s curiosity about Jekyll and Hyde. All 
this leads to Utterson’s dreamy, indolent exploration of Hyde’s misdeeds (6-8). 
Conversation with the wine-drinking Lanyon is described just as the walk with Enfield is: 
these experiences are either “rambles” (6) or “rambling” (12). In either case, thirsty and 
indolent pursuit of otherness, of something more, leads Utterson to explore places 
suggestive of more without marching directly toward fulfillment. Utterson’s habitual 
investigations, encouraged by addictive consumption, thus occur with uncertainty and 
through casual walks. The result, immediately after his rambles with Lanyon and the 
man-about-town Enfield, is time spent in a gloomy bed imagining further scenic rambling, 
a scroll of lighted pictures—a procession of images by which he continues to explore 
vicariously through lazy movement, described to us in the optative mood.  
Below, I first examine Keats’s imaginative indolence and the poetic possibility it 
promises; next I look at Stevenson’s appreciation of that Keatsian mood; then I describe 
how Stevenson explored such an aesthetic of indolence in the intensified terms 
sanctioned by addiction discourse.148 The link between indolence and addiction was 
nothing new. Benjamin Rush, in his influential text on alcohol consumption’s dangers, 
saw indolence as a chief problem for the habitual drunkard, who can become stuck in 
“languor and stupidity” over the course of “two or three days, before he is able to resume 
his former habits of business and conversation” (6). Stevenson, in an aesthetic analogue 
to this conjunction, simply gives his habitual drinkers the imaginative productivity that 
Keats had already ascribed to inactivity when he referred in his letters to “delicious 
diligent Indolence” (Keats Letters 92). Stevenson’s habitual drinkers thirst to move 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 For more on Keats’s fascination with indolence, see Willard Spiegelman’s Majestic Indolence; for a 
detailed account of Stevenson’s novella’s relationship with alcohol addiction, see Thomas Reed’s The 
Transforming Draught: Jekyll and Hyde, Robert Louis Stevenson, and the Victorian Alcohol Debate. 
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toward something more in imaginative ways, something more that can never be wholly 
accessed due to their fundamental indolence. They have this imaginative capability 
because their broader thinking is often merely like their addictive consumption, patterned 
after addictive tendencies without being strictly limited to addiction. Their indolent habits 
therefore hold investigative, imaginative potential, much as Keats’s indolence would 
support language that matches its patterns while articulating newly dreamt-up 
possibilities. 
 
Keats’s Intoxicating Indolence 
Though both seized on indolent patterns for dreamy new literary worlds, Keats 
and Stevenson did encounter different stages of the nineteenth century’s understanding of 
bad habits. Keats wrote before De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium-Eater 
recounted the aesthetic thrills of opium addiction, for example, but after the circulation 
had begun of important early medical works on habitual use of alcohol, such as Thomas 
Trotter’s pioneering study on inebriation published in 1788.149 Indolence (Keats’s 
preferred bad habit) and habitual intoxication were, however, linked by both Keats’s and 
Stevenson’s lifetimes. One representative address on temperance, by a doctor to 
Cantabrigians in 1805, included a discussion of how indolence could do the same evil 
work as intemperance or work side-by-side with it:  “Moral philosophers unite with 
physicians of the first rank in opinion,” he proclaimed, “that all chronic disorders arise 
from either 1st. VEXATION OF MIND, or 2d. an INDOLENT AND SEDENTARY 
LIFE, or 3d. INTEMPERANCE; or from the cooperation of any two of them; or from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 See Trotter’s Dissertatio Medica Inauguralis, Quaedam De Ebrietate, eiusque Efectibus in Corpus 
Humanum complectens. 
	   	   	   	   	  
	   175	  
combination of all three” (Waterhouse 12–13). Even earlier, a foundational text on opium 
use observed that “indolence is a result of prolonged, lavish use of opium. It is as if one 
had been trained to dance to excellent music and then had the music taken away” (Jones 
244–245). Habitual intoxication and indolence had a long history together, well before 
addiction discourse rose to prominence in the Victorian era and continued to connect the 
two. 
There are, furthermore, passages of Keats’s that make parallels between 
intoxication and indolence, which he found generally suffused with an almost addictive 
desire that compels the imagination. In Hyperion, “idle” Apollo (III.106) claims an influx 
of imaginative knowledge—not rare for an indolent character in work by Keats. But 
Apollo makes clear that this indolent awareness acts on him like wine: 
Knowledge enormous makes a God of me. 
Names, deeds, grey legends, dire events, rebellions, 
Majesties, Sovran voices, agonies, 
Creations and destroyings, all at once 
Pour into the wide hollows of my brain, 
And deify me, as if some blithe wine 
Or bright elixir peerless I had drunk . . . (III.113–119) 150 
Keatsian indolence supports Apollo’s grandly imaginative mind, intoxicated by the 
broadest array of possibilities when not much happens actually. He encounters creations 
and destroyings, “all at once.” That expansive knowledge gained by way of idleness acts 
on Apollo like wine. This indolence is intoxicating and radiated by desire for something 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Anya Taylor writes that Keats “cherishes wine’s transitory power” (169). 
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not actively accessed, desire that has compelled the mind to think of vast possibility, 
suggesting an addict’s thirst.151  
But in the early nineteenth century, addiction had not yet become the 
preoccupying concern that it would become for Victorians; Hyperion, elsewhere, does 
not dwell so much on the connection between indolence and alcohol. Those lines of idle 
Apollo’s are among the last in the poem, but Hyperion opens in the depths of sunken and 
sober indolence of the older order of gods. This remains an indolent state from which a 
new kind of imaginative place is described, through language evocative of patterns of 
indolence. Here, Keats creatively echoes the repetitive physicality of indolence with 
alliteratively sensory language: 
 Deep in the shady sadness of a vale 
 Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn, 
 Far from the fiery noon, and eve’s one star, 
 Sat gray-hair’d Saturn, quiet as a stone, 
 Still as the silence round about his lair; 
 Forest on forest hung above his head 
 Like cloud on cloud . . . (I.1–7) 152 
Anaphoric syntax articulates a constant, indolent link with materiality, as Saturn sits in a 
vale like a gray, motionless stone, beneath forest on forest.153 Syntactically evoked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 It also recalls Keats’s negative capability, the state of comfortably “being in uncertainties, Mysteries, 
doubts” (Keats Letters 60). 
152 Helen Vendler writes that Keats’s “diction of re-creation . . . is a sensual diction . . . Its elements include, 
as in so many other passages we shall encounter, drowsiness, ripeness, honey, dreams” (37). 
153 Walter Jackson Bate has described the joining of emotion and physicality in The Stylistic Development 
of Keats: “there was in Keats,” he writes, “an instinctive and almost nostalgic craving for absorption and 
even self-annihilation in that which for him was poetical and which was on all occasions the specifically 
concrete” (43). Bate continues to note that “nowhere in his verse is this tendency more completely revealed 
than in Hyperion, in the Eve of St. Agnes, and in his odes and later sonnets” (44).  
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recurrence and repetitive sounds of alliteration, however indolent they may be, support 
literary invention in this scene. Those repetitions reinforce a sonically material yet mythic 
scene out of fricatives. The result is an imagined and poetically articulated place of 
cloudy, shrouded mystery, of forests on top of forests, clouds on clouds, of material 
patterns suggesting a lack of clarity. Indolence produces language that is indolent-like, 
bogged down in materiality while displaying the imaginative properties of dreamy 
laziness. 
Soon after, in Book I, the Titan Thea addresses the fallen Saturn with attention to 
an indolent condition and the ongoing questioning prompted by indolence: 
 Saturn, sleep on:  – O thoughtless, why did I 
 Thus violate thy slumberous solitude? 
 Why should I ope thy melancholy eyes? 
 Saturn, sleep on! While at thy feet I weep. (I.68–71)      
Anaphoric questioning met with static, stoney silence compels the speaker toward the 
unanswerable and into the weepy, sleepy, reiterated “ee” sounds of line 71.  That which 
can be repeatedly queried without offering an initial response encourages Thea’s poetic 
utterance. Thwarted pursuit of answers from a motionless being encourages patterned 
language of uncertainty, itself rich with the sonorous physicality of assonance. 
  What exactly does this language do, this language that finds possibility for poetic 
expression through material, indolent repetitions? In another passage in Hyperion, we 
find anaphoric language creating a place, a comfortable home—a cradle—sounded out by 
poetic patterns of indolence. Hyperion speaks of 
   . . . this haven of my rest, 
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 This cradle of my glory, this soft clime, 
 This calm luxuriance of blissful light, 
 These crystalline pavilions, and pure fanes, 
 Of all my lucent empire . . . (I.235–239) 
Hyperion reigns over a realm figured as a “cradle,” as a “soft clime,” as, in his 
enumeration of tranquil properties, “calm luxuriance.” Such a repetitively emphasized 
domain of indolence is expressed in crisply alliterative c’s and reiterated demonstrative 
pronouns, through sonic repetitions multiplying in a passage of physical serenity. This 
poetic indolence supports, in short, a lushly imagined world. Apollo, in his intoxicated 
idleness, imagines the vast possibilities of the universe; Saturn, sleeping, becomes an 
object for Thea to wonder and weep at; Hyperion, using similar patterns of indolent 
poetic repetitions spoken by Apollo and Thea, establishes a comfortably imagined scene 
all his own. Poetic possibilities for navigation of new places emerge from physical 
indolence. They emerge through patterns of similar physicality and similar dreaminess, 
which are used to outline and explore places far from actuality. I will now examine how 
Stevenson approached such repetitive, indolent investigation of imagined worlds with a 
sense of aesthetic delight, as in the case of his response to Hyperion, about which he 
commented to Low, “O my God, yes” (RLS Letters V.162). 
 
Stevenson’s Keatsian Addiction 
In the letter voicing that extreme appreciation, Stevenson considered whether he 
could be capable of comparable literary beauty. He was, however, haunted by the 
material ugliness that might belie such aesthetic experience. “The sight of your pictures 
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has once more awakened me to my right mind,” Stevenson wrote to Low about the 
illustrated Lamia; “something may come of it; yet one more bold push to get free of this 
prison yard of the abominably ugly, where I take my daily exercise with my 
contemporaries” (RLS Letters V.163). Then Stevenson considered what would become 
one of literature’s more enduring symbols of ugliness, his own Edward Hyde. He 
introduced to Low the gift that he was including, his Strange Case. “I send you herewith 
a gothic gnome for your Greek nymph; but the gnome is interesting I think and he came 
out of a deep mine, where he guards the fountain of tears. It is not always the time to 
rejoice” (RLS Letters V.163). The possibility of noble Romantic transcendence had 
recalled for Stevenson its opposite: material ugliness.  
That same tension structures Stevenson’s “gothic gnome” itself. Respectable Dr. 
Jekyll’s pursuit of aesthetic pleasure is explicitly described in the text as ugly, 
abominably material—it takes the form of hideous Hyde (who, however, as Stephen 
Arata points out, is largely interested in pleasantly bourgeois delights).154 Stevenson had 
long seen a related aesthetic possibility that Keats mined from gross materiality. He had 
commiserated with the similarly tubercular Keats, whose life he saw, writing in 1882, as 
“a brave and a sad little story”; “the critical part,” he noted, “lies deep in the very vitals of 
art” (RLS Letters III.282–283). In a different letter to Low, Stevenson had located his 
own writing in sickness—an enjoyed sickness. “I don’t die, damme, and I can’t get along 
on both feet to save my soul; I am a chronic sickist; and my work cripples along between 
bed and the parlour, between the medicine bottle and the cupping glass. Well, I like my 
life all the same” (RLS Letters V.162). Materiality intruded on art in challenging ways, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154  “Over the last half of the novel,” notes Stephen Arata in Fictions of Loss in the Victorian Fin de Siècle, 
“Stevenson links Hyde, through a series of verbal echoes and structural rhymes, to various bourgeois 
‘virtues’ and practices” (41). 
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but often with a likeable result as far as Stevenson was concerned, whether in his own 
case or in Keats’s.155  
Critics have already observed that for Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, this relationship 
between the material troubles of sickness and the liberating power of aesthetic pleasure 
occurs especially through addiction (not unlike Stevenson’s habitual movement between 
“the medicine bottle and the cupping glass”).156 For the novella’s habitually drinking 
investigators, unhealthy material experience leads to mystery. Jekyll compares his 
experiments with his potion to an experience like that of wine (57), and he says they are 
like the habits of “a drunkard” (63). Those habits compel him to think in terms of futurity, 
of yearning—they lead him to optative adventure. Inhabiting the avatar of Hyde, Jekyll 
“set out through the lamplit streets, in the same divided ecstasy of mind, gloating on my 
crime, light-headedly devising others in the future” (64). It is that addictively alluring 
element of futurity that I wish to point out here. Jekyll does not merely vicariously 
adventure into lamplit streets; he does so with an experimental, scientific desire for 
possibilities, through his alter-ego Hyde. This story could not exist without such narrative 
use of optative movement, movement that occurs both remotely and with attention 
toward the future, the habitually wished-for and chased-after possible.  
Addictive indolence enhances that imaginative movement for other, more 
explicitly alcoholic characters, such as Utterson. I grant that Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Elsewhere, Stevenson identifies one of the more striking characteristics of Keats’s vitality in an ironic 
perverseness that joins the low with the high. He remarks of Keats, “I have a word or two to say, about the 
perverted humour which reaches us from him. It is all solemnly taken; but I believe he thought to laugh, 
and the Hunts, Cowden Clarkes and such believed he was highly serious” (RLS Letters III.313). In other 
words, in Keats, he saw a kindred writer, a sick man who suffused solemn and elevated art with elements of 
the low, the perverse.  
156 Lawrence Driscoll has recently analyzed addiction in Jekyll and Hyde that opens possibilities in a more 
counter-cultural way—Stevenson, he writes, “has offered us an opening in the rhetoric of drugs. An 
opening that, on reflection, could be infinitely beneficial: drugs can offer us ‘no end of practical usefulness’” 
(63). 
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might not seem like a Keatsian tale of indolence’s creative properties. It is, after all, full 
of active, ambulatory characters who walk around London investigating. For the most 
part, however, those characters are only vaguely professional—barely or indeterminately 
employed, wine-drinking transmitters of stories. And as mentioned, their walking is like 
their alcoholic conversation, and described by Stevenson in the same way: as casual, 
directionless “rambling.”  
Stevenson’s correlation of rambles with alcoholic habits might have owed to 
certain historical factors. It was, first, simply more likely for a writer to describe any 
experience as similar to substance-dependence in the 1880s than at the beginning of the 
century. With the rise of temperance movements, all manner of addiction became a 
public concern, and aesthetic habits were thought similar to drug habits.157 Toxic habit 
may have already been linked to indolence in Keats’s time, and Keats may have at 
moments related his idle characters’ experience to the drinking of wine, but alcoholism 
had become a far more pressing and officially recognized issue by Stevenson’s day. 
Alcohol consumption in England had been increasing throughout the nineteenth century 
due to causes that included  “wretched and debilitating” industrial life in which “the 
public house, for all its deficiencies, was often the one oasis of recreational activity, open 
to all, at little cost” (Greenaway 7-8). Consumption of alcohol per capita had reached its 
peak only shortly before Stevenson published Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, in the period from 
1875 to 1879 (Greenaway 8). Prominent temperance movements on the rise in this period 
included the Alliance for the Suppression of the Traffic in All Intoxicating Liquors 
(started in 1853), which sought William Gladstone’s aid in the banning of alcohol sales 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 For more on the parallel between reading and drug addiction that was often invoked by Victorians, see 
The Reading Lesson, where Patrick Brantlinger describes a related rise of the view of widely accessible 
literary entertainment as poison, as a powerfully bad habit. 
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while Stevenson was working on Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (Reed 99). Stevenson himself, 
who enjoyed wine, was quite aware of the risks of alcoholic habit, as Thomas Reed 
points out. He had a “wrenching sense that drink could always do him in, could cast his 
ship of life onto deadly rocks” (Reed 56). 
Yet Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde does not simply extend an age’s cliché of addiction to 
just any topic; the novella centers around a particular kind of habitual drinker, the kind 
drawn to relaxed but curious seeking. Dr. Lanyon, who drinks wine sociably, studies 
Jekyll’s potion in simultaneously appetitive and exploratory language; after perusing the 
chemicals of Jekyll’s “liquor,” he observes that he had  “whetted his curiosity” (50). 
Appetitive curiosity occurs in other scenes of drinking, too, such as when Jekyll hosts a 
dinner for “judges of good wine” (19). At the dinners, we are told, after drunken 
conviviality, those present “liked to sit awhile in [Utterson’s] unobtrusive company, 
practicing for solitude, sobering their minds in the man’s rich silence after the expense 
and strain of gaiety” (19). Alcoholic consumption inspires movement toward something 
other, which in this scene means the sober experience of solitude and difference after 
exhausting fraternal enjoyment. This is the addiction-like interest accompanying 
enjoyment of habit-forming intoxicants; it is an interest that maintains a sluggish 
attention to strangeness in the manner of the diligent indolence in Keats’s poetry.158  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 It is worth noting that Stevenson never diagnoses his characters as alcoholic, even if at times his 
novella’s characterization of powerful drinking habits combined with indolence reflects and suggests 
Victorian discourse on alcoholism. Nabokov recognized Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde as a text structured by a 
more enjoyably drunken approach to mystery. As he observes, “There is a delightful winey taste about this 
book; in fact, a good deal of old mellow wine is drunk in the story” (180). Stevenson himself, in an 
optimistic moment, had said, “Happiness is a matter of bottled stout” (qtd Reed 53).  
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The Addict’s Rambles 
For a number of Victorian observers, addictive consumption appeared especially 
plainly to support lazy movement or rambling. Henry Mayhew’s accounts of vagrants 
include, in addition to statements about “tramping it across the country just to pass the 
time” (387), discussion of regular alcohol consumption, of “larking, and drinking” (389). 
In The Condition of the Working Class in England, Friedrich Engels observes an aimless 
flow of people through the streets in terms of habitual intoxication among the working 
class: “On Saturday evenings, especially when wages are paid and work stops somewhat 
earlier than usual, when the whole working class pours from its own poor quarters into 
the main thoroughfares, intemperance may be seen in all its brutality” (152). The working 
class pours through the city in this passage, flowing like intoxicating drink itself, rushing 
into the streets, moving fluidly but repetitively (on Saturday evenings) according to its 
intemperance.159 
Such lazy movement, elsewhere, carried with it class-specific worries—worries of 
an amorphously drifting, uncontrolled mob. Meanwhile, Victorian middle-class drinking 
was increasingly attempted in private. “By the 1850s,” notes Brian Harrison, “no 
respectable urban Englishman entered an ordinary public-house” (46). The drinking 
professionals of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde often, likewise, try to keep some distance from 
the disreputable through mediation or by strolling around rather than directly into the 
criminal underworld that fascinates them (in Jekyll’s case, strolling into the underworld 
occurs through the mediation of his alter-ego, Hyde). They derive thrills from 
imaginatively crossing this private/public boundary. Their habits incline them toward the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Wandering could also become a salutary replacement for alcoholism, if the effect could be separated 
from the cause; Peter Bailey has noted how reformers had contended that public walking could become a 
form of “rational” or healthier “recreation” (53). 
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possibility that their material world in all its grubbiness has to offer, toward the multiple 
discoveries and meanings always suggested by their ongoing material experience, but 
they strive, in the spirit of indolent exploration and in the spirit of their class, to keep 
some space between them and those possibilities.  
Such extreme openness to possibility blurs distinctions and fixed meanings, 
including those of class. Hyde, Jekyll, Utterson—they all start to resemble each other in 
their aesthetic habits. They all habitually ramble toward trouble in their city. Keats, too, 
had found a fluid relationship with class by way of indolent aesthetics, and much 
scholarship on Stevenson and Keats over the past few decades has focused on such class-
fluidity.160 Both writers had a dynamic, inconsistent relationship to their social positions 
(as we see in Keats’s allegiance to both rich, elevated, Miltonic language and a 
supposedly Cockney style; as we see in Stevenson’s middle-class bohemianism). Both 
had found literary possibility that electrified and altered the most statically reified, 
habitual experience. In the case of Stevenson’s novella, near-frozen laziness comes to 
narratable life through alcoholic rambles that lead to the underworld, due to the 
possibility his drinkers find pulsing through their patterns of material experience that 
never lead to satiety. Just as Keats’s Titans want something remote from their concrete, 
indolent state of dispossession—a desire that motivates them to speak forth and live 
through ambitious poetry—Utterson from his position of addicted indolence launches 
desirously, if vicariously, into the underworld’s narrative thrills. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 For discussions of Keats’s relationship to history and class see: the essays by Hartman, McGann, and 
Fry in Romantic Poetry: Recent Revisionary Criticism; Jeffrey Cox’s Poetry and Politics in the Cockney 
School: Keats, Shelley, Hunt and their Circle; and Marjorie Levinson’s Keats’s Life of Allegory: The 
Origins of a Style. For Stevenson’s relationship to class, see especially Arata’s Fictions of Loss in the 
Victorian Fin de Siècle. 
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Because he is always in pursuit, Utterson’s story traces a labyrinthine place. To 
some extent, the experience of this place is shaped by intoxicating substances, not just 
addiction to those substances. At one point, confounded by the case of Jekyll, Utterson 
sits with Mr. Guest, his clerk, with “midway between [them], at a nicely calculated 
distance from the fire, a bottle of a particular old wine that had long dwelt unsunned in 
the foundations of his house” (28). The wine itself has world-changing properties: “In the 
bottle the acids were long ago resolved; the imperial dye had softened with time, as the 
colour grows richer in stained windows; and the glow of hot autumn afternoons on 
hillside vineyards, was ready to be set free and to disperse the fogs of London” (28–29). 
Even one dose of alcohol can, physiologically, alter Utterson’s experience of the world. 
And because each dose never wholly satisfies, because wine that already changes 
perception is habitually imbibed while inclining Utterson to consider otherness in that 
world (5), wine especially guides him habitually toward the possible, toward the in-flux 
world seen fleetingly through the fog.  
Stevenson’s novella thus complements Keats’s project of indolently exploring and 
outlining imagined worlds. Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde simply responds to a more actively 
participatory indolence, using the framework of sociable addiction and experimental 
repetitions that form Utterson’s consideration and pursuit of otherness in his city. The 
result, though accessed through mediation of gossip or through letters from the likes of 
Lanyon and Jekyll, is Utterson’s imagined pursuit, imagined movement—his proto-
cinematic sensibility. Utterson thus conceives of a scroll of lighted pictures, an in-process, 
scenic world. Because he is more interested in possibility than attainment, because 
“others” in general interests him, and because he is fundamentally indolent, Utterson 
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welcomes that mediation into his exploration. Letters, gossip, dreams: these things cast 
his mind across space and time, initiating encounters with strangeness that the 
Uttersonian addict craves and that is entailed by mediation’s inherent distancing between 
its referents and audience. And, given film’s temporal dimension, its ongoing movement 
toward something more in a material scene, an anticipated cinema proves a suitable 
vehicle for Utterson’s dreams of addictively ongoing, vicarious exploration.  
 
Material Immateriality 
Utterson, wine-drinking Dr. Lanyon, and potion-swilling Dr. Jekyll all come to 
understand their city through drinks that compel mediated, rambling attention to 
otherness. Dr. Lanyon, having directly encountered the material core of this novella’s 
mysterious possibility (having witnessed the Jekyll/Hyde transformation), even argues for 
the importance in maintaining a relationship with possibility rather than totally resolved 
revelation. “Well, life has been pleasant,” he says, recalling a lifetime of investigation. “I 
liked it; yes, sir, I used to like it. I sometimes think if we knew all, we should be more 
glad to get away” (32). Such an investigator has enjoyed not knowing or having it all. His 
indolently addiction-like hopes direct his thoughts toward the possible instead of 
attainment, and he describes in optative language of “should” how we would recoil at 
meeting with absolute possession of knowledge: we would immediately react in terms of 
what we “should be glad to” do, with a sense of what we wished: in optative terms. 
These habitual investigators reproduce possible worlds for one another, as well, 
because their addictive habits are so socially embedded and outwardly attentive. In the 
midst of their investigations, they share stories of places that feed one another’s sense of 
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there always being something more to explore. Enfield, while rambling through town, 
tells Utterson of “Blackmail House,” a merely possible designation for the place into 
which he had seen Hyde enter—a possible place, but a place to be investigated 
nonetheless (9). This shared world becomes enriched with mystery. The novella’s 
characters live with animating possibility discovered through never-satisfied 
investigations of the material all around them—they discover, in Jekyll’s words, “the 
shocking thing; that the slime of the pit seemed to utter cries and voices; that the 
amorphous dust gesticulated” (69).  
Jekyll himself uses a habitually imbibed substance to turn into Hyde and thus 
discover London’s slimy possibilities. His adventure is not quite Utterson’s, though—less 
comfortable, more dangerous—and their respective potions reflect this. As Vladimir 
Nabokov writes, “one recalls the wine that Utterson so comfortably sips. This sparkling 
and comforting draft is very different from the icy pangs caused by the chameleon liquor, 
the magic reagent that Jekyll brews in his dusty laboratory” (180). Yet both wine and the 
“chameleon liquor” advance plot as they are consumed repetitively, and both feed 
characters who drift through a murkily understood, labyrinthine city. More to the point, 
these habits actually cause, in both Utterson’s and Jekyll’s case, characters to enter into a 
narrative of investigation. Jekyll’s habit does so rather obviously, compelling him into the 
mysterious world of Hyde, while wine causes Utterson’s “eminently human” and 
“approved tolerance for others” to emerge, and addictively ongoing consumption then 
guides him regularly toward otherness (5).161 Utterson, however, by pursuing his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 In Inventing the Addict, Susan Zieger describes Jekyll and Hyde as Stevenson’s attempt to use 
classifications including addiction “in order to make a case against them. By doing so, he hoped to preserve 
a mode of homosocial conviviality, signaled by the loosening pleasure of alcohol” (194–195). See also 
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pleasures more comfortably, more indolently, and through more mediation, maintains a 
greater degree of safety and proto-cinematic appreciation of narrative.  
With Jekyll, we see the addict’s investigations go too far, until they unite possible 
with actual through dead material—“the body of a man sorely contorted and still 
twitching . . . the face of Edward Hyde” (44). Until then, characters move from one solid 
point to other possibilities, exploring a place through optative rambling—as with Hyde’s 
poorly elaborated exploits stemming from Jekyll’s lurid desires, and as with Utterson’s 
strolls with his relative Enfield that lead him to consider what he “would.” This is a 
condition Michel de Certeau has found in the city always being produced by consumers, 
never firmly established as a fixed place: “The moving about that the city multiplies and 
concentrates,” he writes, “makes the city itself an immense social experience of lacking a 
place” (Certeau 103). Robert Mighall notes, too, of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, “The 
narrative suggests a disruption enacted in terms of class and urban geography. Part of the 
horror with which Jekyll’s circle regards Hyde is owing to his lack of deference and his 
not knowing his place” (151).162 Jekyll, Utterson, and Enfield are all also identified by 
consumption habits that compel them about the city, becoming ramblers without a clearly 
defined, static place, all in pursuit of the possibility represented by Hyde, a being of the 
most intense and criminal possibility. 
But Hyde, for all his possibilities, also represents ultimate materiality in the 
story—a paradox, except perhaps for one as familiar with Keats as Stevenson was. For 
both writers, repetitive and sick material experience compelled the mind to think beyond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gwen Hyman’s Making a Man: Gentlemanly Appetites in the Nineteenth-Century British Novel for more 
on the relationship between Victorian masculinity and consumption. 
162 Peter Ackroyd observes a similar blurring of physical specificity in the novel, calling Dr Jekyll and Mr 
Hyde the “greatest novel of London fog . . . in which the fable of changing identities and secret lives takes 
place within the medium of the city’s ‘shifting insubstantial mists’” (Ackroyd 430). 
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the mundane.163 Thus while Hyde is himself excessively material, he unleashes the full 
force of the imaginative element of the novel’s plot. “Mr Hyde,” we are told, is 
physically notable, but so much so that he evades description; he “was pale and dwarfish, 
he gave an impression of deformity without any nameable malformation” (16). 
Stevenson’s addicted characters habitually circle around this and related kinds of living, 
breathing, speaking materiality that can be described in any number of ways; they are 
addictively drawn to material experience rich with possibility, and Hyde’s very being is 
the product of Jekyll’s addictive desires for material possibility. Jekyll recognizes this 
ultimate link between possibility and materiality; as he puts it, he discovers a “trembling 
immateriality, the mist-like transience, of this seemingly so solid body in which we walk 
attired” (56). That experience of trembling solidity, he says, “braced and delighted me 
like wine” (57). Here Jekyll describes an alcoholic aesthetic experience of imagined 
movement—the enjoyment of a bodiless body, of material trembling into something 
immaterial, something different from immediate actuality. 
The story ends when its core material mystery is dispelled, when Hyde is no 
longer distanced or mediated from the world of Jekyll and instead joins with Jekyll 
completely via their shared corpse. There are fewer possibilities, at last, for the addicted 
investigators to ponder. Until this point, possibility and animating mystery flourish in the 
novella’s foggy London of alcoholic wanderers. Utterson, indolent as he is, has 
contemplated this world most safely, by ongoing movement accessible through 
imagination and mediation—through, especially, a dreamt-up scroll of lighted pictures.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Peter Brooks notes of nineteenth-century fiction that it is “as if the underworld of the transgressive and 
dangerous social elements were the last fund of ‘narratable’ material in an increasingly bland social and 
literary system” (Brooks 85). 
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